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THE NEW ANTI-FEDERALISM:

THE

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE-IMPOSED LIMITS
ON CONGRESSIONAL TERMS OF OFFICE
TROY ANDREW EID*
AND JIM KOLBE**

In November 1990, Colorado voters approved a state constitutional
amendment limiting the number of consecutive terms of office that its
U.S. Senators and Representatives may serve.1 By restricting its members of Congress to a maximum twelve years of continuous service, Colorado became the first state to impose term limits on federal
officeholders. 2 Supporters of the fledgling "term limitation movement"
predict the other twenty-four states that allow citizen initiatives will soon
follow Colorado's lead, pressuring Congress "to impose term limits on
'3
itself or face the very real prospect of a constitutional convention."
* Law Clerk to Judge Edith H. Jones, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit.
Member of the Colorado bar. A.B. 1986, Stanford University;J.D. 1991, The University of
Chicago.
** U.S. Representative from Arizona, 1984 to present. B.A. 1965, Northwestern
University; M.B.A. 1967, Stanford University; member, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on State, Commerce and the Judiciary; and the House Budget Committee. A county supervisor's efforts to challenge Kolbe in the 1982 Republican primary
election led to Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002
(1983) (upholding Arizona's "resign-to-run" requirement for state officeholders seeking
election to Congress). Joyner is discussed infra notes 300-306 and accompanying text.
Highlights of this article appeared in The Wall Street Journal. See Jim Kolbe, Term
Limits are Unconstitutional,WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1992, at A15.
The authors thank Michael W. McConnell, Jonathan R. Macey, Allison Hartwell Eid,
and Richard A. "Rowdy" Yeates for their help with earlier drafts. Thanks also to Sandra
L. Eid for research assistance; Theresa Peterson for secretarial services; the law firm of
Holme, Roberts & Owen in Denver, Colorado; and the Bradley Foundation and the Program in Law & Government at The University of Chicago Law School.
1. The initiative, Amendment 5, also imposed term limits on members of the Colorado General Assembly and top executive branch officials. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE
COLORADO GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AN ANALYSIS OF 1990 BALLOT PROPOSALS 19 (Research

Publication No. 350, 1990) [hereinafter LEGIS. COUNCIL ANALYSIS].
2. See, e.g., U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,July 29, 1991, at 6; WALL ST.J.,July 17, 1991,
at Al0; John Andrews, Colorado's Term Limitation an Examplefor Rest of Nation, THE CAPITOL
REP. (Denver), April 29, 1991, at 8 ("Coloradans can take pride that our state stands alone,
first in the union and leading the way for all the other states, on returning the Congress
from the arrogance of permanent incumbency to the responsiveness of a citizen legislature."). In contrast, a term limitation initiative approved the same day by California voters, Proposition 140, applies solely to state officials. See N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1990, at B9.
Oklahoma also approved state term limits. Neal Pierce, Term Limitation Movement Shakes Up
the Political Establishment, DENY. POST, Sept. 23, 1990, at 4D. Unless otherwise indicated,
this article uses the phrases "term limits" and "term limitation" solely to denote restrictions on the eligibility of members of Congress to seek re-election; it does not refer to
similar restrictions on state officeholders.
3. Edward H. Crane, Term Limitation: The End of the Imperial Congress, CATO POL'Y REP.,
Nov./Dec. 1990, at 2. For an excellent overview of the term limitation movement and its
agenda, seejeffery L. Katz, The UnchartedRealm of Term Limitation, GOVERNING,Jan. 1991, at
34. See alsoJames K. Coyne, Term Limitation: Bringing Change, Competition, Control and Chal-
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The movement, loosely coordinated by two national organizations,
Americans to Limit Congressional Terms (ALCT) and Citizens for Congressional Reform (CCR), has won the backing of several prominent
political commentators, 4 the Republican Party, 5 and President George
Bush, who carried the issue to the states in 1990 while campaigning in
state and congressional elections. 6 Supporters report that grassroots
term limit campaigns are now underway in at least twenty states, 7 and
several national opinion polls suggest most Americans favor congres8
sional term limitation.
A driving force behind the'movement's popular appeal is the relatively low turnover in Congress in recent years. Many commentators
from across the political spectrum see today's high rates of incumbency
as symptomatic of a failing democracy. 9 Modern incumbency rates of
lenges to Congress, 331 THE HERITAGE LECTURES 1 (1991). Thus far, the movement has been

unsuccessful in persuading Congress to restrict its own tenure. Six measures were introduced in the 101st Congress to limit terms of office, none of which passed either house.
LEGIS. COUNCIL ANALYSIS at 21. By comparison, during the first six months of 1991, 148

bills were introduced in 45 states to limit the terms of political officeholders ranging from
members of Congress to county commissioners. CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 29, 1991,
at 8.
4. A few notable examples include Richard Cohen of The Washington Post and syndicated columnists Ellen Goodman and Richard Reeves. SeeJohn H. Fund, Liberalsfor Term
Limits, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1991, at A16.
5. The GOP endorsed congressional term limits in its 1988 party platform. Memorandum from Sula P. Richardson, Library of Congress, Congressional Tenure: A Review of
Efforts to Limit House and Senate Service 11 (Sept. 13, 1989) [hereinafter Richardson].
6. See On the Record, NAT'L REV., Nov. 19, 1990 at 1.0; Fred Barnes, Quayle Alert; Bush
Health Troubles and Public Worries About the Vice President, NEW REPUBLIC, May 27, 1991, at I 1
(crediting Vice President Quayle with "clearing the way" for the President's subsequent
endorsement of congressional term limitation). Bush is not the first President to favor
term limitation. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy also backed proposals to
limit congressional tenure. See Mark P. Petracca, The Poison of ProfessionalPolitics, 151 CATO
INST. POL'Y ANALYSIS 21 (May 10, 1991).

7. See CHI. TRIB.,July 14, 1991, at C13. According to ALCT, the states most likely to
vote on congressional term limitation in 1992 are Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota and Wyoming. PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, July 7, 1991,

reported in AM. POL. NETWORK HOTLINE, July 10, 1991. Petitions have already been filed in
Massachusetts, see BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 8, 1991, at 34. Term limit activity has also been
reported in Alaska, Georgia, Texas and Wisconsin, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, supra, and in

South Carolina, USA TODAY, Mar. 12, 1991, at 6A.
The term limitation movement suffered a setback in November, 1991, when voters in
Washington State unexpectedly rejected Initiative 553, which would have limited the
terms of the state's congressional delegation. See Deborah Privitera, Washington State's Defeat of Term Limits Stirs Debate, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 17, 1991, at 26A. Unlike the measure
approved last year in Colorado, Initiative 553 would have applied retroactively. Its "threeterms-and-out" rule would have involuntarily retired House Speaker Thomas S. Foleyand every other member of Washington's House delegation-in 1994. Ronald D. Elving,
National Drive to Limit Terms Casts Shadow over Congress, CONG. Q., Oct. 26, 1991, at 3101.
Arguing that the initiative was unconstitutional, Foley and others initially tried to exclude
553 from the November ballot. The Washington Supreme Court, however, denied their
request, holding that there was not enough time to consider the issue. See Dan Balz, Washington State Voters Weigh Term Limitsfor Elected Officials, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 8, 1991, at 15A.
8. For instance, 70% of the respondents to a Gallup Poll conducted for the National
Foundation of Independent Business in December 1989 and January 1990 favored such
limits. See Mike Kelly, Limit Terms, Expand Democracy, INDEPENDENCE ISSUE PAPER No. 10-90

(Independence Institute, Golden, Colo.) July 18, 1990, at 1.
9. Compare, for example, the sentiment expressed in a fundraising letter written by
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near 90% are the highest since the middle of President George Washington's first term.1 0 During the early 1800s, congressional turnover per
election increased substantially. By the time of the Civil War, fewer
than 2% of House members served more than twelve years. Overall, reelection rates in the 19th Century ranged from between 40% and 70%,
with an all-time low of 24% in 1842.12 After World War I, re-election
13
rates surpassed 70%o and have generally been climbing ever since.
Most recently, despite predictions that voters would vent their frustrations in the 1990 congressional elections, 96% of incumbent U.S.
Representatives and Senators prevailed in their re-election bids, compared to 98% in 1988 and 1986, and 95% in 1984.14 One journalist
spoke for many by observing that "the power of incumbency for those
on Capitol Hill proved considerable even in the face of populist
rumblings.... [N]ot many of the rascals were thrown out, for all the
hullabaloo." 1 5 However, low turnover in the 1990 elections-and the
unwillingness of Congress to impose term limits on itself-has
prompted activists to carry their campaign to the states with an intensity
that would have been unthinkable only a few years ago.
Term limit opponents, taken aback by the movement's sudden
strength, warn that such restrictions would deprive Congress of badly
needed leadership and expertise. 1 6 Many of the movement's critics
Republican State Senator Terry Considine, chairman of Colorado's term-limit campaign
organization ("Democracy in America is in trouble.... We have learned through bitter
experience that Thomas Jefferson was right when he warned that professional politicians
are a danger to American liberty and prosperity.") (Sept. 12, 1990) (on file with the authors) with the views of liberal pundit Lewis H. Lapham:
Mhe politicians in the Capitol speak with only one voice, which is the voice of
the oligarchy that buys the airline tickets and television images ... the voice of
only one kind of functionary: a full-time politician, nearly always a lawyer, who
spends at least 80 percent of his time raising campaign funds and construes his
function as that of a freight-forwarding agent redistributing the national income
into venues convenient to his owners and friends.
Lewis H. Lapham, Democracy in America? Not Only the Economy is in Decline, HARPER'S MAG.,
Nov. 1990, at 47, 52-53.
Indeed, the Wall Street Journal's John Fund has recently documented the growing
popularity of term limitation among liberal Democrats, many of whom see the movement
as a means of removing moderate and conservative incumbents from Congress. Left-ofcenter public figures who call themselves term-limit supporters include former California
Governor and presidential candidate Edmund G. "Jerry" Brown, Jr.; former U.S. Representative Shirley Chisholm; and activist Ralph Nader. Fund, supra note 4.
10. Hendrik Hertzberg, Twelve is Enough, NEw REPUBLIC, May 14, 1990, at 23.
11.

See generally JAMES STERLING YOUNG, THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY, 1800-1828

(1966).
12. John H. Fund, There's No Debate-The Career Congress Lives, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11,
1991, at A14.
13. Hertzberg, supra note 10.
14. Had nationwide term limitation been enacted twelve years ago, it would now disqualify 347o of Congress's current members. Id. From 1977 to 1989, for example, turnover in the U.S. House and Senate averaged 62% and 53%, respectively. See Karl T. Kurtz,
Limiting Terms of Office Would Cripple State Legislatures, DENY. POST, Sept. 23, 1990, at 4D.
15. R.W. Apple,Jr., The Big Vote Is for 'No', N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1990 at Al, B6. However, the margin of re-election for many incumbents was narrower in 1990 than in other
elections of the recent past. In particular, the number of House incumbents re-elected
with 60%o of the vote or less was twice as high as two years before. See id.
16. See, e.g., David S. Broder, Term Limits Could Cause a Brain Drain, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 18,
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share its desire for congressional reform, especially of campaign financing laws that shield incumbents from viable challengers. 17 But critics
fear term limits would hurt the democratic process by increasing the
clout of political action committees and special-interest groups in shaping national legislation.' 8 Less-experienced legislators, they argue,
would be even more dependent on private lobbyists for guidance; term
limits prevent voters from retaining veteran legislators who have served
them well in the past. 19
To further their cause, term limit foes have formed Let the People
Decide, a group based in Washington, D.C. and headed by Melvin R.
Laird, a former U.S. Representative and Secretary of Defense under
President Nixon. 20 Just as the movement's supporters hail from across
the political spectrum, its critics range from organized labor groups such
as the AFL-CIO, to former Reagan Administration officials William
Bradford Reynolds and Bruce Fein. 2 1 The result has been one of the
most interesting political discussions in recent years.
Ironically, both sides have mostly ignored the federal constitutional
implications that should be central to the term limit debate. The Colorado amendment obliquely raised the possibility that term limits may be
unconstitutional by encouraging "the federal officials elected from Colorado to voluntarily observe" 22 the limits on congressional terms of of1990, § 4, at 3; Pat M. Holt, Term Limits Would Throw Out the Able with the Inept, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MoNIToR, Jan. 3, 1991, at 19.
17. See, e.g., David S. Broder, A Reluctant Voice for Campaign Reform, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9,
1990, § 4, at 3; Thomas E. Cronin, Term Limits-A Symptom, Not a Cure, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
1990, at Eli. It is interesting to note that in every congressional election since 1974,
when the current federal campaign finance system was enacted, at least 90% of incumbents seeking re-election were retained. Hertzberg, supra note 10, at 23.
18. See, e.g., Eleanor Clift, Term Limits Won't Work, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 11, 1991, at 30.
Clift notes that "unless term limits are accompanied by campaign-finance reform, legislators would still be dependent on PAC [political action committee] money." Id at 30-31.
Others charge that the term limit movement is itself driven by special interests, noting that
CCR received its seed money-about $400,000-from brothers Charles G. and David H.
Koch, chairman and executive vice-president, respectively, of Koch Industries, Inc., a privately held, diversified energy company in Wichita, Kansas. Paula Dwyer, Term Limits: Popular Revolt or Extremist Crusade?, Bus. WK., Nov. 11, 1991, at 40. Dwyer concludes: "[Tihe
reality doesn't bear out the populist myth. The term-limit crusade may have begun as a
citizens' movement. But it has been taken over by big money." Id. See generally Bill
Hornby, Terms Limits Involve People in High Places, DENY. POST, Nov. 5, 1991, at A20.
19. See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, Why Americans Hate Politicians,TIME, Dec. 9, 1991,
at 92. Krauthammer concludes: "The case for term limits rests on the proposition that if
you scramble eggs, you reduce the cholesterol. Throwing out today's rascals is cathartic
but hardly a solution. There is not a shred of evidence that newer, less experienced politicians will make more effective legislators." Id.
20. David S. Broder, Labor, Laird to Oppose Term Limits, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1991, at
AS. Like Laird's group, ALCT is chaired by a former GOP House member, James K.
Coyne.

21. Id.; Bruce Fein & William B. Reynolds, Term Limits: Why Oust Good Incumbents?
TEX. LAW., Dec. 17, 1990, at 24. See also Bruce Fein, From California,A Troubling Ruling on
Term Limits, Id., Nov. 4, 1991, at 15.
22. LEGIS. COUNCIL ANALYSIS, supra note 1 (text of amendment) (emphasis added). A
brochure distributed to voters by the Colorado term limit campaign organization explains
that the constitutionality of its proposal "is an unsettled area of constitutional law."
COLORADANS BACK IN CHARGE, RESPONSES TO CONCERNS ABOUT TERM LIMITATIONS (undated) (on file with the authors) [hereinafter TERM LIMrrATIONS]. Given this uncertainty,
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fice should the courts later invalidate them. Thus far, however, the term
limitation movement and its critics have confined their dialogue to public policy arguments without reference to the Constitution's text, structure and history, or to the U.S. Supreme Court decisions that bear on
the question. As this article concludes, there is strong reason to believe
that congressional term limits are unconstitutional. The reluctance of
some movement leaders to confront this fact creates false expectations
among voters who support such restrictions. Voters who believe states
can limit congressional terms without running afoul of the U.S. Constitution are likely to be disappointed.
As section I of this article shows, the framers of the Constitution
considered and rejected term limits for members of Congress. Several
prominent Anti-Federalists advocated such restrictions for Congress as
well as for the President, and the delegates at the Constitutional Convention considered proposals to this effect. 2 3 Yet the framers voted to
delete term limits from the final text of the Constitution, apparently because they believed other institutional safeguards, such as frequent elec24
tions, would be sufficient to control congressional abuses of power.
Moreover, neither the states nor Congress may impose such limits
without impermissibly adding to the Constitution's standing qualifications for congressional service. As section II of this article argues, the
founders intended for the Standing Qualifications Clauses in Article 125
to be the exclusive list of restrictions on congressional eligibility. Section III notes that the Tenth Congress rejected one state's attempt to
"superadd" qualifications to its U.S. Representatives in 1807, and while
later Congresses have occasionally imposed their own membership qualifications, the Supreme Court has since limited this practice. 2 6 The sec"[t]he language used in drafting the term limit proposal makes it plain that the federal
term limits can be severed from the rest of the bill, so if the federal term limits are challenged in court, and the court throws them out, that action would have no effect on the
rest of the measure." Id.
23. See infra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
25. These clauses establish age, residency and citizenship requirements for U.S. Representatives and Senators. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cI. 2 (Representatives must be twentyfive years of age, have seven years' citizenship in the United States, and state residency);
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (Senators must be thirty years of age, have nine years' residency in the United States, and state residency).
26. Article I, Section 5, Clause 1 of the Constitution provides that "Each House Shall
be the judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members." Congress
has relied on this section to establish procedures for governing disputed elections. 2
U.S.C. §§ 381-96 (1982). See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 97
(1988). In its most recent decision, however, the U.S. Supreme Court rebuffed Congress's
efforts to use Article I, Section 5 to create new substantive qualifications for its members.
The decision, Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), is discussed infra notes 227-43
and accompanying text. Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment creates a narrow exception,
now of only historical interest, to the Standing Qualifications of Article I:
No person shall be a Senator or Representative of Congress . . . who, having
previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress ... to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against
the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a
vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
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tion also addresses Thomas Jefferson's suggestion that states retain the
power under the Tenth Amendment 2 7 to impose additional qualifications on their federal representatives. Jefferson's view does not adequately address the fact that federal power comes directly from the
people, through the Constitution, rather than from the states. Because
the Constitution fixes the standing qualifications for U.S. Representatives and Senators, the states do not retain powers they never had.
The article closes in section IV by examining a theory that is rapidly
gaining popularity among term limit supporters: that Article I, Section
4,28 which empowers Congress and the states to regulate "the Times,
Places and Manner" of congressional elections, also permits them to declare incumbent U.S. Senators and Representatives ineligible to stand
for re-election.2 9 We conclude that neither the states nor Congress can
use the Times, Places, and Manner Clause as a vehicle to read the standing qualifications out of Article I because the Clause applies solely to
federal election procedures, and not to the substance of office-holding.
Whatever the merits of congressional term limits, they will become
a reality only through an amendment to the U.S. Constitution, rather
than through piecemeal, state-imposed measures. 3 0 If term limitation
supporters are serious about achieving their objectives, they should focus on the constitutional amendment process. 3 ' Although Congress
could propose a constitutional amendment, it is unlikely to limit its own
32
terms-a reality of which term limit supporters are keenly aware.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3. See generally P. Allen Dionisopoulos, A Commentary on the
ConstitutionalIssues in the Powell and Related Cases, 17J. PUB. L. 103, 111-15 (1968).
27. U.S. CONsT. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.").
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except
as to the Places of chusing Senators.").
29. For arguments in favor of reading a substantive component into the Times, Places
and Manner Clause, see, e.g., Steven Glazier, Each State Can Limit Re-Election to Congress,
WALL ST.J.,June 19, 1990, at A20; Editorial, Elections That Count, WALL ST.J.,July 5, 1990,
at A1O (supporting Glazier); and Miles C. Cortez & Christopher T. Macaulay, The Constitutionality of Term Limitation, 19 CoLo. LAw. 2193, 2196 (Nov. 1990).
30. This is not to say, however, that the movement toward state-imposed term limitation has had no political effect. Indeed, some commentators believe the term limitation
movement is primarily responsible for Congress's renewed interest in.campaign finance
reform. Keith White, Senate Grapples with Campaign FinanceReform, Gannett News Service,
May 19, 1991, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, GNS file (citing pressure created by the
Colorado amendment on Senate efforts to reform federal campaign finance laws).
31. A constitutional amendment can be proposed in one of two ways. First, Congress
can propose an amendment "whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary ....
U.S. CONST., art. V. Alternatively, Congress "shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments" if asked to do so by two-thirds of the states. Id An amendment
proposed through either method becomes part of the Constitution after it has been ratified by three-fourths of the states. Id. For an overview of the constitutional convention
amendment process, see JAMES E. BOND, DAVID E. ENGDAHL & HENRY N. BUTLER, THE

CONSTrrTUTIONAL CONVErrIoN (Nat'l. Legal Ctr. for the Pub. Interest, Oct. 1987).
32. See comments of CCR President Paul Becker, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1991, at A4
("Congress probably finds any limit to their terms unacceptable. We know we must go
around Congress and impose strict limits.").
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Term limit supporters should concentrate on obtaining the thirty-four
states needed to convene a constitutional convention, instead of engaging in costly and time-consuming deliberations over initiatives like Colorado's that cannot pass muster in the courts, regardless of their merits as
public policy.
I. TERM LIMrrs AND THE FOUNDING
Prior to the 1990 Colorado initiative, no state had ever limited the
number of consecutive terms of office its members of Congress could
serve. 3 3 Arguments for and against congressional term limits, however,
are as old as the United States. In 1776, Thomas Jefferson proposed a
resolution in the Continental Congress urging the states to restrict their
representatives to two years of service. 34 just as many of today's reformers believe that low turnover in Congress threatens democracy, Jefferson warned:
To prevent every danger which might arise to American freedom by continuing too long in office the members of the Continental Congress, to preserve to that body the confidence of
their friends, and to disarm the malignant imputation of their
enemies: It is earnestly recommended to the several provinces,
assemblies or conventions of the United Colonies, that in their
future elections of delegates to the Continental Congress, one
half, at least, of the persons chosen be such as were not of the
delegation preceding, and the residue be of such as shall not
have served in that office longer than two years. 3 5
36
Jefferson's colleagues defeated his resolution.
There is no record of the debate over the resolution. Yet, assuming
a majority of members opposed term limitation, they acted consistently
with the English tradition. Members of the British House of Commons,
37
who then served seven-year terms, were eligible to seek re-election.
Jefferson, then, was pressing an idea that must have seemed novel at the
time.
In designing their system of separated and enumerated powers, the
founders did not entirely reject the English experience. Instead, they
incorporated many of its best features into the framework for their new
republic, while designing safeguards to prevent oppression. Bothieffer33. See Kelly, supra note 8, at 6.
34. Id. at 8.
35. Id
36. Id. at 9. Notably, however, Jefferson's home state of Virginia seems to have followed his advice, at least in part. The following year, Virginia's legislature approved a
resolution providing that "[n]o person who shall have served two years in Congress, shall
be capable of serving therein again, till he shall have been out of the same one whole
year." Id.
37. See, e.g., 10 WILLIAM HOLDSWORrH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 598 (1938). By
comparison, membership in the House of Lords, which the Federalists derided as a "hereditary assembly of opulent nobles," was not limited to a specific length of time. THE
FEDERALIST No. 63, at 430 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (responding to
Anti-Federalist criticism that the proposed Senate, with its six-year terms, would create an
aristocracy similar to the House of Lords).
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son and the framers of the Constitution hoped to spare the emerging
nation from the sort of tyranny that dominated Parliament under King
George III. Yet, just as Jefferson's fellow members of the Continental
Congress defeated his term limitation resolution, so too did the delegates at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 reject such restrictions
in the text of the final document.
A.

The Imperial Parliament

The American Colonists were keenly aware of what legal historian
William Holdsworth has called the "imperial Parliament" of King
George 111,38 for they were its victims. Their rallying cry of "taxation
without representation" helped spark a revolution.3 9 But the men who
would become the founding fathers also had more specific grievances
against Parliament, including the so-called standing incapacities, which
denied membership in Parliament to the vast majority of the British
population; a system of elections that legitimated bribery and corruption; and the House of Commons' self-proclaimed right to refuse to seat
40
even duly elected members without justification.
Practically speaking, George III's subjects could claim a "House of
Commons" in name only. His kingdom's unwritten constitution-that
is, its parliamentary customs and traditions, augmented by statute-rendered most classes of persons completely ineligible to be House members, let alone vote. The standing incapacities recognized in Great
Britain at the time of America's Declaration of Independence included
certain members of the clergy, women, aliens, minors, persons attainted
of treason or felony, judges who sat in the House of Lords, Royal officers and tax collectors, and sheriffs, mayors and bailiffs seeking to represent their own jurisdictions. 4 1 Moreover, a statute passed during the
reign of Queen Anne in 1710 required that members hold certain
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 559.
39. At the Stamp Act Congress of 1765, the Colonists rejected "virtual representation," the doctrine by which the Crown claimed the right to tax them without formal representation in Parliament. English defenders of the Stamp Act had insisted that the
Colonists were no different than other disenfranchised persons living in the kingdom, such
as women and non-freeholders: "All British Subjects . . . are virtually represented in Parliament; for every Member of Parliament sits in the House, not as Representative of his
own Constituents, but as one of that august Assembly by which all the Commons of Great
Britain are represented." THOMAS WHATELY, THE REGULATIONS LATELY MADE CONCERNING
THE COLONIES AND THE TAXES IMPOSED UPON THEM, CONSIDERED 104-109 (London, 1765),
reprintedin EDMUND S. MORGAN & HELEN M. MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT CRISIS 106 (1963)
(emphasis in original). In response, the delegates to the Stamp Act Congress declared
"that no Taxes be imposed on [his Majesty's Subjects in these Colonies], but with their
own Consent, given personally, or by their Representatives ....
[Tihe people of these
Colonies are not, and from their local Circumstances cannot be, Represented in the House
of Commons in Great Britain." Declarationsof the Stamp Act Congress, Oct. 7-24, in Proceedingsof
the Congress at New York (Annapolis, 1766), reprintedin MORGAN, supra at 143.
40. This latter point arose in the notorious case of John Wilkes, a popular member
whom the House of Commons expelled for seditious libel in 1769 and later refused to seat
even after he was re-elected three times. See infra notes 135-150 and accompanying text.
41. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES 169-70 (1765), cited in 2 THE FOUNDERS' CoNsTrrTrON 68-69 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter THE
38.

FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION].
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amounts and types of property. The statute, which aimed at preserving
the ascendancy of the landed gentry in the House of Commons, remained in force until 1838.42 Finally, members were required to swear
an oath whose religious tenets effectively barred service by Roman
Catholics, Quakers and Jews. 43 The standing incapacities helped produce a legislature so homogenous that "it often happened that a seat in
the House of Commons became as hereditary as an estate or as a seat in
44
the House of Lords."
England's election system reinforced this homogeneity. Despite
several anemic attempts at reform, the buying and selling of seats in the
House of Commons persisted on a massive scale throughout the 18th
century. In counties and boroughs alike, a handful of wealthy landowners, nobles and wealthy merchants, loosely known as patrons, wielded
almost plenary power over the election process. The patrons not only
selected House candidates and funded their campaigns, but sometimes
"elected" them without any polling. 45 The elections themselves were
mostly pro forma, returning the patrons' relatives and friends to office
time and again. As one historian has noted:
Of no less than 30 among the 80 knights of the shires returned
in 1761, the fathers had previously represented the same counties, while another 19 had been preceded by more distant ancestors in the direct male line; together 49 out of 80 can be said
to have inherited their seats. Of another 20, ancestors in the
direct male line had sat in Parliament, though for different constituencies, and
only 11 were without Parliamentary ancestry in
46
the male line.
The most influential patrons exerted a disproportionate impact
over an already corrupt process. For instance, an observer of the elections of 1780 claimed that the two or three wealthiest patrons in Great
Britain controlled nearly one-quarter of all members elected to Parliament. 4 7 If the patrons in every county were to unite, he continued, "they
could nominate every county member except one." 4 8 By another contemporary estimate, 307 members-a majority of the House-were returned to Parliament by only 154 persons. 4 9 So thoroughly did the
borough patrons dominate elections that a market developed in House
seats, which sold at an average price of £2,000 each by 1761.50
Members of Parliament shared in the spoils of the system. At a time
when government service was mostly unpaid, and purchasing a seat ex42.

HOLDSWORTH,supra note 37, at 553-54.

43. Id.
44. Id.at 557.
45. HoLDswoRTH,supra note 37, at 557-58. During the 18th century, there were 513
English and Welsh members of the House of Commons. Of these, 94 represented the
counties, 415 the boroughs, and 4 the universities of Oxford and Cambridge. Id. at 563.
46. Id. at 557 n.5 (citing historian Lewis B. Namier).
47. HOLDSWORTH,supra note 37, at 557.
48. Id.
49. IM at 576 n.3.
50. Id. at 576.
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pensive, many members expected to profit handsomely during their tenure. Members who bought their seats expected to see their money back
in the shape of an office, appointment or commendation, a pension, or
simply a cash payment.5 1 As one Whig who had served seventeen years
in the House wrote in 1757, "I have ever apprehended it to be reasonable that those who dedicate their time and fortune to the service of the
Government should be entitled to a share of the rewards that are in its
disposal .... 52 Nor was the national treasury the sole source of a member's wealth. The patrons who sold members their seats often reinvested the proceeds to support the members in office. This helped
defray not only the expense of members' gifts to voters and local officials both during and after the campaign, but also the costs of the elec53
tion itself.
This last point bears repeating. Challengers not only had to fund
their own campaigns, but were expected to help pay for the polls as well.
Not surprisingly, truly contested elections were infrequent, but those
that did occur-usually between rival noble families or merchant interests-were expensive. A host of election officials, representing both the
Crown and local authorities, routinely exacted various fees for their
services without any statutory authority. 54 For patrons who could afford
the initial investment, however, a successful election was often well
worth the cost; they could expect to see the resources of the central
government diverted to their parochial interests. Given the high stakes,
patrons whose boroughs dared show independence at the polls risked
painful consequences. Such was the case, for instance, when the Duke
of Newcastle's candidate was rejected at Lewes in 1768:
IT]he tenants who had voted for Colonel Hay, the successful
candidate, were given notice to quit at Michaelmas. The constables at Lewes were informed that his Grace withdrew his interest from the town, that he would no longer contribute to
their entertainments, as he had been accustomed to do, that the
plate which they had on loan from him for use on ceremonial
occasions was to be returned. He would refrain from his usual
endeavors to have the assizes fixed at Lewes. All tradesmen
who had dared to vote against him were forthwith to lose his
custom. If there were rewards for compliance, there was the
risk of incurring severe penalties in case of disobedience ....55
By offering this brief introduction to a few of the abuses of the English Parliament at the time of the American Revolution, we do not mean
to suggest that every member of Parliament was corrupt, that all elections were rigged, or that the rest of society was indifferent to the mischief it observed. On the contrary, a rising chorus of reformers, among
51. Id. at 580.
52. Id. at 578 n.l.
53. Id. at 577. Consequently, brokering seats was primarily a means for the patrons to
gain access to favorable legislation and other government benefits; it was seldom profitable in itself.
54. Id. at 571.
55. Id. at 576 n.2.
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them such prominent figures as Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, de56
manded various changes to parliamentary practice and procedure.
One reformer of particular interest is Richard Price, whose 1776
pamphlet, Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, 57 sharply criticized
England's treatment of the Colonists. Price called for shortening the
length of the seven-year parliamentary session, 58 a proposal which
would undermine the patrons-the driving force behind parliamentary
corruption-by making it more expensive to broker elections. Many patrons already found it unduly costly and time-consuming to manage
elections once every seven years. 59 More frequent elections would diminish patron control over the election process. This, in turn, might
lead to serious competition for House seats. In theory, at least, even
challengers with modest financial backing could wage. credible
campaigns..
Although figures such as William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, also favored
shorter parliamentary sessions, 60 the reform movement languished as
George III consolidated power. A few members who engaged in the
most flagrant abuses were punished, but Parliament as an institution
went unchanged. Chatham captured the frustration of many when he
61
wrote in 1771 that "the whole constitution is a shadow."
The failure of the reform movement in England also had profound
consequences for the Colonists. The leaders of the American Revolution-many of the same men who would later become the Federalists
and Anti-Federalists-were well-acquainted with the larger pattern of
parliamentary corruption which touched their everyday lives. 6 2 Thus, it
was no accident that the founders crafted a constitution with numerous
checks and balances on Congress's authority, including dramatically
shorter terms for what was then its "popular branch," the House of
63
Representatives.
In contrast, the Constitution did not expressly disqualify incumbents from running in those same elections. Jefferson's term limit resolution of 1776, and similar proposals that followed, show that the
founders had ample opportunity to restrict incumbency if they had so
56. Id. at 117.
57. RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY, THE PRINCIPLES
OF JUSTICE AND POLICY OF THE WAR WrrH AMERICA (Feb. 8, 1776).

58. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 117. See generally PRICE, supra note 57.
59. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 577. Indeed, it was the rise of the aristocracy in
the House of Commons that led to the passage of the Septennial Act, which lengthened
parliamentary sessions from three to seven years. The Act was unpopular with the public
for another reason: it entitled the members who enacted it, who had been elected for
three-year terms, to serve another four years without any elections. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 61 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)(discussing the transcendent
and uncontrolled authority of Parliament).
60. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 100, 102 n.4.
61. Id. at 101 n.1.
62. As Holdsworth concludes, "[t]his Parliamentary tyranny . . . was the principal
cause of the American war of independence." Id. at 102.
63. Until the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, the state legislatures
chose the Senators who represented their states in Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, c. 2.
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desired. The absence of a term limitation provision in the final document ratified by the states suggests a continuation of the English tradition, whereby legislators remained eligible for re-election as the voters
saw fit. The events surrounding the Constitutional Convention, and the
deliberations themselves, reinforce this view.
B.

Federalists,Anti-Federalists and the Convention

In 1777, the Articles of Confederation limited congressional delegates to three years of service. 64 Prior to that time, the states re-elected
those delegates who wished to continue serving in Congress "almost as
a matter of course."'6 5 More importantly, the Constitution that replaced
the Articles in 1789 did not incorporate any such restrictions on incumbency. This omission is all the more striking because the original draft
of the Constitution, the so-called Virginia Plan offered by Edmund Randolph, declared U.S. Representatives "to be incapable of re-election for
the space of - after the expiration of their term of service ...
.
Rather than fill in this blank space as the Convention progressed,
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina moved to eliminate the provision
64. Because the Articles were not ratified until 1781, the term limitation provision
contained in Article 5 "did not actually take effect until 1784, when a handful of members
became ineligible for re-election." JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITIcS: AN INTERPRETATIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 218 (1979). Professor

Rakove notes that even if Article 5 had taken effect earlier, it would have been virtually
irrelevant to the actual composition of Congress:
Of the 235 delegates who attended Congress for a minimal period of four weeks
during any one calendar year between 1774 and 1783, 56 appeared in Congress
during one year only, another 65 were present during each of two years, while a
mere 53 attended during each of three.... [OInly 31 delegates, or one-eighth of
our total, served in Congress during each of the calendar years or more. By the
end of 1776, more than half of those who had attended Congress prior to the
Declaration of Independence had left its chambers for good.
Id.
Against this statistical backdrop, Rakove concludes that the term limitation provision
in Article 5 "clearly reflected the Americans' early commitment to the republican principle
of rotation in office, and in that sense may also have been a mark of the naivete with which
they initially weighed the merits of experience in government against the dangers of entrenched power." Id. He observes, for instance, that the vast majority of delegates who
served between 1774 and 1783 had extensive government experience; four out of five had
held office at the colony or statewide level. Id. at 224. Nonetheless, few of them wanted to
stay in Congress for very long. Many members found it difficult to serve in Congress
during wartime, and the job itself was extraordinarily expensive. Delegates were forced to
travel to sessions in such cities as Baltimore, Philadelphia and New York, taking them away
from their homes, families, livelihoods and, in many instances, their political careers in the
states, which in many ways were far more powerful than the central government. Id. at
236. Rakove concludes that "[tihe exercise of power was tedious, fatiguing, and damaging
to [the delegates'] private interests. So long as most delegates thought their attendance a
concession to patriotism rather than the fulfillment of their ambitions, Congress would be
condemned to muddling through to independence." Id at 238.
65. THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 364-65 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
66. JAMES MADISON, NoTEs OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 31

(Adrienne Koch, ed., 1966)(footnotes omitted)[hereinafter NoTEs]. Randolph offered this
draft on May 29, 1787, and it became the Convention's working plan. Significantly, the
Virginia Plan did not include term limits for Senators, an idea endorsed by at least one
Anti-Federalist. See infra text accompanying note 80.
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entirely. The delegates agreed and voted unanimously to delete the
67
term limit provision.
There are at least two plausible explanations for why the framers
failed to include congressional term limits in the final draft of the Constitution. 68 According to the first theory, the framers were largely ambivalent toward federal term limitation, preferring to let the states or
Congress settle the matter later, if at all. Adherents of this view stress
that while the Constitution does not expressly provide for federal term
limits, neither does it expressly prohibit states or Congress from imposing such restrictions. 6 9 The second explanation, in contrast, is that the
founders deliberately rejected term limits for both Congress and the
President, so that the Constitution ratified in 1789 forbids both Congress and the states from imposing such restrictions on federal
officeholders.
We conclude that the second explanation is more historically accurate. In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that it is sometimes difficult, if not impossible, to know the framers' precise intentions toward a
given subject. The founders, after all, were political leaders with diverse
interests and agendas. They left an incomplete paper trail for historians
trying to piece together their thinking on many matters, and they simply
could not have foreseen all of the challenges their democracy would face
in future years. Nonetheless, the framers expressly considered congressional term limitation. While the available evidence is not entirely unambiguous, on balance it strongly suggests the founders rejected such
restrictions.
1. Term Limits and the Anti-Federalist Agenda.
The campaign against ratifying the Constitution was already underway when the Convention met in May 1787. By September, the AntiFederalists had added several prominent Convention delegates to their
ranks, and details of the closed-door negotiations at Philadelphia were
being replayed in the public press. 70 The Federalists struck back quickly.
67. I at 109; 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 248 (Max
Farrand ed., 1937) [hereinafter Farrand].
68. By offering these two explanations, we do not mean to suggest that they are the
only possible interpretations of what happened at the Constitutional Convention. Our
purpose, rather, is to draw a basic distinction between: 1) an account of history in which
the Convention delegates did not forbid the states or Congress from imposing term limitation on members of Congress; and 2) an account of history in which the Convention delegates not only rejected term limits for members of Congress, but also precluded the states
or Congress from imposing such restrictions.
69. Jefferson's theory of unenumerated rights under the Tenth Amendment, revealed
in an 1814 letter to his friendjoseph C. Cabell, is consistent with this view. For a discussion of the Standing Qualification Clauses of the Constitution, and attempts by states to
interpose their own requirements on federal representatives, see infra notes 158-242 and
accompanying text.
70. When the Convention met for the first time in May, some delegates protested by
refusing to attend; Rhode Island, which declined to name any delegates, was unrepresented. Robert Yates and John Lansing of New York abandoned the Convention in early
July. Within two months, they were followed by Maryland's Luther Martin, whose "Genuine Information," a tract that purported to reveal the Convention's plot to replace state
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Their well-orchestrated counter-attack included The FederalistPapers, the
first of which appeared the next month, followed by others at regular
intervals thereafter. Each side, then, was very much aware of the other
side's views.
It is significant that several Anti-Federalists publicly condemned the
proposed Constitution for its failure to forbid incumbent members of
Congress from seeking re-election. As discussed below, this response
suggests that even the Constitution's critics believed the document to
reject term limits for federal officeholders. There is no indication,
moreover, that the Anti-Federalists thought that the states ratifying the
Constitution would retain the power to limit the terms of their federal
representatives. On the contrary, the Convention's refusal to enact congressional term limitation helped persuade at least one of its delegates,
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, to denounce the Constitution. 7 1 The
states' ratification of the Constitution shows a realization that, for better
or worse, some members of Congress might be re-elected time and
again.
Admittedly, the more controversial issue of whether to limit the
President's term of office overshadowed the public debate over congressional tenure restrictions. The Convention delegates, stung by Anti72
Federalist charges that they planned to create an "elective king,"
spent days wrestling with proposals to limit the President to a single
term, eventually rejecting them all. The original Virginia Plan provided
that the President would be "ineligible a second time," 7 3 and the matter
was not resolved until the delegates had discussed it for several months.
Opponents of presidential term limits, such as Governeur Morris of
Pennsylvania, argued that disqualifying an incumbent President from
seeking re-election would destroy his incentive to serve the public interest. Responding to a motion by Luther Martin of Maryland to limit the
President to a single term, Morris warned:
What effect will this have? 1. It will destroy the great incitement to merit public esteem by taking away the hope of being
rewarded with a reappointment. It may give a dangerous turn
to one of the strongest passions in the human breast. The love
of fame is the great spring to noble & illustrious actions. Shut
the Civil road to Glory & he may be compelled to seek it by the
sword. 2. It will tempt him to make the most of the short space
of time allotted him, to accumulate wealth and provide for his
sovereignty with a central monarchy, fanned popular outrage. Finally, by mid-September,
Edmund Randolph and George Mason of Virginia and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts
told the Convention they would not sign the proposed Constitution, outlining objections
that helped frame the public debate over ratification. ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERALISTS: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 1-2 (John D. Lewis ed., 1967)[hereinafter ANTI-FEDERALISTS].
71. On September 15, 1787, Gerry told the Convention he would withhold his name
from the Constitution partly because of "the duration and re-eligibility of the Senate." Id.
at 64.

72. William Findley, Letter of an Officer of the Late ContinentalArmy, Nov. 3, 1787, in ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 70, at 135 (listing arguments against adoption of the
Constitution).
73. NOTES, supra note 66, at 31.
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friends. 3. It will produce violations of the very constitution it
is meant to secure. In moments of pressing danger the tried
abilities and established character of a favorite Magistrate will
prevail over respect for the forms of the Constitution.... Let
him be of short duration, that he may with propriety be re74
eligible.
Martin's motion failed, despite the strong backing of Elbridge Gerry and
Edmund Randolph, all three of whom eventually defected to the Anti75
Federalist camp.
Subsequent proposals to limit the President's tenure also failed.
Martin, Gerry, and Randolph, joined by Virginia's George Mason and
others, continued their rhetorical battle against the "elective king." At
one point in the debate, Gerry was even willing to let the President serve
a single twenty-year term as long as he would be barred from seeking reelection thereafter. 76 The majority of delegates, meanwhile, thwarted
this and other term limit proposals. Responding to Gerry, Connecticut's Oliver Elseworth insisted that the President "should be re-elected
if his conduct proved him worthy of it. And he will be more likely to
render himself, worthy of it if he be rewardable with it."' 77 James Wilson
of Pennsylvania agreed, adding that Gerry's plan assumed the nation's
most experienced leaders "must be cast aside like a useless hulk"7 8 after
a certain time, even if they had served the country with distinction. Nor
did the debate end when the Convention adjourned. Jefferson himself,
a proponent of the Constitution touted by the Federalists, voiced the
frustrations of many Anti-Federalists when he complained in 1789 that
79
its "real defect" was "the perpetual re-eligibility of the president."
As the high-profile controversy over presidential tenure dragged
on, the Anti-Federalists waged an equally unsuccessful campaign to impose term limits on members of Congress. The Anti-Federalist pamphleteer Cincinnatus argued that Senators, like the President, should be
limited to a single term.80 Gerry argued both at the Convention and in
the press that unless congressional terms were limited, nothing could
prevent "the perpetuity of office in the same hands for life." 8' It is strik74. Id at 323-24.
75. Id at 322-29.
76. Id at 358. Gerry insisted that a longer term would protect the President from
legislative encroachment while ensuring he would not exploit the office.
77. Ide
78. Id. at 359.
79. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to David Humphreys (March 18, 1789), in ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 70, at 123-24. Jefferson was in France as U.S. Ambassador when
the Convention was taking place. The "perpetual re-eligibility" of the President finally
came to an end with the ratification of the Twenty-second Amendment to the Constitution
in 1951, limiting the President to two four-year terms.
80. Cincinnatus, Anti-FederalistNo.64 On The Organization and Powers of the Senate (Part
III), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS 188 (Martin Borden ed., 1965). See also Vik D. Amar,
Note, The Senate and the Constitution, 97 YALE LJ. 1111, 1121 (1988) (arguing that the AntiFederalists wanted less continuity in the Senate so it would be "merely another representative body," while the Federalists prevailed in creating "a powerful, deliberative, energetic upper branch").
81. Elbridge Gerry, Replies to the Strictures of 'A Landlord' (1787), in ANTi-FEDERALISTS,
supra note 70, at 199 (footnote omitted). See also Gerry's remarks to the Convention on
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ing that these and other critics understood the Constitution to exclude
term limits for members of Congress. There is no indication that they
believed the states retained power to impose such restrictions on federal
officeholders. On the contrary, when William Findley urged the citizens
of Philadelphia to reject the proposed Constitution, he lamented: "Rotation, that noble prerogative of liberty, is entirely excluded from the new
system of government and the great men may and probably will be continued in office during their lives." '8 2 Findley, like others in the Anti-Federalist camp, believed the Constitution was flawed because the republic it
created "entirely excluded" term limitation-not just for the President,
but for members of Congress as well.
2.

The Federalist Response.

Not surprisingly, proponents of the Constitution also assumed U.S.
Senators and Representatives would be eligible for re-election under the
new system of government. In The FederalistNo. 53, James Madison not
only predicted that some House members would be returned to office
repeatedly, but argued that their re-election would benefit the institution as a whole:
A few of the members, as happens in all such assemblies, will
possess superior talents, will by frequent re-elections, become
members of long standing; will be thoroughly masters of the
public business, and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves
of those advantages. The greater the proportion of new members, and the less the information of the bulk of the members,
the more 83
apt will they be to fall into the snares that may be laid
for them.
Refusing to disqualify incumbents from re-election was consistent with
the Federalists' overarching vision of Congress as a national legislature
that would do more than simply represent state and local interests, as
the Continental Congress had done under the Articles, and whose members would engage in a truly deliberative decision-making process. Earlier in The Federalist No. 53, Madison explained that Congress simply
could not function without a cadre of skilled and experienced
lawmakers. Using foreign policy as an example, he argued that maintaining good relations with other nations meant House members must
September 15, 1787, id at 64 ("Mr. Gerry, stated the objections which determined him to
withhold his name from the Constitution. 1. the duration and re-eligibility of the Senate."); Elbridge Gerry, Observations by a Columbian Patriot (1788), id. at 181, 184. Earlier in
the Convention, Gerry had read a resolution from the Massachusetts Legislature, instructing him "not to depart from the rotation established in the 5th art. of Confederation
NOTES,.....
supra note 66, at 451-52. Ironically, Gerry's own tenure in the Continental
Congress had exceeded that of virtually all its other members. See RAKOVE, supra note 64,
at 219.
82. William Findley, Letter of an Officer of the Late Continental Army, Nov. 3, 1787, ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 70, at 135 (emphasis added). See also Samuel Bryan, Letters of Centinel, I, Oct. 5, 1787, id. at 139, 141 (urging Philadelphians to reject the Constitution because it excluded rotation for federal officials).
83. THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 365 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961).
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have a working knowledge of all applicable treaties, domestic commercial policy, and the laws of the affected countries. Madison observed:
Some portion of this knowledge may no doubt be acquired in a
man's closet, but some of it can only be derived from the public
sources of information; and all of it will be acquired to best
effect by a practical attention to the
subject during the period
84
of actual service in the legislature.
Madison was never one to confuse men with angels, and the framers' preoccupation with governmental checks and balances-seen most
dramatically in the tripartite separation of federal powers-dispels any
doubt that they were in fact realists when it came to controlling human
beings and their sometimes evil ambitions. Yet, while recognizing the
possible dangers of congressional incumbency, the Federalists decided
that the benefits, in the form of greater institutional stability and expertise, outweighed the risks. The corrupt tendencies of individual incumbents could be controlled by requiring all federal legislators to face their
electors with reasonable frequency. While The Federalist Papers ignore
the Anti-Federalists' demand for congressional term limitation, they
devote considerable attention to the need for frequent congressional
elections, which Madison called the "corner stone" of liberty.8 5
The Convention debate over two- and six-year terms for Representatives and Senators, respectively, was reminiscent of that which had
taken place in England a few years earlier over limiting the duration of
parliamentary terms.8 6 Indeed, in rejecting the Anti-Federalists' claim
that "where annual elections end, tyranny begins," Madison contrasted
the Constitution's biennial elections for Representatives with the sevenyear sessions of the British House of Commons:
As it is essential to liberty that the government in general,
should have a common interest with the people; so it is particularly essential that . . . [the House of Representatives] should
have an immediate dependence on, & an intimate sympathy
with the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy
by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured. But
what particular degree of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the purpose, does not appear to be susceptible of any
precise calculation ....
[I]f we may argue from the degree of
liberty retained even under septennial elections, and all the
other vicious ingredients in the [British] parliamentary constitution we cannot doubt ... that biennial elections under the
federal system cannot possibly be dangerous to the requisite
dependence 8 7of the house of representatives on their
constituents.
84. Id. at 364.
85. Id. at 361.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 57-61.
87. THE FEDERALST No. 52, at 355-57 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961)(emphasis added). At the time of the framing, the frequency of elections for the
popular branch of the legislature varied from state to state. Connecticut and Rhode Island
held more than one election per year, while South Carolina held biennial elections. Id. at
360.
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Just as the Federalists' refusal to restrict congressional incumbency
was consistent with republican values, their insistence on biennial rather
than annual elections for Representatives, and on even longer terms for
Senators, was intended to promote a deliberative national legislature.
The founders were determined not to repeat the mistakes of the parliamentary system, which had permitted abuses of power that subverted
the English constitution. But given the failure of the Articles of Confederation, they were also committed to creating a Congress that would be
truly national in scope, and stable enough to withstand constant pressure from special-interest groups as well as the popular passions of the
moment. Madison articulated this view in perhaps the best-known Federalist essay, The FederalistNo. 10, when he rejected a "pure democracy"
in favor of a republic that would
refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through
the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may
best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to
temporary or partial considerations."8
Accordingly, The FederalistNo. 53 concludes that two-year terms for
Representatives, coupled with the accrued experience of veteran
lawmakers, would provide the institutional experience and expertise demanded of a national legislature. The Anti-Federalists' call for term limitation, and for annual elections, would have more closely resembled
pure democracy, but it simply could not sustain the degree of institutional competence demanded of a republican Congress. Although annual elections were then the practice in the popular branches of most
state legislatures, that alone could not warrant their use at the federal
level. Madison recognized that "the business of federal legislation must
continue so far to exceed both in novelty and difficulty, the legislative
business of a single state as to justify the longer period of service assigned to those who are to transact it." 8 9
Biennial elections for Representatives, moreover, were offset by the
six-year terms for Senators, who were to be elected directly by the state
88. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). The
very essence of Madisonian republicanism is that the electors choose representatives not
merely to protect their parochial interests, but to join with other representatives in a collective deliberation for the common good. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC

1776-1787, at 61-64, 179-80 (1969). As Professor Wills observes

about the passage quoted above:
The image is of "refining," in which a substance is passed through several
processes-Hume's successive "concoctions"-to reach a pure state. For
Madison, the thing to be refined is virtue. It is present in the people, who are
admitted to the first concoction; otherwise their genius would not be republican.
But it is in an impure state there, mingled with private interest and local bias.
Through several concoctions, the interest is purged.
GARY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 226 (1981). See alsoJames E. Castello,
Note, The Limits of PopularSovereignty: Using the Initiative Power to Control Legislative Procedure,
74 CALIF. L. REV. 491, 537-39 (1986)(discussing Professor Wills's proposition). A variant
of this view holds the Federalists achieved "a kind of synthesis of republicanism and the
emerging principles of pluralism." Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Life,
38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 47 (1985).
89. THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 364 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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legislatures. The framers believed the Senate was especially important
to the balance of legislative powers because it would ensure stability and
expertise; a relatively small group of Senators, each serving for six-year
terms, would guard against "the impulse of sudden violent passions" to
which Representatives might succumb. 90 Madison envisioned a "cool
and deliberate" Senate, with "sufficient permanency to provide for such
objects as require a continued attention.... [S]uch an institution may be
sometimes necessary, as a defence to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions." 9 1
Not only do The FederalistPapers omit any discussion of the proposals
by Elbridge Gerry and other critics to limit Senators to one term, but
Madison warned that the "rapid succession of new [House] members,
however qualified they may be, points out in the strongest manner, the
necessity of some stable institution in the government." 92 If anything,
the Federalists feared that high rates of congressional turnover might
undermine the effectiveness of the national legislature. This may seem
strange to us today, but at the time of the framing, relatively few
lawmakers aspired to serve for several consecutive terms. In the popular
branches of the state legislatures, for example, turnover averaged 50%
per election. 93 In The Federalist No. 63, Madison noted:
from this change of men must proceed a change of opinions;
and from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But a
continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with
every rule of prudence, and every prospect of success. The remark is verified in private life, and becomes more just as well as
94
more important, in national transactions.
Prudence, then, was inconsistent with term limits that would bar veterans from seeking re-election.
As the Convention drew to a close, the Anti-Federalists' campaign
for term limitation foundered. Randolph's Virginia Plan expressly limited Representatives to a single term, but the delegates voted to eliminate this provision on June 12th.9 5 Gerry and others demanded term
96
limits for Senators, but they too were unsuccessful.
Later Convention debates further support the argument that both
Federalists and Anti-Federalists understood the final draft of the Constitution to exclude term limits for members of Congress. On July 26th,
for example, the delegates were at loggerheads over whether to limit the
President to a single term. George Mason offered one of many motions
to declare the President ineligible to seek re-election. According to
Madison, Mason
held it as an essential point, as the very palladium of Civil lib90. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 418 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 424-25 (James Madison)(icob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 420 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
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erty, that the great officers of the State, and particularly the Executive should at fixed periods return to that mass from which
they were at first taken, in order that they may feel & respect
those rights &
interests, which are again to be personally valua97
ble to them.
Governeur Morris opposed Mason's motion by arguing that "on the
same principle the Judiciary ought to be periodically degraded; certain it
was that the Legislature ought on every principle, yet no one had proposed
'9 8
or conceived that the members of it should not be re-eligible."
For better or worse, term limits had been abandoned. The framers
instead chose to harness the self-interested motives of incumbent legislators to the advantage of their new republic through the mechanism of
frequent elections. Madison made this point in The FederalistNo. 57 by
observing that:
these ties which bind the representative to his constituents are
strengthened by motives of a more selfish nature. His pride
and vanity attach him to a form of government which favors his
pretensions, and gives him a share of its honors and distinctions. Whatever hopes or projects might be entertained by a
few aspiring characters, it must generally happen that a great
proportion of the men deriving their advancement from their
influence with the people, would have more to hope from a
preservation of their favor, than from innovations in the government subversive of the authority of the people.
All these securities, however, would be found very insufficient without the restraint of frequent elections. Hence... the
House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the
members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the
people. Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the
mode of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power,
they will be compelled to anticipate the moment when their
power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be reviewed,
and when they must descend to the level from which they were
raised; there forever to remain unless a faithful discharge of
their trust shall have established their title to a renewal of it. 9 9
Madison was writing about the House, but his willingness to let the electors decide who should represent them in Congress-without restricting
their choice through a constitutional provision rendering incumbents ineligible for re-election-applies with equal force to the Senate. 10 0
Looking back at the framing from today's vantage point, the Federalists may well have overestimated the ability of frequent elections to
control Congress. Madison and Mason lived in an era in which relatively
97. NoTEs, supra note 66, at 371.
98. Id. at 371-72 (emphasis added).
99. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 386 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
100. As discussed supra note 63, Senators were then chosen by the state legislatures.
The point, however, is that nothing in the original Article I, Section 3 (or, for that matter,
the Seventeenth Amendment, which provides for the popular election of Senators) purports to restrict incumbent Senators, who presumably have the same "selfish" motives as
Representatives, from seeking re-election.
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few men aspired to serve for many years in the upper echelons of the
federal government. Madison and like-minded Convention delegates
expected only a few House members "with superior talents"' 0 1 to be reelected every two years-a far cry from today's re-election rate of
1
greater than 90%. 02
Nonetheless, from the founders' perspective the matter was settled.10 3 Thus, to pretend that the framers failed to speak at all is to deny
the thoroughness and decisiveness of the term limit debate. Maintaining respect for their original understanding of the Constitution means
that nothing short of a constitutional amendment can impose term limits
on members of Congress.
3.

The Bill of Rights.

After failing to enact congressional term limits in the text of the
original Constitution, Anti-Federalists tried to include such restrictions
in the Bill of Rights. When the first Congress convened in 1789, Representative Thomas Tucker of South Carolina introduced term limitation
proposals for both the House and Senate.' 0 4 Tucker's first proposal
would have limited Representatives to a maximum of three terms during
an eight-year period. His second bill would have reduced a Senator's
term to one year while restricting him to five consecutive years of service
during a six-year period.' 0 5 Unfortunately for the Anti-Federalists, the
House never voted on either of Tucker's measures.106
Anti-Federalists favoring congressional term limitation made better
inroads at the state ratifying conventions. For instance, a term limit proposal for both the executive and legislative branches was among the
amendments to the U.S. Constitution discussed at the Virginia Ratifying
Convention in 1788.107 That same year, the North Carolina Ratifying
Convention urged Congress to adopt a "Declaration of Rights" endorsing the principle of rotation in executive and legislative office. 10 8 Dele101. THE FEDERALiST No. 53, at 365 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
102. Hertzberg, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
103. Of course, it might be argued that the framers' original intentions are no longer
binding, that they should be totally disregarded, and that changed circumstances in modem American society justify reading term limits into the text of the Constitution. We reject this approach. As Judge Frank Easterbrook wrote in a recent essay commemorating
the bicentennial of the Constitution: "The Constitution is a system of laws, not an empty
vessel into which we can pour our dreams. That is how it was, is and must always be."
Frank H. Easterbrook, An Immutable Vision, WASH. POST MAG., June 28, 1987, at 52.
104. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 790 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
105. Id.
106. Richardson, supra note 5, at 4.
107. Interestingly, the committee charged with proposing constitutional amendments
at the Virginia Ratifying Convention formally proposed a term limit amendment for the
President, but not for members of Congress. The proposed Thirteenth Amendment to
the Constitution was to provide: "That no person shall be capable of being President of
the United States for more than eight years in any term of sixteen years." Virginia Ratifying
Convention, ProposedAmendments to the Constitution,June 17, 1788, in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONsTrruTiON, supra note 41, at 17. However, the committee recommended that in enumerating "the essential and unalienable rights of the people," the Bill of Rights should include
the concept of both presidential and congressional term limitation. Id-at 15.
108. North Carolina Ratifying Convention, Declarationof Rights and OtherAmendments, August
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gates at the New York Ratifying Convention of 1788 took a slightly
different approach, proposing "[t]hat no person be eligible as a senator
for more than six years in any term of twelve years."' 0 9
Yet these Anti-Federalist victories were short-lived. Despite the
term limitation proposals that emerged from the state ratifying conventions, the Bill of Rights introduced by Representative James Madison at
the first Congress in 1789 did not include either presidential or congressional term limits. " 0 Later that same year, Congress submitted twelve
proposed articles of amendment to the states. None of these proposed
articles included term limits for federal officials." ' Just as the Anti-Federalists failed to muster enough support to place their term limit proposals in the text of the original Constitution, so too did they fail in
1791.112
II.

THE STANDING QUALIFICATIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL SERVICE

While the Convention delegates rejected congressional term limits,
it might still be argued that the Constitution does not explicitly prevent
states from imposing such restrictions. Thus, the argument goes, the
passage of the Bill of Rights in 1791 should be seen as a belated victory
for the Anti-Federalists. The Tenth Amendment could be read to bolster this argument by providing that "[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the People."' 13 Since the Constitution does not expressly prohibit states from limiting congressional
terms, a negative inference might be drawn that the states retain this
4
power through the Tenth Amendment. 1
1, 1788, in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONsTIrTiON, supra note 4 1, at 17. North Carolina proposed
that Congress adopt a "Declaration of Rights" that included as its fifth principle:
That the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers of government should be
separate and distinct, and that the members of the two first may be restrained
from oppression by feeling and participating in the public burdens: they should,
at fixed periods, be reduced to a private station, return into the mass of people,
and the vacancies be supplied by certain and regular elections, in which all or any
part of the former members to be eligible or ineligible, as the rules of the constitution of government and the laws shall direct.
Id.
109. New York Ratification of Constitution,July 26, 1788, in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrruTION, supra note 41, at 14. New York delegates also proposed limiting the President to two
terms. Id.
I10. See House of Representatives, Amendments to the Constitution, June 8, 1789, in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CoNsTrrrunON, supra note 41, at 25-29.
111. See H.R. Doc. No. 256, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1977). Of the original twelve,
articles II through XII were ratified in 1791 and are popularly known as the Bill of Rights.
112. One historian has concluded that for nearly 150 years after Representative Tucker
introduced his ill-fated term limit proposals in 1789, "limiting congressional service by
constitutional amendment did not appear to be much of an issue, and no such measure
came to a vote in Congress." Richardson, supra note 5, at 4.
113. U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
114. The Ninth Amendment, which provides that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people," might be seen as another textual basis for this theory. Supporters of the 1990
Colorado term limitation campaign invoked both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in
response to suggestions that their initiative might be unconstitutional. For example, in the
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Despite the appeal of this argument to modern reformers, the architects of the Constitution plainly intended the opposite result. From the
outset of the Convention, Madison and his allies were determined that
the Standing Qualifications Clauses contained in Article I, Sections 2
and 3115 would be the exclusive list of qualifications for congressional service. Imposing term limitation without a constitutional amendment
would add an unenumerated qualification-lack of incumbency-to
membership requirements that are fixed by the Constitution. It would
also contravene a constitutional safeguard that the framers saw as critical to popular sovereignty: that all persons who can satisfy the Standing
16
Qualifications Clauses are eligible to serve in the U.S. Congress.'
A.

Restrictions on the Electors, Not the Elected

The founders' decision to make the Standing Qualifications Clauses
the sole criteria for congressional membership is especially striking
given their insistence that states be allowed to set their own restrictions
on who could vote in federal elections. Article I, Section 2 provides
that "the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite of
the most numerous branch of the State Legislature." '1 17 The states have
frequently used this power to disqualify women, blacks and others from
voting while enforcing minimum property ownership requirements reminiscent of those in England.1 18 In contrast, the Constitution says nothing about letting states impose similar qualifications on federal
officeholders. This silence was the product of one of the founding's
greatest debates: whether to restrict service in the national legislature
to an elite few. The majority of delegates chose to reject an array of
proposed membership qualifications-mostly pertaining to wealthbefore approving the relatively minimal standing qualifications of age,
residency and citizenship that are found in Article I.19
article written by Mike Kelly, campaign chairman Considine is described as believing that
"the ninth and tenth Amendments make it plain that what he [Considine] is trying to do is
constitutional." Kelly, supra note 8, at 7. After reciting the text of the two amendments,
Kelly writes:
What this means, Considine says, is that the federal government has only
those powers explicitly delegated to it by the Constitution, and the implied powers needed to carry out the powers explicitly delegated. On any matter on which
the Constitution is silent, the states have the right to do what they want. There is
no mention in the Constitution, pro or con, on [sic] limiting the tenure of congressmen and senators. So if the states want to limit federal terms, they can do
SO.

ME (citation omitted).
115. U.S. CONsT. art. I, §§ 2 and 3. See supra note 25 for a discussion of the contents of
these provisions.
116. Since the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, Senators have been
directly elected by the voters, as House members have always been. See supra note 63.
Thus, while the founders understandably limited their discussion of popular sovereignty
to the House, which was to be the "popular branch" of the legislature, their remarks now
apply with equal force to the Senate.
117. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
119. This is obviously not to suggest that the framers envisioned a truly representative
Congress that would include, for instance, minorities and women, or the economically
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1. Populist Politics.
In response to mounting pressure from populist politicians and
commentators, the founders wanted to give at least the appearanceof having created a national legislature that was truly representative. Standing
qualifications for federal lawmakers that were both inclusive (ensuring
that the "common man" as well as the aristocrat could serve in Congress) andfixed (thereby insulated from tampering by Congress and the
states) would help ease concerns that the proposed Congress might become the American equivalent of Parliament. However, by retaining
state-imposed restrictions on electors, the Constitution would at the
same time guard against the emergence of an overly popular legislature
that might threaten private property and other vested interests.
The Convention debate over property qualifications reveals the
framers' balancing act. One of the most hotly contested of all constitutional debates, both in Philadelphia and at the state ratifying conventions, focused on whether federal officeholders should be required to
own a specified amount of property. At one extreme, South Carolina's
Charles Pinckney urged his fellow Convention delegates to adopt prop20
erty qualifications for officials in all three branches of government.1
Madison, on the other hand, was convinced that "qualifications in the
Electors would be much more effectual than in the elected."' 12 1 The majority of delegates-including dissidents such as Virginia's George Mason-agreed, rejecting every attempt to impose property qualifications
1 22
on federal officeholders.
Many delegates who favored property and other qualifications were
willing to forego them in the interest of political necessity. The Convention had been stung by criticism from the Anti-Federalists who warned
that service in the new Congress would be limited to the rich and powerful, just as the House of Commons had in practice been dominated by
the landed aristocracy. Richard Henry Lee, for instance, told fellow Virginian Edmund Randolph that the House of Representatives would provide only the illusion of democracy, amounting to little more than "a
disadvantaged, in equal proportion to their numbers in the population. Even the most
ardent Anti-Federalists, who chided the Federalists for failing to create a national legislature that would truly "mirror" the populace, were not advocates of social equality in any
modem sense. Indeed, there was virtually unanimous agreement on both sides that the
states should be free to set qualifications for federal electors, which meant that in practice
a great many Americans would be excluded from voting.
120. See Pinckney's remarks in Farrand, supra note 67. But even Pinckney opposed disqualifying public debtors from serving in Congress, fearing it would unfairly exclude "persons who had purchased confiscated property or should purchase Western territory of the
public." A proposal to this effect was defeated by a vote of 7 to 2. See Pinckney's remarks
ofJuly 26, 1789, in THE FOUNDERS' CONsTrruTION, supra note 41, at 71.
121. Id. at 70.
122. Id. See also Mason's remarks of the same day, id. at 69 (observing that the parliamentary qualifications adopted by England in 1710 had met with "universal approbation"). Governeur Morris also spoke in favor of Madison's view. See Morris's remarks, id[
at 69-70. Although the Constitution spells out qualifications for both the President and
members of Congress, it is virtually silent as to judicial qualifications. For possible explanations, seeJohn R. Vile and Mario Perez-Reilly, The U.S. Constitution andJudicial Qualifications: A Curious Omission, JUDICATURE 198 (Dec./Jan. 1991).
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mere shred or rag of representation." 1 23 Similarly, the minority at the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention argued that the proposed Constitution would ensure that
men of the most elevated rank in life will alone be chosen [to
serve in Congress]. The other orders in society, such as farmers, traders, and mechanics, who all ought to have a competent
number of their best informed men in the legislature, shall be
totally unrepresented ....
[Congress] will consist of the lordly
and high minded; of men who will have no congenial feelings
with the people, but a perfect indifference for, and contempt of
them; [it] will consist of those harpies of power that prey upon
the very vitals, that riot on the miseries of the community.124
The Federalists thus faced the delicate task of diffusing these populist charges without alienating others who feared popular sovereignty
would jeopardize their property interests. Madison devoted all of The
FederalistNo. 57 to rebutting charges that the House "will be taken from
that class of citizens which will have least sympathy with the mass of the
people, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many to
the aggrandizement of the few." 125 In response to Anti-Federalist concerns that congressional control over elections would usurp the states'
power, he stressed that federal electors "are to be the same who exercise
the right in every State of electing the correspondent branch of the Legislature of the State."' 2 6 In practice, "[t]he electors are to be the great
body of the people of the United States"' 2 7-a sharp contrast to England, where 90%o of the population was disenfranchised. As for congressional eligibility, Madison wrote:
Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen
whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence
of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious
faith, or of civil profession, is permitted to fetter the judgment
128
or disappoint the inclination of the people.
In other words, the minimal requirements of age, residency and citizenship were to be the sole criteria for congressional service. As Alexander
Hamilton noted in The FederalistNo. 60, Congress's membership qualifications "are defined and fixed in the constitution; they are unalterable
29
by the legislature."'
The debate over property qualifications underscores the founders'
commitment to limiting the scope of standing qualifications for congressional service, so as to create the popular perception (if not reality) that
the national legislature could accommodate members with a wide range
123. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Randolph (Oct. 16, 1787), in ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 70, at 19.
124. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787-1788, at
472 (John B. McMaster & F. D. Stone eds., 1888).
125. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 384 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
126. Id. at 385.
127. Id. By today's standards, of course, this was something of an overstatement.
128. Id. at 384.
129. THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 409 (Alexander Hamilton)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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of interests and experience. Additional qualifications, such as property
ownership requirements, would have enflamed populist fears that the
30
Convention delegates had schemed to build an American aristocracy.1
By characterizing these qualifications as inclusive and immune from
state or congressional interference, the Federalists were able to take a
strong public stand in favor of representative democracy, while at the
same time assuring critics that the states would continue setting qualifications for federal electors. Madison alludes to this political compromise in The Federalist No. 52:
The first view to be taken of... [the House of Representatives]
relates to the qualifications of the electors and the elected.
Those of the former are to be the same with those of the electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislatures.
The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as
a fundamental article of republican government. It was incumbent on the Convention therefore to define and establish this
right, in the Constitution. To have left it open for the occasional regulation of the Congress, would have been improper
for the reason-just mentioned. To have submitted it to the legislative discretion of the States, would have been improper for
the same reason; and for the additional reason, that it would
have rendered too dependent on the State Governments, that
branch of the Federal Government, which ought to be dependent on the people alone. To have reduced the diferent qualifications in the different States, to one uniform rule, would probably have
been as dissatisfactory to some of the States, as it would have been difficult
to the Convention. The provision made by the Convention appears therefore, to be the best that lay within their option. It must be satisfactory
130. Moreover, such qualifications would have narrowed the class of persons eligible to
serve in Congress, possibly at the expense of republican values. In The FederalistNo. 10,
Madison warns against "faction"-the dangers of special-interest groups that might dominate the legislature at the expense of the national interest. Madison believed faction could
be controlled not only by promoting a deliberative and experienced legislature that could
"refine and enlarge the public views," but by ensuring that Congress would have enough
members to represent a multitude of interests, diminishing the clout of any single faction.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Madison
cautioned:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently
will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are
placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression.
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you
make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to
invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be
more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.
Id. at 62-63.
Admittedly, the founders tended to be wary of popular sovereignty. Consequently,
their failure to impose property qualifications on federal officeholders hardly means that
they embraced the populist notion that Congress should consist of people from all professions and walks of life. Rather, Hamilton observed that "there would be no temptation to
violate the constitution in favor of the landed class, because that class would in the natural
course of things enjoy as great a preponderancy as itself could desire." THE FEDERALIST
No. 60, at 407 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)(rejecting charges that the
landed aristocracy would monopolize Congress).
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to every State; because it is conformable to the standard already established, or which may be established by the State
itself...
The qualifications of the elected being less carefully and properly defined
by the State Constitutions, and being at the same time more susceptible of
uniformity, have been very properly considered and regulated by the Convention. A representative of the United States must be of the
age of twenty-five years; must have been seven years a citizen of
the United States, must at the time of his election, be an inhabitant of the State he is to represent, and during the time of
his service must be in no office under the United States. Under
these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the Federal Government, is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty
or
13 1
wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith.
The founders' determination to restrict the standing qualifications
to those enumerated in Article I was therefore part of a much larger
compromise over the role of popular democracy in the federal scheme.
Fixed, inclusive qualifications would help reassure a nervous public that
service in the national legislature would not be limited to a privileged
few. This, in turn, might substantially improve the Constitution's
chances for success at the state ratifying conventions.
Against this political backdrop, it is hardly surprising that the delegates at Philadelphia repeatedly voted down a host of proposed restrictions on congressional membership, while insisting that the few finally
agreed upon could be altered only by constitutional amendment. When
the Convention ended, the views of delegates such as New Hampshire's
John Langdon had carried the day. Langdon warned that too many restrictions on congressional service "would render the system unacceptable to the people."1 3 2 Alexander Hamilton echoed this sentiment when
he admonished delegates eager to exclude foreign immigrants from
membership in Congress that such "minute restrictions" would be "embarrassing" to the government.' 3 3 Admittedly, the consensus was not
universal. A few delegates, such as Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts
and John Dickenson of Delaware, proposed letting Congress determine
its own membership qualifications. 13 4 But in the face of strong Federalist pressure, these proposals went nowhere.
131. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 354-55 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961)(emphasis added).
132. THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrrtnION, supra note 41, at 71. Governeur Morris's remarks
of the same day support Langdon's position: "It was a precept of great antiquity as well as
of high authority ... we should not be righteous overmuch. He thought we ought to be
equally on our guard agst. being wise over much .... how cruel wd. it be ... to keep a

distinguished & meritorious Citizen under a temporary disability & disenfranchisement."
Ia at 69-70.
133. L at 72. Governeur Morris, like Hamilton, "was opposed to such minutious regulations in a Constitution." Ia at 70.
134. Id. at 69, 70. Dickenson opposed listing any qualifications for congressional service in the Constitution for fear that it would "by implication tie up the hands of the Legislature from supplying the omissions .. " Id. at 70.
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The John Wilkes Case.

There is a second reason why the founders decided against giving
Congress or the states a free hand to create their own qualifications for
federal officeholders. Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike were well
aware of the John Wilkes case, described by the Supreme Court as "the
13 5
most notorious English election dispute of the 18th century."
The controversy began in 1763, when Wilkes, a House member,
published a blistering attack on the Crown for concluding a peace treaty
with France.' 3 6 His subsequent arrest, conducted by Royal authorities
using an illegal warrant and in violation of parliamentary privilege,
quickly made him a popular hero.' 3 7 Prior to trial, Wilkes went before
the House to denounce his treatment as unconstitutional, promising
that if his colleagues would affirm his right to be privileged from arrest,
"I shall then be not only ready, but eagerly desirous, to wave that privilege, and to put myself upon ajury of my countrymen."'13 8 Instead, the
House expelled him for publishing seditious libel. 13 9 Wilkes then fled
England-ironically, to France, where English authorities later sentenced him to remain in exile. 140 The following year, after the Parlia135. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 527 (1969).
136. lId
137. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 99-100. In a speech to the House of Commons
on November 15, 1763, Wilkes recounted the details of his arrest, which would later serve
as a potent example to the American Colonists of the extent to which Parliament and the
Crown had subverted the constitution:
On the 30th of April, in the morning, I was made a prisoner in my own house, by
some of the king's messengers. I demanded by what authority they had forced
their way into my room, and was shewn a warrant in which no person was named
in particular, but generally the authors, printers and publishers of a seditious and
treasonable paper, intitled, The North Briton, No. 45. The messengers insisted on
my going before lord Halifax, which I absolutely refused, because the warrant
was, I thought, illegal and did not respect me. I applied, by my friends, to the
court of common pleas, for a Habeas Corpus, which was granted, but as the
proper office was not then open, it could not immediately issue. I was afterwards
carried, by violence, before the earls of Egremont and Halifax, whom I informed
of the orders given by the court of common pleas for the Habeas Corpus; and I
enlarged upon this subject to Mr. Webb, the solicitor of the treasury. I was, however, hurried away to the Tower by another warrant, which declared me the author and publisher of a most infamous and seditious libel, intitled, The North
Briton, No. 45. The word treasonable was dropped, yet I was detained a close
prisoner, and no person was suffered to come near me for almost three days,
although my council, and several of my friends, demanded admittance, in order
to concert the means of recovering my liberty. My house was plundered, my bureaus broke open, by order of two of your members, Mr. Wood and Mr. Webb,
and all my papers carried away. After six days imprisonment I was discharged, by
the unanimous judgment of the court of common pleas, "That the privilege of my
house extended to my case." Notwithstanding this solemn decision of one of the
king's superior courts of justice, a few days after, I was served with a subpoena
upon an information exhibited against me in the king's bench. I lost no time in
consulting the best books, as well as the greatest living authorities; and from the
truest judgment I could form, I thought that serving me with a subpoena was
another violation of the privilege of parliament, which I will neither desert nor
betray, and therefore I have not yet entered an appearance.
JOHN WILKES, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF THE GENUINE PAPERS, LETERS, &C. IN THE CASE

OF JOHN WILKES, EsQ. 51-3 (1767).
138. Id. at 54.
139. Powell, 395 U.S. at 527.
140. Id.
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ment from which he had been expelled was dissolved, Wilkes returned
to England and was re-elected. 14 1 Before he could serve, however, he
was tried and convicted of seditious libel and sentenced to twenty-two
months' imprisonment.1 4 2 During his imprisonment, the new Parliament declared Wilkes ineligible for membership and expelled him from
the House of Commons.143
Wilkes was released from prison in 1770, campaigned for re-election, and won, but once again, the Parliament declared him ineligible
and declined to seat him. 144 In all, Wilkes was re-elected three times to
the vacant seat; but Parliament was unbending, and each time he was
45
declared ineligible to serve.'
Wilkes's release from prison triggered a fierce debate over Parliament's ability to exclude duly elected members for reasons other than
those fixed in the British constitution. Prior to Wilkes's arrest, English
precedent stood for the proposition that" 'the law of the land had regulated the qualifications of members to serve in parliament' and those
qualifications were 'not occasional but fixed.' ",146 The first edition of
Blackstone's Commentaries,147 published in 1765, is also consistent with
this view. 14 8 The House later returned to this position in 1782 by expunging from Wilkes's record the resolutions disqualifying him from
141. IL
142. Ik143. Id at 527-28.
144. Id at 528.
145. Id.
146. Id., quoting 16 PARL. HIsT. ENG. 589, 590 (1769). But see HOLDSWORTH, supra note
37, at 540 (arguing that the question of whether the House of Commons could exclude
members for reasons other than those enumerated in the constitution "was by no means
an easy question to answer ... [b]oth those who asserted and those who denied the authority of the House were able to cite authority for their views"). As evidence of this
confusion, Holdsworth cites Blackstone, who oscillated on the matter. Id However, Blackstone's views may have been colored by the Wilkes controversy itself. See infra note 148.
147. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES (1765).
148. In Professor Holdsworth's words, Blackstone "had not stated that a vote of the
House could render a candidate incapable of being elected; and, after enumerating various
incapacities, he had said that, subject to them, 'every subject of the realm is eligible [to
serve in Parliament] of common right.'" HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 540. Thus, when
Blackstone took the position during the Wilkes affair that Parliament could, by resolution,
disqualify a member from sitting for the remainder of that Parliament without relying on
the standing qualifications fixed by the constitution, his opponents naturally cited the Commentaries against him. Id.
In the wake of this criticism, Blackstone revised the later editions of the Commentaries
to conform with what had happened to Wilkes, explaining that "there are instances,
wherein persons in particular circumstances have forfeited that common right, and have
been declared ineligiblefor that Parliament ...orfor ever by an Act of the Legislature." Id.
at 541 (quoting Blackstone's Commentaries) (emphasis in original).
In Powell v. McCormack, the Supreme Court cites Holdsworth's analysis of Blackstone's Commentaries to support its assertion that Blackstone "was an apologist for the antiWilkes forces in Parliament." 395 U.S. 486, 537-38 (1969). While this may or may not
have been true as a matter of history, it is inaccurate to attribute this view to Holdsworth.
In fact, Holdsworth's History stresses that there were plausible arguments on both sides.
See HOLDSWORTH,supra note 37, at 540.
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serving in Parliament, 14 9 resolving that its prior actions were "subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this kingdom." 15 0
Wilkes's struggle to be seated in Parliament made him a cause celebre
for the Colonists, and "the cry of 'Wilkes and Liberty' echoed loudly
across the Atlantic Ocean as wide publicity was given to every step of
Wilkes' public career in the colonial press... -151 Consequently, when
the Convention delegates met at Philadelphia five years later, they were
very much aware of how Parliament had manipulated the standing qualifications to exclude Wilkes. They vowed not to make the same mistake.
On August 10, 1787, as the debate over property qualifications for
federal officeholders continued, the Convention considered a proposal
by the Committee on Detail that "[t]he Legislature of the United States
shall have authority to establish such uniform qualifications of the members of each House, with regard to property, as to the said Legislature
shall seem expedient." 152 In language which the Supreme Court later
described as strikingly similar to that of Wilkes, 15 3 Madison urged delegates to accept nothing less than standing qualifications fixed by the
Constitution. The Committee's proposal, Madison warned, would
vest[] an improper & dangerous power in the Legislature. The
qualifications of electors and elected were fundamental articles
in a Republican Govt. and ought to be fixed by the Constitution ....
A Republic may be converted into an aristocracy or
oligarchy as well by limiting the number capable of being
15 4
elected, as the number authorized to elect.
As the deliberations continued, Madison referred to what constitutional
historian Charles Warren later concluded "was undoubtedly.., the famous election case of John Wilkes."' 15 5 Madison denounced Parlia149. Powell, 395 U.S. at 528.
150. Id. (quoting 22 PARL. HIST. ENG. 1411 (1782)).
151. LAWRENCE GIPSON, I I THE BRITISH EMPIRE BEFORE THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
222 (1956). Gipson continues: "The reaction in America took on significant proportions.
Colonials tended to identify their cause with that of Wilkes. They saw him as a popular
hero and a martyr to the struggle for liberty.... They named towns, counties, and even
children in his honour." Id.
152. Farrand, supra note 67, at 179.
153. Powell, 395 U.S. at 534. After reviewing both the Wilkes affair and the debates
over standing qualifications at the Convention, the Court in Powell concluded that the
House could not exclude Representative Adam Clayton Powell, who had been duly reelected by the voters, from taking his seat for any reason other than those enumerated in
the Standing Qualifications Clause of Article I, Section 2. The Court then cited this passage from the Wilkes debate in Parliament:
'That the right of the electors to be represented by men of their own choice, was
so essential for the preservation of all their other rights, that it ought to be considered as one of the most sacred parts of our constitution.... That the law of
the land had regulated the qualifications of members to serve in parliament, and
that the freeholders ... had an indisputable right to return whom they thought
proper, provided he was not disqualified by any of those known laws ....
They
are not occasional but fixed: to rule and govern the question as it shall arise; not
to start up on a sudden, and shift from side to side, as the caprice of the day or
the fluctuation of the party shall direct.'
Id. (citing 16 PARL. HIST. ENG. 589-90 (1769)).
154. Farrand, supra note 67, at 249-50.
155. CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONsTrruTION 420 n.1 (1929).
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ment's self-proclaimed power to decide the qualifications of both
electors and the elected: "the abuse they had made of it was a lesson
worthy of our attention." 1 5 6 Madison's fellow delegates agreed, and the
Committee's proposal was not enacted.
Madison leveled his criticism at Parliament, the institution that had
defied the law of the land by asserting the right to exclude Wilkes without any priorjustification. Yet the founders' insistence that the standing
qualifications be protected by the full weight of the Constitution applies
with equal force to the states. It makes no difference whether the states
or Congress alters those qualifications. The result in either case is precisely the same. To argue today that Congress and the states retain
power to add their own qualifications to those that are undeniably fixed
in the Constitution would turn history on its head. From the founders'
perspective, it makes no difference whether the reasons now given for
justifying new qualifications might be desirable as a matter of public policy, as advocates of congressional term limitation have claimed. The fact
remains that the framers made their choice more than two centuries ago
when they enumerated the membership requirements for federal representatives, and then agreed that "[t]his Constitution . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."'15 7 A clear reading of the founders' intentions
leads to the inescapable conclusion that additions to the Standing Qualifications Clauses can be achieved only by amending the text of the
Constitution.
III.

STANDING QUALIFICATIONS:

THE VIEW FROM CONGRESS AND THE

COURTS

In the two centuries since the Philadelphia Convention, both Congress and the Supreme Court have generally construed the Standing
Qualifications Clauses to be the exclusive list of membership requirements for federal representatives. Although Congress sporadically has
excluded members for reasons other than those in the text of the Constitution, 158 in Powell v. McCormack,159 the Supreme Court held that
Congress cannot exclude a duly elected member of Congress who otherwise satisfies the age, residency and citizenship requirements contained
in Article 1.160 Powell leaves little doubt that Congress cannot impose its
own substantive membership rules, such as term limits for incumbent
Senators and Representatives, without violating the Standing Qualifications Clauses. 16 1 The holding in Powell, moreover, should apply with
equal force to the states.
156. Farrand, supra note 67, at 250.
157. U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
158. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 543-47 (1969); see also infra text accompanying notes 222-26.
159. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
160. Id. at 548.
161. Id. at 543-47; see also infra text accompanying notes 239-41.
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The Maryland Contested Election

While the Court has not squarely addressed whether states can impose their own restrictions on incumbent Senators and Representatives,
the House of Representatives considered and rejected the idea in a spirited 1807 debate over a disputed election in Maryland. The controversy
began when incumbent William McCreery violated an 1802 state law
creating Maryland's fifth congressional district, "which district shall be
entitled to send two Representatives to Congress, one of which shall be a
resident of Baltimore county, and the other a resident of Baltimore city."' 1 62 In
effect, the law imposed additional residency requirements on Article I,
Section 2 of the Constitution, which provides that "[n]o person shall be
a Representative... who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of the
63
State in which he shall be chosen."'
McCreery had lived in Baltimore city for many years, but he and his
family began spending summers at his farm in Baltimore county in
1803.164 Since McCreery's service in Congres's required him to spend
winters almost entirely in Washington, he spent virtually no time residing in Baltimore city. 1 6 5 In the 1807 election, Baltimore county resident
Nicholas R. Moore received the most votes, entitling him to the fifth
district's "county" seat. McCreery took second place, and Baltimore city
resident Joshua Barney finished third. 1 66 Barney claimed to have received "the highest number of votes given to a candidate legally qualified to represent the city of Baltimore,"' 6 7 and petitioned the House to
seat him pursuant to the Maryland law.' 68 The dispute was referred to
the House Committee of Elections, which issued a report recommending that McCreery be seated. The report concluded:
162. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 871 (1807) (text of the official report by the House Committee on Elections) (emphasis added). In 1790, moreover, Maryland had passed a law requiring members of Congress to have resided within their districts for twelve months
immediately preceding their election. Id. at 870-71. It does not appear that Maryland was
unique. Representative Philip Key of Maryland (incidentally, the uncle of "Star-Spangled
Banner" author Francis Scott Key) argued that it was imperative for Congress to decide
the constitutionality of the Maryland law because other states had been imposing similar
residency requirements on their U.S. Representatives for the past twenty years. "If the
States have power to add one qualification," Key warned, "they have power to create all."
Id. at 913-14. North Carolina, for instance, had enacted a law requiring its Representatives
to reside in the districts they represented, according to Representative John Rowan of
Kentucky. Id. at 894. It seems likely that Congress's prior willingness to tolerate such laws
was a question of enforcement; the Maryland dispute was simply the first such case to raise
the issue for congressional adjudication. The statements of Key and Rowan support this
view. Rowan, for example, urged the House to settle the matter "because it appeared that
other encroachments had been made on the Constitution." Id.
163.
164.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
17 ANNALS OF CONG. 871 (1807).

165. Id. at 871. McCreery was aware that his absence from Baltimore city might violate
the Maryland law "and expressed to some of his friends some apprehensions that exceptions might be made on account of his constant family residence not being in the city of
Baltimore." Id. Moreover, in both the 1805 and 1807 congressional elections, McCreery
and his family apparently made a point of residing in Baltimore city for five or six days
before the actual voting. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 870.
168. Id.
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The committee proceeded to examine the Constitution, with
relation to the case submitted to them, and find that qualifications of members are therein determined, without reserving
any authority to the State Legislatures to change, add to, or
diminish those qualifications; ... [T]he committee are of the
opinion that William McCreery is duly qualified to represent
the fifth district of the State of Maryland, and that the law of
that State, restricting the residence of the members of Congress to any particular part of the district for which they may be
chosen, is contrary to the Constitution of the United States
169

In the debate that followed, Committee Chairman William Findley
of Pennsylvania-the former Anti-Federalist whose 1787 pamphlet denounced the Constitution for its failure to limit congressional
terms 7 0-urged his colleagues to reject Barney's petition on the
grounds that neither Congress nor the states could add their own requirements to those in the Standing Qualifications Clauses.' 7 1 Summarizing the report's conclusions, Findley observed:
The Committee of Elections considered the qualifications of
members to have been unalterably determined by the Federal
Convention, unless changed by an authority equal to that which framed
the Constitutionatfirst; that neither the State nor the Federal Legislatures are vested with authority
to add to those qualifica72
tions, so as to change them.'
The Committee based its conclusion on several factors. Its most
basic concern was political. Many national lawmakers were undoubtedly
committed to protecting their power against state infringement. The
Committee recognized that letting Maryland prevail in its effort to regulate U.S. Representatives could prompt other states to do so. Findley
said:
if the State Legislature had a right to prescribe in what part of
the same district, and for what length of time, each of the Representatives should reside, they had also a right to prescribe in
what street or what house of a street they must reside, and for
173
what length of time.
The implications for congressional incumbents such as William McCreery were all too obvious. As a practical matter, then, it was essential
for the House to take an unequivocal stand against state infringements
on federal power.
It is significant, however, that Findley and many of his colleagues
were willing to go beyond the political to offer complex constitutional
arguments. They were keenly aware that the Maryland election dispute
raised a constitutional issue of profound importance.' 74 Consequently,
169. Id. at 871.
170. See Findley, supra note 72.
171.

17 ANNALS OF CONG. 872 (1807).

172. Id. (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 873.
174. Members on both sides of the controversy frequently made this point during the
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the Committee sought to interpret the Standing Qualifications Clauses
in light of Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides that
"[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members .... 17-5 The Committee construed this
language to mean that the authority to "judge" qualifications was purely
judicial in nature; it did not entitle Congress to create its own,substantive
requirements for who could serve in the national legislature.1 76 The Standing Qualifications Clauses provided the framework in which Congress
performed its judicial role, restricting what would otherwise be Congress's virtually open-ended discretion to impose its own substantive
membership qualifications under the guise of judging them.
As the debate unfolded, some members argued that the negative
sentence structure of Article I, Section 2177 was broadly inclusive, and
debate. Typical are the remarks of Representatives Joseph Desha of Kentucky on Nov. 18,
1807, id. at 928 (The Maryland law presented "a question in which a great Constitutional
point was involved."), andJohn Love of Virginia, ia.
at 938 (describing it as a "great Constitutional question"). Indeed, Representative Joseph Clay of Pennsylvania moved to
amend the Committee's original resolution to make the constitutional basis for seating
McCreery more explicit. His resolution provided:
Resolved, That the second section of the first article of the Constitution of the
United States, having prescribed the qualifications of the persons who may be
elected Representatives in the Congress of the United States, neither the Congress of the United States nor the Legislature of any of the States, can Constitutionally add to, or take from those qualifications.
Id. at 946 (emphasis in text). The Committee of the Whole rose before Clay's amended
resolution could be voted on, and the McCreery-Barney dispute was then recommitted to
the Election Committee. Id. at 946-47. Many lawmakers were understandably skittish
about deciding the constitutional question presented, and took great pains tojustify their
decision on other grounds.
175. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
176. See, e.g., the comments of Virginia's John Love, who argued that the power delegated to Congress to judge qualifications necessarily prevented it from enacting substantive qualifications for its members. Love told the House: "The functions appear to me to
be entirely distinct, as much so as the power of making the law is distinguished from the
power ofjudging on it when made." 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 900 (1807). Nor is it surprising
that Love and many others construed Congress's function to be purely judicial. Even
though this function had been committed to Congress instead of to the Judiciary, there
was ample precedent for coordinate review elsewhere in the Constitution-particularly in
the provision giving the Senate the sole power to try all impeachments. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 3.
It appears that the founders also did not find giving Congress a judicial role to be
problematic. Although the enumeration of the standing qualifications for members of
Congress had been hotly debated at the Convention, the delegates approved Congress's
exclusive power to judge those qualifications without debate or a recorded vote. NOTES,
supra note 66, at 431.
Many members of the Tenth Congress were undoubtedly familiar with at least the
basic contours of the debates at the Constitutional Convention twenty years earlier. The
1807 debate reveals that many Representatives were well informed about the Convention
proceedings as well as about the debates in the state ratifying conventions, and they often
referred to The FederalistPapersand other contemporary materials. See, e.g., the remarks by
Representative Key, 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 915-16 (1807) (citing The FederalistPapers for the
proposition that the founders intended the standing qualifications to be fixed and exclusive), and Representative Lemuel Sawyer of North Carolina, id. at 932 (referring to the
John Wilkes Case).
177. "No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained the Age of
twenty-five years, and been seven Years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not,
when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen." U.S. CONsT. art.
I, § 2 (emphasis added).
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urged that the House could refuse to seat only those persons who failed
to satisfy those minimum qualifications.1 78 Representative Rowan of
Kentucky, for instance, stressed that the Times, Places and Manner
Clause of Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution explicitly delegated the
power to define the qualifications of electors to the states. Had the Convention sought to do the same for the elected, it would have done so in
express terms. 179 Maryland's Philip Key expanded this argument by focusing on the use of qualifications for other federal officeholders. The
prohibitive language of the Standing Qualifications Clauses, he observed, mirrored those for the President.' 80 He continued:
The expressions used in [Article II, Section 1] are in negative
terms, in the same manner as those used with respect to the
qualifications of the Representatives; and does any friend of the
Constitution, say that the States can superinduce or add any
other qualification 8 to the President than those designated by
the Constitution?' 1
Other members engaged in a more philosophical inquiry ranging
from federalism, to Madisonian republicanism, to the impact of stateimposed qualifications on popular sovereignty. In describing his own
views on the Maryland law; Chairman Findley cautioned that allowing
states to create qualifications for national officeholders was antithetical
to both federal supremacy and republican values. With respect to the
first point, Findley asserted that:
The qualifications of the National Legislature are of a national
-character, and as such must be uniform throughout the nation,
and prescribed by the authority of the nation, and by it exclusively; but no State Legislature is vested with national authority, they cannot make citizens for the nation, nor prescribe
qualifications either for citizens or for Executive officers of the
nation, much less can they prescribe qualifications for the National Legislature, other than the nation itself has prescribed,
nor abridge the Constitutional power of Congress to decide on
the qualifications of its own members, agreeably to the rules
prescribed by the Constitution; that authority, expressly vested
by the whole, cannot be abridged or changed by a part-by18 2a
seventeenth part of the nation [i.e., the state of Maryland].
Other Representatives were quick to endorse Findley's view that the
Maryland law was incompatible with the Supremacy Clause. Representative Rowan, for instance, was convinced that the House should reach
178. As discussed supra notes 120-34 and accompanying text, this view was consistent
with the Federalists' overarching desire to impose qualifications on the electors rather
than the elected.
179. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 893-94 (1807).
180. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1 ("No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen
of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to
the Office of the President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not
have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the
United States.").
181.

17 ANNALS OF CONG. 914 (1807).

182. Id. at 873.
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the constitutional question legitimately before it. "Whilst [Rowan] relied on the State sovereignties," he is reported as saying, "he also revered the National sovereignty, as one, without which, the State
sovereignties could not be preserved; and by which, if the State sovereignties were assailed, they could alone be rescued."' 8 3 Rowan likened
the relationship between the federal government and the states to that
between the states and their counties. A state's function in drawing congressional districts, he argued, was solely "for the convenience of the
18 4
electors, and not in abridgment of their rights."'
The Maryland law also struck at the heart of Madisonian republicanism. Opponents of the Maryland law insisted that members of Congress
were federal officers, not merely agents of the states. In rejecting the
Articles of Confederation and embracing a republican form of central
government, the founders necessarily abandoned the states' claims to
equal power in matters affecting the national legislature. Congress was
not merely to reflect the parochial interests of each member's home
state, but was to "refine and enlarge the public views,' 8 5 fusing them
into a national outlook through a combination of experience and deliberation.18 6 Although McCreery was elected from Maryland, his actions
as a U.S. Representative responsible for declaring war or raising taxes
were binding on the people in every state. Each U.S. citizen, therefore,
had a vital federal interest in every member of the House, regardless of
which state elected him to serve in Congress. In Representative Key's
words, "the people in each State are interested in the qualifications of
the Representatives of every State, and no one State can destroy the
87
right."1
This last point leads to what appears to have been the most widely
shared constitutional objection to the Maryland law: that it infringed
upon popular sovereignty in national elections. Key, Findley and many
other members believed that allowing states to impose qualifications on
the elected as well as the electors would compromise the federal
franchise. Although McCreery finished ahead of Barney, Maryland law
denied the majority of the electors the right to their choice. That those
same electors may have voted for the state legislators who enacted the
Maryland law was irrelevant. A state had nonetheless claimed the right
to restrict the franchise in national elections-a direct violation of federal constitutional supremacy. Representative Rowan spoke for many
when he argued that the inclusive nature of the Standing Qualifications
Clause of Article I, Section 2 had been designed to safeguard the electors' freedom to elect candidates without interference from Congress or
the states. Letting the states "superadd" qualifications, he noted, would
188
subvert that freedom.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 896.
Id. at 394.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.

187.

17 ANNALS OF CONG. 913 (1807).

188. Id. at 894.
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Rowan reminded his colleagues that the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 had represented the people, not the states qua
states.' 8 9 Key agreed, stating: "[tihe Convention who formed the Constitution of the United States, represented not the States, but the people
of the United States. They met to form not a State government, but a
National Government for the people of the United States."' 9 0 Because
the people, and not the states, were the true source of popular sovereignty in the House, Key emphatically rejected the notion that the
Times, Places and Manner Clause of Article I, Section 4 could justify
state-imposed qualifications on federal officeholders, saying:
It has been said, but faintly relied on, that if the States have
power to fix election districts for the electors, they may equally
locate the Representative. But this is a great mistake. The Constitution, in permitting the States to determine the manner of
holding elections, permits them, if it suits their convenience, to
hold them in districts; but the attempt to curtail and rob the
people of their elective franchise, by making the eligibility of
the candidate depend on the locality of his residence, is out of
their power, and not given to them by the Constitution. As to
the propriety and policy of such power being placed in a State, it is not
now a question. We are notframing a constitution. We are examining
where it is placed by our Constitution. If it is not well placed, there is a
Constitutionalmode of alteringit.1 9 1
Key advocated taking a firm stand against the Maryland law and other
encroachments on popular sovereignty by states purporting to regulate
federal election procedures under the Times, Places and Manner Clause:
"like water dropping on a stone, [they] wear away the very substance of
92
the Constitution."'1
Not all members of the Committee, however, shared Key's views.
Leading a small but vocal group of dissenters, most of them from Southern states, was Virginia's John Randolph, who repeatedly warned the
House that adjudicating the constitutionality of the Maryland law could
have catastrophic consequences, possibly triggering a popular backlash.
Claiming that the House had never been called upon to decide a more
important question, Randolph "laid it down as a principle not to be
questioned, that Congress should never undertake to pronounce upon
State regulations, but in cases too clear to admit a contest ..."193 Any
other principle would render the states "mere skeletons of Governments
...[amounting to] the death warrant of the existing Constitution, and of
the people's liberties."' 9 4 Randolph confronted his colleagues with the
grim consequences of striking down a state law on federal constitutional
grounds: "Beware lest, whilst you proudly assert your power, you do
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Id. at 911.
Id. at 913 (emphasis added).
Id. at 914.
Id.
Id. at 882-83.
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not meet the reprobation of the great body of the American people." 195
It was not that Randolph and like-minded legislators were philosophically opposed to the House adjudicating a constitutional question.
They were concerned, rather, that most Representatives would reject
their arguments that either the Times, Places and Manner Clause or the
Tenth Amendment reserved to the states the power to impose their own
qualifications on members of Congress. 19 6 Consequently, Randolph and
his allies focused on persuading their colleagues to avoid the constitutional issue even if they decided to seat McCreery. Thus, when it became clear that the vast majority of members favored seating McCreery
instead of Barney, Randolph tried to amend the House resolution to
construe the Maryland law in McCreery's favor-in effect deciding the
constitutional question in favor of the states. 197 This attempt failed by a
vote of 8-92.198 Yet Randolph's pressure ultimately paid off. After several sustained debates over the span of more than a month, the House
voted 89-18 to approve a resolution that stated simply "[t]hat William
McCreery is entitled to his seat in this House." 1 9 9 The result permitted
both sides to claim that Congress had avoided a touchy constitutional
issue. But given the posture of the McCreery-Barney dispute, the Committee's report, and the substance of the ensuing debate on the House
floor, the House's attempt to decide the case on non-constitutional
grounds is unpersuasive since the vast majority of House members had
rejected a state's right to impose substantive qualifications on Congress.
Despite the passage of nearly two centuries, there is reason to believe that the House's result in the Maryland Contested Election is controlling constitutional precedent even today. 20 0 In contrast, Randolph's
195. Id. at 886.
196. Just as Key, Findley, Rowan and others scoffed at suggestions that the Times,
Places and Manner Clause entitled the states to impose substantive requirements on federal officeholders, Randolph and his supporters failed to persuade the vast majority of his
colleagues that the Tenth Amendment -was controlling. Again, the fundamental debate
was over the source of state and federal power under the Constitution. On one hand,
Randolph supporters argued that because the Constitution does not expressly prohibit
states from imposing residency requirements, they must retain that power under the
Tenth Amendment. Id. at 907. Thus, the people's rights derived from the states themselves. But most Representatives disagreed, believing that the standing qualifications in
Article I could not be infringed by the states because they had been enacted by the people
themselves, through their delegates to the Constitutional Convention. See, e.g., the remarks of Representative Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts, who observed that the Tenth
Amendment "was a delegation of powers in the Constitution, not merely to the States, but
to the people, who constituted those States. The language of the Constitution was not we
the States, but we the people of those States. Their power derived from the people; they were
responsible for the exercise of that power to the people, and not to the States." Id. (emphasis in original).
197. Randolph's resolution stated that McCreery was to be seated because he was the
candidate "having the qualifications required by the law of Maryland." Id. at 1234.
198. Id. at 1237 (1807).

199. Id. See also ASHER
THE UNITED STATES § 414

C.

HINDS, I PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF

(1907).

200. There is no longer any question, for instance, that the Constitution prohibits
states from requiring U.S. Representatives to reside in the districts they represent, so long
as they satisfy the inhabitancy provision of Article I, § 2 of the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523, 1529 n.4 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983)
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theory of retained states' rights is of diminished credibility in the postCivil War era. The House debates reveal that one of his primary motivations for supporting the constitutionality of the Maryland law was to
protect Southern slave-owning interests, a concern that is no longer applicable in the wake of the Reconstruction Amendments. Randolph argued that if the Committee's original resolution was adopted, and the
Maryland law struck down as unconstitutional, the "monstrous and
abominable conclusion" would be that slave-owning states would be le20 1
gally powerless to disqualify black men from serving in Congress.
Undoubtedly Randolph's remarks were rhetorical; his colleagues scoffed
at what must have seemed the wildly improbable notion that the Southern states would begin electing African-Americans to Congress. 20 2 Still,
Randolph's appeals on behalf of pro-slavery interests not only help explain his reluctance to acknowledge the supremacy of federal power, but
also suggest why his conception of retained states' rights-which made
him a dissenter even in the early 19th century-is even less compelling

today. 203
B.

From William McCreery to Adam Clayton Powell
1. Jefferson's Reflections on the Maryland Election.

The House debate over seating William McCreery remains the single most exhaustive discussion on the constitutionality of state-imposed
(listing cases holding that state laws rendering officials ineligible for state office prescribe
unconstitutional qualifications); Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d 853, 859 (2d Cir. 1980)
("State laws that require a Congressional candidate to live within the Congressional district he seeks to represent have uniformly been invalidated as imposing an additional qualification, notwithstanding the candidate's freedom to move into the district.").
Interestingly, another incumbent U.S. Representative from Maryland was unsuccessfully challenged in 1808 on grounds virtually identical to those raised in the McCreeryBarney dispute. See 18 ANNALS OF CONG. 1848-49 (1808). For a more recent Maryland
case, see Hellman v. Collier, 141 A.2d 908, 910 (Md. 1958) (invalidating state statute requiring a House candidate to live in the congressional district he sought to represent). In
the years since the Maryland Contested Election, however, both Congress and the federal
courts have sometimes relied on the Times, Places and Manner Clause to exclude members for failing to follow certain state laws regulating federal election procedures, but not
otherwise preventing them from running for Congress. See infra notes 244-307 and accompanying text.
201. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 888-89 (1807).
202. In countering Randolph, Representative Quincy raised an equally implausible scenario: "Suppose that one of the Northern States should say that none but a black man or a
man of color should be elected." Id. at 908-09(emphasis in original). Quincy admitted that
he never expected this would happen, but wanted to remind Randolph that the states'
power to superadd qualifications to national lawmakers could also be destructive of Southern interests. Id at 909. There is, of course, a well-deserved irony in Randolph's choice of
hyperbole: the Southern states did elect a number of black Representatives to Congress
during Reconstruction. In fact, four black veterans of the victorious Union Army later
went on to serve in Congress. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION 6 (1988).

203. However, one modern writer claims support for state-imposed term limits based
on the practice of many Southern state legislatures to "instruct" their U.S. Senators-that
is, to bind them to vote a certain way on a particular issue. See Kelly, supra note 8, at 7.
Supporters of the 1990 term limit campaign in Colorado argued that the practice of instruction was never subjected to constitutional challenge. Id. It is questionable, however,
whether instruction is relevant-let alone persuasive-evidence of the constitutionality of
modern term limitation proposals, especially now that Senators are popularly elected.
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qualifications on members of Congress. While Congress and the federal
courts have had several occasions to consider whether Congress can define the qualifications of its own members, no case involving the constitutionality of state additions to the Standing Qualifications Clauses has
been raised. This is probably not surprising. The House vote in the
Maryland Contested Election was widely reported by scholarly commentators, and its influence was widely felt. In the decades following the
Maryland election dispute, state laws imposing qualifications on federal
officeholders fell into desuetude.
This is not to suggest, however, that the House's decision was the
final word on the matter. Thomas Jefferson was uncertain whether the
House's decision in the Maryland Contested Election meant that the
states were absolutely forbidden to impose qualifications on their federal representatives. When his longtime friend and confidant Virginia
state Senator Joseph C. Cabell asked his opinion, Jefferson replied that
while he had initially agreed with the decision to seat William McCreery,
he now doubted "the correctness of my first opinion. ' 20 4 Grounding his
arguments solely in the text of the Constitution, without reference to the
framing or other historical evidence, Jefferson agreed with Cabell that
the Standing Qualifications Clause of Article I, Section 2 could plausibly
be understood as the minimum, but not exclusive, set of requirements
for congressional service when read in light of the Tenth Amendment. 20 5 Because the language of the Constitution does not expressly
prohibit states from imposing qualifications on members of Congress,
Jefferson continued, it was conceivable that the states retained such
20 6
power.
In summarizing his conclusions, Jefferson cautioned Cabell:
This reasoning appears to me to be sound; but on so recent a
change of view, caution requires us not to be too confident, and
that we admit this to be one of the doubtful questions on which
honest men may differ with the purest motives; and the more
207
readily, as we find we have differed from ourselves on it.
Jefferson warned that state-imposed qualifications on members of Congress were best avoided because they called for adjudicating sensitive
constitutional issues that threatened to generate needless friction between the central government and the states:
I have always thought where the line of demarcation between
the powers of the General and the State governments was
doubtfully or indistinctly drawn, it would be prudent and
praiseworthy in both parties, never to approach it but under
the most urgent necessity. Is the necessity now urgent, to declare that no non-resident of his district shall be eligible as a
member of Congress? It seems to me that, in practice, the par204. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell (Jan. 31, 1814), in THE FOUNDERS' CONsTrrTUON, supra note 41, at 81.

205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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tialities of the people are a sufficient security against such an
election; and that if, in any instance, they should ever choose a
non-resident, it must be one of such eminent merit and qualifications, as would make it a good, rather than an evil; and that,
in any event, the examples will be so rare, as never to amount
to a serious evil. If the case then be neither clear nor urgent,
would it not be better to let it lie
undisturbed? Perhaps its de2 08
cision may never be called for.
In Jefferson's view, the benefits of state-imposed qualifications on federal representatives were illusory. The people should be trusted to pick
the most meritorious candidates to represent them in Congress. Moreover, such qualifications might be costly to federalism, given the potential for a constitutional standoff between Congress and the states.
Jefferson's reluctance to let the states add qualifications to those
fixed by the Constitution is compelling. While not an Anti-Federalist, he
had long championed states' rights. Jeffersonian republicanism was synonymous with circumscribed national power. Toward this end, Jefferson himself had advocated term limitation for federal officeholders since
the days of the Declaration of Independence.2 0 9 It might be easily
imagined that if Jefferson had been a U.S. Representative in 1807, instead of President, he would have joined his fellow Virginians in supporting the constitutionality of the Maryland residency law. Instead, he
agreed with the House's decision until challenged by Cabell, and even
then warned against any state-imposed qualifications on members of
2 10
Congress except "under the most urgent necessity."
2. Justice Story's Commentaries.
Jefferson's doubts about the House's decision in the Maryland Contested Election were in turn questioned by Justice Joseph Story, one of
the greatest constitutional scholars of the era. In his Commentaries on the
Constitution,2 1 I Story argued that Jefferson erred by telling Cabell that
states could impose substantive qualifications on federal officials if extraordinary circumstances warranted them.
Story suggested that Jefferson, "with his avowed devotion to state
power, '"212 had been blinded to the true source of congressional authority. Jefferson's reading of the Tenth Amendment failed to recognize
that "no powers could be reserved to the states, except those, that ex208. Id.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
210. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Cabell (Jan. 31, 1814), in THE FOUNDERS'
CoNsrrrTUrION, supra note 41, at 81. The wording ofJefferson's letter indicates that it was
Cabell who first suggested that states could impose qualifications on members of Congress; Jefferson responded that he had never even considered the idea until he received
Cabell's letter. Id. The fact that Cabell was apparently trying to persuade his close friend
of the correctness of his position may be significant. Jefferson responded that Cabell's
opinion was "sound," but then cautioned him against taking action. Id.
211. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 2: §§ 612-28, reprintedin THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTIrrUON, supra note 41, at 81.

212. Id. at 84.
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isted in the states before the Constitution was adopted." 21 3 In reality,
Story argued, it was the Constitutional Convention-and not the
states-that created the national government. Consequently, Congress's authority can only come from the Constitution itself. Like other
federal officeholders, members of Congress owe their existence to the
people, whose delegates created the Constitution.
The truth is, that the states can exercise no powers whatsoever,
which exclusively spring out of the existence of the national
government, which the Constitution does not delegate to them.
They have just as much right, and no more, to prescribe new
qualifications for a representative, as they have for a president.
Each is an officer of the Union, deriving his powers and qualifications from the Constitution, and neither created by, dependent upon, nor controllable by, the states. It is no original
prerogative of state power to appoint a representative, a senator, or a president for the Union. Those officers owe their
existence and functions to the united voice of the whole, not a
portion of, the people. Before a state can assert the right, it
must show, that the Constitution has delegated and recognized
it. No state
can say, that it has reserved, what it never
2 14
possessed.
Moving from constitutional theory to practice, Story warned that
state-imposed restrictions on congressional service threatened to read
the Standing Qualifications Clauses out of the Constitution. Had the
Maryland residency law at issue in 1807 been upheld, other states might
have prescribed "that a representative should be forty years of age, and
a citizen for ten years. In each case, the very qualification fixed by the
'2 15
Constitution is completely evaded, and indirectly abolished.
Justice Story's critique is no less persuasive today, at a time when
several supporters of the term limitation movement have resurrected
Thomas Jefferson's Tenth Amendment theory to defend state-based initiatives 2 16 such as that passed in Colorado. The notion that states can
213. Id. (emphasis added).
214. Id. § 626 at 84. Story's theory of federal power is consistent with statements made
on the House floor in 1807 by several opponents of Maryland's residency law. See, e.g., the
remarks of Representative Key, supra text accompanying note 190.
215. STORY, supra note 211, at 85.

216. Admittedly, Story assumed that state legislatures such as Maryland's were imposing qualifications on federal officials, and were not amending their state constitutions

through the initiative process. As his Commentaries acknowledge: "A state, and the legislature of a state, are quite different political beings." Id. § 627 at 84. Story observed, however, that the Tenth Amendment does not reserve powers to the states exclusively, as

political bodies, but to the states or the people. Id. Story also implicitly drew a further
distinction-and, for our purposes, a more important one-between the people of a given

state and "the whole people of the United States," id. at 85, whose delegates framed the
Constitution. Just as the states cannot impose qualifications on federal officers, the people
of those states cannot do so either-unless, of course, they amend the U.S. Constitution.

Thus, extending Story's reasoning, it makes no difference whether congressional term limits are imposed by a state law or by popular amendments to a state constitution. From the
standpoint of federal constitutional law, the only salient point is that the Standing Qualifications Clauses for members of Congress are fixed by the Constitution itself. Changing
them means changing the Constitution.
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bar congressional incumbents from standing for re-election depends on
interpreting the Tenth Amendment to deny the federal government all
powers not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. 21 7 This view is unconvincing for the same reasons that led Story to reject it in 1833. This
argument rests on the flawed premise that states retain powers which
they never had. Federal power, including that which created Congress,
derives from "We the People," and not-as Jefferson supposed-from
"We the States." When the people's delegates chose the Standing Qualifications Clauses as the exclusive criteria for congressional service, they
necessarily barred Congress and the states from imposing their own
qualifications. Nothing prevents the people from changing their minds
now, but to do so they must also change the supreme embodiment of
their will: the text of the Constitution.
3.

Congressionally Imposed Qualifications Prior to Powell.

Although Congress has not considered the constitutionality of
state-imposed qualifications on national lawmakers since 1807, it has occasionally excluded duly elected members for reasons other than those
enumerated in the Standing Qualifications Clauses. 2 18 The first such incident occurred in 1868, when a House dominated by radical republicans voted to exclude two members-elect accused of giving aid and
comfort to the Confederacy. 21 9 The Senate quickly followed suit, excluding a member-elect accused of the same offense. 22 0 As one commentator has concluded, "[t]his change was produced by the North's
bitter enmity toward those who failed to support the Union cause during
the war.... It was a shift brought about by the naked urgency of power
22 1
and was given little doctrinal support."
217. For example, the brochure distributed by the Colorado term limit campaign prior
to the 1990 election assures voters: "According to the U.S. Constitution, we do have the
right to limit terms." TERM LIMITATIONS, supra note 22. After reciting the text of the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the brochure proposes a theory of retained rights that, in
its essential features, is identical to the view espoused by Jefferson in 1814 and later discredited by Story:
What this means is that the federal government has only those powers explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution. On any matter on which the Constitution is silent, the states, or the people, have the right to do what they want. There is no
mention in the Constitution, pro or con, on limiting the tenure of Congressman
[sic] and senators. So, according to both the plain meaning of the Constitution,
and the intent of the Founding Fathers, as described in the Federalist Papers and
other documents, if a state, by vote of the people, should decide to limit terms of
its federal representatives, it has the right to do so.
Id.
218. For a detailed historical account of those instances, see Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 543L47 (1969). For most of the 19th century, Congress steadfastly opposed
efforts to create additional qualifications. This pressure intensified during and immediately following the Civil War, when both the House and Senate initially resisted several
attempts to exclude members-elect accused of disloyalty to the Union. Id. at 544 n.80.
219. 1 HINDS, supra note 199, §§ 449-51, 464.
220. SENATE ELECTION, EXPULSION AND CENSURE CASES, S. Doc. No. 71 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 21 (1962).
221. Comment, Legislative Exclusion:Julian Bond and Adam Clayton Powell, 35 U. CHI. L.
REV. 151, 157 (1967).
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From the Reconstruction era to Powell v. McCormack,2 22 congressional exclusion was sporadic and unprincipled. Congress refused to
seat members-elect for "offenses" ranging from socialist beliefs, 223 to
polygamy, 22 4 to selling appointments to the U.S. military and naval
academies. 22 5 The Senate successfully excluded a member for the last
time in 1929,226 and in 1967, the House's exclusion of Representative
Adam Clayton Powell of New York ended a congressional practice reminiscent of that used by Parliament in refusing to seat John Wilkes.
C.

The Powell Decision

In Powell v. McCormack,2 2 7 the Supreme Court for the first time confronted the question whether Congress's authority to judge the qualifications of its members included the power to create qualificatiors not
enumerated in the Standing Qualifications Clauses. The case was
brought by longstanding incumbent Representative Adam Clayton Powell of New York, who, in 1966, had been re-elected to serve in the Ninetieth Congress. During the previous Congress, a special House
subcommittee had concluded that Powell and members of his staff had
deceived House authorities about certain travel expenses. 2 28 The Committee's report also presented strong evidence that Powell had ordered
illegal salary payments be made to his wife. 229 The House took no formal action against Powell during the Eighty-Ninth Congress. 23 0 Prior to
the organization of the Ninetieth Congress, however, the Democratic
members-elect met in caucus and voted to remove Powell as chairman of
23
the Committee on Education and Labor. '
When the Ninetieth Congress officially convened in January 1967,
Powell's colleagues asked him to step aside while the oath of office was
administered to the other members-elect. 23 2 The House then convened
a second investigating committee to determine whether Powell was eligible to take his seat. 233 Upon the Committee's first invitation to appear
before them, Powell gave only limited testimony. 234 Following a second
invitation, Powell refused to testify, arguing that the standing qualifications were the exclusive requirements for congressional service, and that
222. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
223.

See, e.g., CLARENCE CANNON, 6 PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF

THE UNITED STATES §§ 56-59 (1935) (exclusion of Representative Victor L. Berger).
224. See, e.g., I HINDS, supra note 199, §§ 473, 477-80.
225. See 2 Hinds id. § 1273.
226. See CANNON, supra note 223, § 180. A 1947 effort to exclude Senator Theodore G.
Bilbo of Mississippi for illegally intimidating black voters in Democratic primaries, and for
allegedly accepting gifts from war contractors, ended when he died. 93 CONG. REC. 3-28
(1947).
227. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
228. Id. at 490.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. Powell requested an adversarial-type procedure be instituted, and when this
request was refused, he testified only as to his age, citizenship and residency.
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members could not be punished or expelled unless they had first been
seated. 235 When the committee reported that Powell had engaged in
various other improprieties, the House finally passed a resolution excluding Powell and declaring his seat vacant. 2 36 Powell and several voters from New York's Eighteenth Congressional District then brought
suit against the House, seeking a declaratory judgment that he had been
improperly excluded. 23 7 While the case was pending, the Ninetieth Congress terminated; Powell was seated as a member of the Ninety-First
Congress. 23 8
Writing for an 8-1 majority, Chief Justice Warren concluded "that
the Constitution leaves the House without authority to exclude any person, duly elected by his constituents, who meets all the requirements for
membership expressly prescribed in the Constitution. '- 23 9 Thus, "in
judging the qualifications of its members, Congress is limited to the
standing qualifications prescribed in the Constitution. '2 40 That rule,
which the Court has followed to this day, prevents Congress from using
Article I, Section 5 to create substantive qualifications for its
24
members. 1
In holding that the Standing Qualifications Clauses are the exclusive set of criteria for congressional service, the Powell Court based its
decision on an exhaustive review of "the relevant historical materials."' 24 2 These materials were not limited to qualifications created by
Congress. Rather, the Court also cited the John Wilkes Case and the
Convention debates, as well as the outcome of the Maryland Contested
Election, to support its expansive conclusion that the standing qualifications are fixed by the text of the Constitution. 24 3 Thus, while the issue
of state-imposed qualifications was not directly before the Court, the nature of the materials used by the Powell Court strongly suggests that
state-imposed qualifications are invalid as well.
235. lId at 492.

236. l
237. Id. at 493.
238. Id. at 495.
239. Id. Although Powell involved a U.S. Representative, the Court emphasized that its
holding applied with equal force to the Senate since Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution
applies to both houses of Congress. Id at n.44.
240. Id at 550.
241. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 133 (1976). In invalidating several portions of
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Buckley Court, citing Powell, observed:
The power of each House to judge whether one claiming election as a Senator or
Representative has met the requisite qualifications . . . cannot reasonably be
translated into a power granted to the Congress itself to impose substantive qualifications on the right to so hold office. Whatever power Congress may have to
legislate such qualifications must derive from § 4, rather than § 5, of Article I.
Id The constitutionality of using the Times, Placei and Manner Clause of Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution as a basis for federal term limitation is examined infra notes 244307 and accompanying text.
242. Powell, 395 U.S. at 522.
243. Id. at 527-31, 542-47.
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TERM LIMITS AND THE TIMES, PLACES AND MANNER CLAUSE

Despite the Court's holding in Powell and substantial historical evidence suggesting that the Standing Qualifications Clauses are the exclusive requirements for congressional service, term limit supporters offer
two theories to defend the constitutionality of state initiatives. The first
argument simply revives Jefferson's 1814 theory of unenumerated
rights. 244 According to this line of analysis, states retain the right to bar
congressional incumbents from standing for re-election under the
Tenth Amendment because the Constitution does not expressly prohibit
such restrictions. 24 5 The second theory takes a different approach. It
asserts that the Times, Places and Manner Clause of Article I, Section
4,246 which permits states to establish procedures for electing U.S. Senators and Representatives, also includes a substantive component allowing states to prevent incumbents from seeking re-election.
According to this view, a state may legitimately conclude that its members of Congress wield so much power-in the form of campaign finance
laws and "the array of incumbent-protections Congress has created on
its own behalf" 24 7-that elections have become ineffective as a means of
determining true voter preferences. To halt "this erosion of competitive Democracy by Congress," 24 8 states may invoke the Times, Places

and Manner Clause to bar incumbents from seeking re-election, thereby
restoring integrity to the manner of federal elections.
While this second theory has attracted widespread public attention,
it depends on the same faulty premise as the first: that the Standing
Qualifications Clauses are not the exclusive criteria for congressional
244. See supra text accompanying notes 205-206.
245. See id.
246. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl.1. ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except
as to the Places of chusing Senators.")
247. Editorial, supra note 29. Examples of "incumbent protections" include congressional staff, targeted mailings to constituents (in the form of newsletters and casework),
and franking and long-distance phone privileges.
248. Glazier, supra note 29. The Wall StreetJournal's editorial board echoed this sentiment in an editorial praising both Glazier's earlier article (which appeared on the opinions
page) and the Colorado initiative. The editorial distinguishes Powell on the facts and, more
importantly, on the grounds that:
ti]ts
argument against Congressional exclusion was based on the principle that in
a democracy the people should be able to elect whom they please. But surely the
near-impossibility of defeating an incumbent today allows Colorado voters to
democratically decide that the only way they can easily remove incumbents is to
limit terms.
Id. The editorial observes that term limitation "is admittedly a blunt weapon," but warns
that without it, "citizen interest and participation in politics will continue to plummet as
elections more and more seem a sullen ratification of the status quo, rather than competitive contests." Id
Cortez and Macaulay make essentially the same point in their article supporting the
Colorado initiative's constitutionality. Cortez & Macaulay, supra note 29. They conclude:
"With mounting evidence that the electoral process is operating so as to keep virtually
every incumbent in office as long as he or she chooses to run, the need to protect legitimate state interests should be manifest." Id. at 2198.
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service. 24 9 It is beyond doubt that the Times, Places and Manner Clause
lets states regulate the machinery of federal elections. But it does not
empower states to deny congressional membership to persons who
otherwise meet the standing qualifications of age, residency and citizenship. The Standing Qualifications Clauses of sections 2 and 3 are substantive rules, defining who is eligible to serve in the House and Senate,
respectively. In contrast, Section 4 allows states to design the procedures
for their election. Together, these three clauses are part of a coherent
scheme; they simply cannot be read in isolation. Importing a substantive component into the word "Manner" so that states may define who is
eligible to serve in Congress can have but one result: to achieve indirectly what the Standing Qualifications Clauses directly forbid. Neither
history nor the relevant case law supports this view. Indeed, courts have
uniformly rejected state attempts to use the Times, Places and Manner
Clause to add congressional qualifications to those enumerated in the
Constitution.
A.

The Ballot Access Cases

Supporters of the Times, Places and Manner Clause theory claim
that a line of cases denying ballot access to independent party candidates in congressional elections means that states may disqualify any potential candidate so long as they do not violate the First or Fourteenth
Amendments. Adherents of this view admit that the states have never
2 50
construed the Times, Places and Manner Clause in quite this way.
Nonetheless, they assert that a 1974 Supreme Court decision, Storer v.
Brown,2 5 1 and a lower court ballot-access case, Williams v. Tucker, 25 2 justify reading the Clause with such breadth. 2 53 These decisions, however,
only permit states to deny ballot access for valid procedural reasons.
Neither case lets states impose their own substantive qualifications for
holding congressional office.
At issue in Storer was a California law that denied a place on the
ballot to independent candidates who voted in the immediately preceding primary, or who had registered with a qualified political party less
25 4
than one year prior to the immediately preceding primary election.
The law also required persons seeking ballot status as independent
249. Advocates of both theories take the position that Powell was either wrongly decided or does not apply to qualifications created by the states. See, e.g., Editorial, supra note
29 (stressing that the Powell Court "was silent on the issue of state regulation"). A variant
of this view stresses that even ifPowell was correctly decided, its holding is based solely on
Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution. Consequently, states are free to add their own
qualifications under Section 4 so long as they do not infringe the First or Fourteenth
Amendment rights of candidates or the voters. Cortez & Macaulay, supra note 29, at 2194.
250. In Glazier's words, the clause "has never been used by the states to limit the right
of a congressional incumbent to stand for re-election, which may be the reason that some
mistakenly assume that such limitations can be enacted only by constitutional amendment." Glazier, supra note 29.
251. 415 U.S. 724 (1973).
252. 382 F.Supp. 381 (D. Pa. 1974).
253. See generally Glazier, supra note 29.
254. 415 U.S. at 726.
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party candidates to file nominating papers signed by a certain number of
voters at least sixty days prior to the general election. 25 5 Storer and
Frammhagen had been registered Democrats in early 1972, but sought
ballot status as independent candidates for Congress in the November
general elections. 2 56 Two other plaintiffs, members of the Communist
Party, claimed the right to be independent candidates for President and
Vice President. 25 7 Storer and Frammhagen claimed that the California
provision not only violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 2 58
but that it also added qualifications for congressional office in violation
of Article I, Section 2.259
In a 6-3 decision, the Court upheld the law, 2 60 concluding that it
was an "integral part of the entire election process" 2 6 1 by which the
state's voters selected public officers. Although a state's disaffiliation
condition cannot unduly burden the right of independent candidates or
their supporters to associate for political purposes under the First
Amendment, or to vote effectively under the Equal Protection
Clause, 26 2 the Court ruled that California had a legitimate interest in
protecting its direct primary process by refusing to recognize independent candidates who failed to make early plans to leave a party and take
26 3
the alternative course to the ballot.
Storer established an analytical framework for evaluating whether a
state law violates the Standing Qualifications Clauses or the Times,
Places and Manner Clause. The first step is to determine whether the
state law at issue is designed to regulate election procedures. If so, the
Court proceeds to examine that process to determine whether the
state's interest is sufficiently strong to overcome any First or Fourteenth
Amendment concerns. If, however, the state law does not regulate election procedures, but instead makes certain persons ineligible to serve in
Congress, the Court must then decide if the law violates the Standing
Qualifications Clauses by imposing additional qualifications on mem26 4
bers of Congress.
255. Id. at 726-27.
256. Ia at 727.
257. Id. at 728.
258. Id. at 727-28.
259. Id. at 728.
260. The dissenters would have held that the law unduly infringed the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of independent candidates and their supporters. Id at 756
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
261. Id at 735.
262. Id at 729.
263. Id.at 735. Because the California primary was the first stage in a process designed
"to winnow out and finally reject all but the chosen candidates," id, allowing defeated
primary candidates to win a place on the general election ballot would not only undermine
the procedures with which the major political parties selected their candidates, but confuse
the voters. As the Court observed: "The people, it is hoped, are presented with understandable choices and the winner in the general election with sufficient support to govern
effectively." Id.
264. Applying this framework, the StorerCourt held that the statute was concerned with
maintaining the integrity of California's election process. Moreover, the plaintiffs could
have registered with a qualified party within the proper time frame and sought its nomination, see id.at 746 n. 16, or filed nominating papers for ballot status as independent candi-

19921

THE NEW ANTI-FEDERALISM

Williams v. Tucker 26 5 applied the Storer framework to uphold a Pennsylvania statute preventing an incumbent Representative, who had been
defeated in his party's primary, from having his name placed on the general election ballot as an independent candidate. 2 66 Pennsylvania's election code established two methods of nomination for Congress:
candidates could either seek to be nominated in a political party primary
election, or file nominating papers signed by a certain number of independent voters. 26 7 However, the law barred candidates who failed to
win their party's primary from filing nomination papers for the general
election. 26 8 After Representative Williams's defeat in the Republican
primary, he attempted to run as an independent and ultimately landed
in court, where he presented the same constitutional objections as had
the plaintiffs in Storer.2 69 Applying the Storer framework, the district
court characterized the state law as procedural, and then rejected arguments that it infringed the plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. 2 70 And, as in Storer, the court brushed aside Williams's claim that
the statute violated the Standing Qualifications Clause. 2 7 1 According to
the court, the statute "merely regulates the manner of holding elections
and does not add qualifications for office."' 2 72 By equating the word
"manner" with election procedures, Williams directly undercuts the notion that the Times, Places and Manner Clause permits states to regulate
the qualifications for congressional service.
Ironically, some commentators claim that these two ballot-access
cases support the theory that the Times, Places and Manner Clausejustifies state-imposed term limits on members of Congress. Writing in The
Wall StreetJournal,New York attorney Stephen Glazier characterizes Williams as holding that "states can restrict access of congressional incumbents to the ballot, by using one-year waiting periods before running for
re-election, in order to pursue the Storer state interest in an effective
election process. ' 27 3 Speaking of these cases and the "resign-to-run"
decisions discussed below, Glazier concludes:
The thrust of these cases is that the actions of a democratically
elected state government will not be frustrated by the "no additional qualifications" clauses, if the state limits candidates for
its congressional races in a way that does not offend freedom of
speech or
equal protection and that pursues some state
2 74
interest.
Glazier's analysis of the cases may be tantalizing. However, it all
dates. See id. Instead, they failed to comply with either procedure. In no sense was
California prescribing qualifications for congressional eligibility.
265. 382 F. Supp. 381 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 383.
268. Id. at 384.
269. Id. at 385-87.
270. Id. at 388.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Glazier, supra note 29.
274. Id.
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but ignores their doctrinal significance. Storer establishes a two-part inquiry for applying the Times, Places and Manner Clause: 1) Does the
state law in question regulate election procedures for congressional candidates, and 2) if so, does the state have a legitimate interest in those
procedures that is sufficiently compelling to outweigh First and Fourteenth Amendment values? If, however, a state law purports to disqualify an entire class of persons from standing for re-election-as
congressional term limits would do in the case of incumbents-then the
Times, Places and Manner Clause simply does not apply.
Glazier argues that all state election laws, even those imposing direct restrictions on the eligibility of persons to serve in Congress, should
merely be judged by their impact on free speech and equal protectionas if the Standing Qualifications Clauses did not exist. As a critic of Glazier's approach observes: "Denying ballot access for valid procedural
reasons is not the same as requiring an additional qualification for a congressional office." 2 75 By confusing these two concepts, Glazier would
effectively read the standing qualifications out of the Constitution by allowing the states and Congress to expand and contract such qualifications at will through the use of the Times, Places and Manner Clause.
The dangers of this approach, so eloquently debated during the Maryland Contested Election of 1807, are manifest. As Representative Philip
Key warned on the House floor, this approach would permit the states
"to curtail and rob the people of their elective franchise" 2 76 by denying
those who wish to support incumbents from doing so.
Nor are the states the sole source of that danger. Critics of the "Imperial Congress" would do well to remember that the Times, Places and
Manner Clause also applies to Congress. Reading the clause to allow
state-imposed qualifications might tempt the House and Senate to add
their own restrictions, diminishing the franchise even further. Of
2 77
course, it might be argued that public pressure would prevent this.
Then again, public pressure has not prevented congressional turnover
to hover below 10% per election for nearly two decades. It is unclear
why the national legislature should be trusted to determine the rules of
its own members when its forays into this arena since the Wilkes case
have so often been alarming.
B.

The Resign-to-Run Cases
Finally, advocates of the Times, Places and Manner Clause theory

275. Memorandum from L. Paige Whitaker, Library of Congress, Constitutionality of
States Limiting Re-Election to Congress 2 (July 6, 1990) (on file with the authors). Whitaker
concludes that Glazier's reliance on Storer and other ballot access cases "seems to be misplaced. No case he sets forth involves the question of qualifications for office. Instead,
they all focus on procedural aspects of elections, which have traditionally been within the
purview of state legislation or federal legislation if the Congress deemed it appropriate."
Id.

276. 17 ANNALS

OF CONG.

913 (1807).

277. Glazier suggests a slightly different scenario: that public pressure would prevent
Congress from repealing state-imposed term limits on its members. Glazier, supra note 29.
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claim support from a second line of cases involving "resign-to-run" requirements for state officeholders. A number of states have passed such
laws (in the form of statutes or state constitutional amendments) to prohibit their high-ranking officials from running for Congress unless they
resign first.278 These decisions are typically distinguishable from the
ballot-access cases in one important respect. Resign-to-run provisions
are not directly concerned with regulating federal election procedures
per se, but rather with ensuring that certain state officeholders who run
for Congress (or, for that matter, for other state offices) do not neglect
their official duties or otherwise harm the state's plenary power in administering its government. 2 79 Despite this difference, the test for determining the constitutionality of resign-to-run provisions is the same as
that used in the ballot-access cases. A resign-to-run provision will be
upheld only if it does not prevent a person from standing for election to
Congress, but merely imposes "indirect burdens" on her candidacy-for
instance, by requiring her to resign her post in the state judiciary or
legislature before seeking a House or Senate seat. 280 If the law categorically denies the person's eligibility, or is so burdensome as to have the
281
same practical effect, the Standing Qualifications Clauses apply.
Glazier bases much of his argument supporting term limitation on
the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Clements v. Flashing.2 8 2 That case
involved two provisions of the Texas Constitution-an ineligibility for
legislature provision, 2 83 and a resign-to-run provision.28 4 The ineligibility provision declared that persons holding state, federal and foreign
government offices were ineligible to serve in the Texas Legislature. 28 5
The provision required the officeholder to complete his or her current
term of office before he or she was eligible to take a seat in the state
legislature. 28 6 The Texas Constitution further provided that if holders
of certain state and county offices whose unexpired terms exceeded one
year became candidates for any state or federal office, "such announcement or such candidacy shall constitute an automatic resignation from
the office then held. '' 28 7 The plaintiffs, all subject to this resign-to-run
provision, claimed that they would have run for the state legislature if
not for the provision. 28 8 The Court rejected their First and Fourteenth
Amendment claims, arguing that the state's interests outweighed the im28 9
pediments to their candidacies.
278. See, e.g.,Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523, 1529 n.4 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1002 (1983) (listing cases holding that state laws rendering officials ineligible for
state office prescribe unconstitutional qualifications).
279. See, e.g., Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d 853, 859 (2d Cir. 1980).
280. See, e.g.,Joyner, 706 F.2d at 1528.
281. Id. at 1528, 1531.
282. 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
283. TEx. CoNsT. art. III, § 19.
284. Id. art. XVI, § 65.
285. Id.art. III, § 19.
286. Clements, 457 U.S. at 960.
287. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 65.
288. Clements, 457 U.S. at 961.
289. Id.at 972-73.
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C/ements did not even mention the Standing Qualifications Clauses.
The state officials involved wanted to run for the Texas legislature. Yet,
although he admits that "[t]he facts of Clements are a bit different than
restricting incumbents in Congress from running for re-election," he
claims the case establishes "the constitutional analysis for anti-incumbent laws." '290 He goes on to explain that a state can declare incumbents
who would like to run for Congress ineligible so long as it does not
infringe their free speech or equal protection rights. 29 1 As in his discussion of Storer and Williams, Glazier draws no distinction between laws
entitling state officials to run for Congress so long as they resign first,
and laws barring them from ever doing so. Here, however, he compounds the error by treating all "anti-incumbent laws" alike, as if
Texas's plenary power over its state legislators is coextensive with its
authority over Congress. This assertion probably flows from Glazier's
curious point of departure: that C/ements, the decision that supposedly
"establishes the constitutional analysis for anti-incumbent laws," 29 2
does not even mention the Standing Qualifications Clauses.
Glazier closes by extending his Clements analysis to a pair of federal
appellate court resign-to-run cases, Signorelli v. Evans 293 and Joyner v.
Mofford.294 Both cases, he argues, support the idea that states can override the standing qualifications when necessary to protect the integrity
of congressional elections. 29 5 That integrity is threatened not only
when election procedures are deficient, but when the substantive outcomes of elections fail to promote "democratic principles. 2 9 6
Glazier quite appropriately speaks in terms of the states' legitimate
interests. Yet he fails to explain that the states can impose only indirect
burdens on potential candidates for Congress even when those interests
are most compelling. Signorelli andJoyner make clear that states cannot
add to, subtract from, or modify the standing qualifications for nomination or election to Congress-even when the candidates are high-ranking state officeholders who fall under the state's traditional plenary
power. 29 7 Because congressional incumbents are not "state officials,"
290. Glazier, supra note 29.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. 637 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1980).
294. 706 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir. 1983).
295. Glazier, supra note 29.
296. Id. Two other commentators, Miles C. Cortez, Jr. and Christopher T. Macaulay,
both Denver attorneys, echo Glazier's view. After reviewing Signorelli andJoyner,as well as
the ballot-access cases, they conclude:
It is undisputed that the states have authority to regulate the manner of elections,
and, in fact, the states have a duty to see that elections are open, competitive and
free from influence.... If evidence establishes that election outcomes are predetermined or results guaranteed within two or three percentage points, the state
has an obligation to adopt measures necessary to insure that the people are able
to exercise the franchise in fair and open elections. There is no more basic area
of legitimate and traditional state interest.
Cortez & Macauley, supra note 29, at 2196.
297. See Signorelli, 637 F.2d at 8 58;Joyner, 706 F.2d at 1528.
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the argument for allowing states to prohibit incumbent U.S. Representatives and Senators from standing for re-election is even less persuasive.
In Signorelli, the Second Circuit rejected a challenge to a New York
law requiring state judges to resign from the judiciary before running
for political office. 2 98 The court emphasized that the law placed only an
indirect burden on potential candidates, and did not prevent judges
299
from seeking federal office.
Similarly, in Joyner, the Ninth Circuit distinguished between state
laws which violate the Standing Qualifications Clauses by barring potential candidates from seeking federal office, and those that merely regulate the conduct of state officeholders by requiring them to resign
first. 30 0 ConradJoyner, a Pima County, Arizona supervisor, brought suit
challenging a resign-to-run provision in the state's constitution.3 0 1 The
provision prohibited various state officials from remaining in office if
they ran for an elected federal position before the final year of their
term.3 0 2 The district court held for the plaintiff, permitting him to
mount an unsuccessful campaign in the Republican primary for Arizona's newly created fifth congressional district.3 0 3 The Ninth Circuit
later reversed, rejectingJoyner's argument that the resign-to-run provision created an impermissible "fourth" qualification for county supervisors in violation of Article I, Section 2.304
Like Signorelli, Joyner emphasizes that states may use their plenary
power to impose indirect burdens on state officeholders seeking federal
election, but are forbidden by the Standing Qualifications Clauses from
barring any person-even the state's own officials-from running for
Congress. 30 5 Joyner also implicitly rejects the notion that the Times,
Places and Manner Clause permits states to infringe those qualifications
by stealth:
The courts considering challenges to state laws relying on the
Qualifications Clause have distinguished between state provisions which bar a potential candidate from running for federal
office, and those which merely regulate the conduct of state officeholders. The former category of laws imposes additional
qualifications on candidates and therefore violates the Qualifications Clause, while the latter category is constitutionally ac298. Signorelli, 637 F.2d at 856.
299. Id. at 859. In arguing that indirect burdens on candidates are ordinarily constitutional-particularly when imposed on state officials subject to the state's plenary powerthe Signorelli court referred to the Incompatibility Clause, which provides: "[N]o Person
holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his
Continuance in Office." U.S. COws-T. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. The court observed that the clause
"regulates federal offices even though it indirectly imposes an additional requirement
upon holding Congressional office." 637 F.2d at 859. As with resign-to-run provisions,
the Incompatibility Clause does not prevent officers of the United States from running for
Congress. Rather, it imposes an indirect burden by requiring that they resign first.
300. Joyner, 706 F.2d at 1528.
301. Id. at 1526.
302. Id. at 1525.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1528.
305. Id.
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ceptable since it merely bars state officeholders from remaining
in their positions should they choose to run for federal office.
The burden of candidacy, imposed by laws of the latter category, is indirect and attributable to a desire to regulate state
officeholders and not
to impose additional qualifications to
30 6
serving in Congress.
While neitherJoyner nor Signorelli raises the issue of congressional
term limitation, there are at least two reasons why these decisions prevent states from imposing such restrictions under the Times, Places and
Manner Clause. First, state initiatives such as Colorado's categorically
deny incumbents the right to stand for re-election. Joyner and Signorelli,
as well as the ballot-access cases, demonstrate that states may use Article
I, Section 4 only to hinder certain classes of persons from running for
Congress; they cannot prevent any person from standing for election or
re-election. To the extent term limits disqualify congressional incumbents, they violate the Standing Qualifications Clauses.
Second, the resign-to-run cases show that states have a special interest in regulating the conduct of their own officials. 30 7 The states' plenary power gives them greater latitude to impose indirect burdens on
state officeholders who, unlike congressional incumbents, are within the
states' immediate control. Nevertheless, if state officials desire to run
for Congress, the Standing Qualifications Clauses do not allow state
governments to disqualify them. The ballot remains open to them, provided that they resign their state posts or conform to alternative
procedures.
In sum, the ballot-access and resign-to-run cases reveal that the
push for importing a substantive component into the Times, Places and
Manner Clause did not originate in, and is not endorsed by, the courts.
Those who insist that the Clause lets states decide both the manner in
which elections are run, and who may run in them, are really arguing
that the standing qualifications are neither fixed nor exclusive. Such a
conclusion cannot be supported by either case law or the deliberations
of the Constitutional Convention.
CONCLUSION

The debate over congressional term limitation is not new. The Federalists and Anti-Federalists fought it out at the Philadelphia Convention
more than two centuries ago. The Federalists prevailed, defeating all
efforts to limit congressional terms. In the intervening years, several
306. Id.
307. In Joyner, the Ninth Circuit accepted the state's argument that the resign-to-run
provision was essential for four reasons: 1) to encourage elected state officials to devote
themselves exclusively to the duties of their office; 2) to reduce the possibility that officials
will simply use their state office as a political "stepping stone;" 3) to guard against abuse of
office before and after the election; and 4) to protect the expectations of the electorate in
voting a candidate into state office. Id. at 1532. Thus, the State of Arizona did not hinder
Joyner's candidacy in order to control the substantive outcome of his congressional campaign. Instead, Arizona made it more difficult for him and other state officials to run for
federal office because it wanted to protect the integrity of its own government.
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states restricted the tenure of their own officeholders. At the federal
level, the Twenty-Second Amendment now limits the President to a
maximum eight years of service. But neither Congress nor the states
have used the constitutional amendment process to limit congressional
terms. While the courts have never squarely addressed the issue, Powell
and a wealth of historical evidence show that the Standing Qualifications
Clauses are the exclusive criteria for congressional service. State measures like Colorado's 1990 initiative add another qualification-lack of
incumbency-to those enumerated in the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the overwhelming historical evidence and case law,
proponents of congressional term limitation rely on two basic arguments to justify the constitutionality of their proposals. Neither, however, is persuasive. The argument which relies on the Tenth
Amendment fails because the Tenth Amendment cannot reserve a
power to the states or the people when that power has already been
delegated to the federal government in the Standing Qualifications
Clauses. The argument that the Times, Places and Manner Clause permits Congress and the states to impose substantive requirements on federal officeholders is equally unpersuasive. Federal courts have
repeatedly held that this Clause permits states to regulate election procedures, such as political party registration, and not the substantive requirements of office-holding. Using the Clause as a textual basis for
declaring congressional incumbents ineligible for re-election would permit states to modify the standing qualifications through the backdoorin other words, to achieve precisely what the Constitution forbids.
Thus, while no court has faced the question directly, the Colorado
initiative and others like it are unlikely to pass constitutional muster in
the U.S. Supreme Court. This possibility has not deterred the term limitation movement's political campaign. If anything, the fact that the issue
is technically still an open question has energized the movement's leaders. The remarks of one of the movement's national spokespersons,
Colorado State Senator Terry Considine, illustrates this point. Considine, who chaired the successful 1990 initiative campaign in Colorado,
admits it might be unconstitutional for a state to limit the number of
terms its members of Congress may serve. A brochure distributed to
voters by his campaign organization states: "The provision limiting the
terms of Colorado's U.S. Senators and Representatives could, of course,
be challenged in the courts. But that's not bad if it is the only way we
can find out for sure if a state does have the power to limit terms."130 8 In
other words, a constitutional showdown is not only expected, but
desired.
Considine is certainly correct in stating that the constitutionality of
the Colorado initiative is officially in limbo. It is unclear whether the
federal courts will accept jurisdiction before the issue ripens-that is,
before the Secretary of State declares an incumbent ineligible to have
308.

TERM LIMITATIONS,

supra note 22.
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her name on the ballot because she has served a maximum of twelve
years. Even if the courts were to consider the issue sooner, a final decision may still be years away. Meanwhile, initiative campaigns are reportedly underway in nearly two dozen states by term limit organizations
hoping to follow Colorado's lead. But supporters of these groups are
likely to wind up on the losing side of any constitutional test case they
may help to create.
No observer of the American political scene can doubt the seriousness of the political mood that underlies the term limitation movement.
Voters are justifiably concerned about the rise of the "professional politician" in Congress. They see fewer and fewer incumbents going down
to defeat at the ballot box. The public is demanding immediate reform
of the electoral process. While changes in campaign finance laws and
Congress's institutional procedures, such as its committee structure,
hold some hope for improvement, only term limitation purports to offer
a quick-fix to the problem. Hence its popular appeal.
But popular appeal is no substitute for constitutionality.3 0 9 Unfortunately, the term limitation movement, confronted by what it sees as a
Congress that frustrates the will of the people, has ignored the proper
constitutional procedure for achieving its objectives. If the American
people truly want congressional term limitation, they must amend the
Constitution.

309. By no means do we suggest that the popularity of these proposals among voters is
therefore unimportant. On the contrary, the term limitation movement might well have
strategic reasons for sponsoring state initiatives that are likely to fail in the courts. Several
commentators have predicted that if enough states follow Colorado's lead, Congress will
eventually bow to public pressure and approve a constitutional amendment limiting the
terms of its members. Crane, supra note 3, at 2.
Similarly, Congressional Quarterly has suggested that the term limitation movement
"may reshape congressional politics without ever imposing term limits by law ....
For
example, a pledge to limit one's terms could be to the politics of the near future what the
no-new-taxes pledge was to the politics of the recent past." Elving, supra note 7, at 3101.

EXAMINING EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE
JURISPRUDENCE: SHOULD A CAUSE
OF ACTION BE CREATED FOR
STUDENT-ATHLETES?
Timothy Davis*
I.

INTRODUCTION 1

The state of intercollegiate athletics continues to generate substantial study and intense debate. 2 In 1990, the Knight Commission released a report which recommended major reforms and structural
changes in intercollegiate athletics. 3 The compromise of academic integrity was specifically identified as one of the critical issues confronting
intercollegiate athletics. 4 Public officials have also joined the chorus de* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law. B.A.
1975, Stanford University; J.D. 1979, University of California at Berkeley School of Law.
1. This Article is a sequel to Timothy Davis, An Absence of Good Faith: Defining a
University's Educational Obligation to Student-Athletes, 28 Hous. L. REV. 743 (1991). The
foregoing article focuses on the extent of the compromise of academic integrity in
intercollegiate athletics. That article also explored the nature of the express contractual
relationship between student-athletes and their institutions. Arguing that universities by
virtue of this contractual relationship make some form of educational commitment to
student-athletes, the article proposed that the good faith doctrine provides a mechanism
by which meaning can be given to an institution's otherwise vaguely expressed academic
obligation to student-athletes,
The scope of this Article is summarized in the text accompanying notes 20-34, infra.
2. Several comprehensive studies examining various aspects of intercollegiate athletics have recently been published. The Knight Foundation Commission released a report
examining the state of college athletics on Mar. 19, 1991. Gerald Eskenazi, Panel Tells
College Heads to Take Control ofAthletics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1991, at D25. OnJuly 3, 1991,
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) released the first parts of a study
examining graduation rates for student-athletes. NCAA Findingsfrom its Study of 3,288 Athletes, USA TODAY, July 3, 1991, at 9C. A Chronicle of Higher Education survey, released
shortly before the NCAA study, also examined the graduation rates of student-athletes.
Douglas Lederman, College Athletes Graduate at Higher Rates Than Other Students, But Men's
Basketball PlayersLag FarBehind, a Survey Finds, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 27, 1991 at Al,
A38. A paper entitled "Light and Shadows on College Athletes" examines the careers of
former student-athletes. CLIFFORD ADELMAN, OFFICE OF EDuc. RESEARCH & IMPROVEMENT,
LIGHT AND SHADOWS ON COLLEGE ATHLETES: COLLEGE TRANSCRIPTS AND LABOR MARKET

HISTORY (1990). In 1989, the United States General Accounting Office released information concerning the academic performance of student-athletes. GAO, STUDENT ATHLETES:
INFORMATION ON THEIR ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE (1989).
Professor Murray Sperber provides a comprehensive examination of the financial, ethical and academic issues confronting intercollegiate athletics in MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE
SPORTS INC.: THE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT vs. THE UNIVERSITY (1990). The role that intercollegiate athletics plays in American society is examined in DONALD CHU, THE CHARACTER
OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION AND INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT (1989). Additional studies
and surveys are identified and discussed in Davis, supra note 1.
3. -REPORT OF THE KNIGHT COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, KEEPING
FAITH WITH THE STUDENT-ATHLETE: A NEW MODEL FOR INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS (1991)
[hereinafter KNIGHT COMMISSION REPORT]. The Knight Commission's proposed changes

are discussed in detail in Davis, supra note 1, at 767-68.
4.

KNIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 14-18.
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crying the condition of intercollegiate athletics. Federal legislation was
enacted in 1990 requiring colleges to disclose graduation rates for student-athletes. 5 Congressional hearings during the summer of 1991 fo7
6
cused on financial disclosure laws for college sports. Student-athletes
have taken steps to protect and promote their interests in the form of
private actions challenging the quality of the academic instruction they
received during college. 8 A recent lawsuit 9 asserted by a former basketball scholarship student questioned Drake University's educational commitment to student-athletes. 10 Shortly thereafter, a decision was
rendered in Ross v. Creighton University," a much celebrated 12 educational malpractice lawsuit asserted by a student-athlete.
Kevin Ross asserted claims against Creighton sounding in tort and
contract 13 for its alleged failure to provide him an opportunity to acquire basic academic skills during his tenure at the university. 14 Ross's
dissatisfaction with Creighton stemmed from Creighton's recruitment of
5. Student Right-to-Know Act, Pub. L. No. 101-542, 104 Stat. 2381 (1990). See
Christopher J. Alessandro, Note, The Student-Athlete Right-to-Know Act: Legislation Would Require Colleges to Make Public Graduation Rates of Student-Athletes, 16J.C. & U.L. 287 (1989), for
a detailed discussion of the legislation. See also Davis, supra note 1, at 765-66 (summarizing
the parameters of the disclosure requirements).
6. Douglas Lederman, House PanelHears Conflicting Testimony on Disclosure Law for College Sports, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 5, 1991, at A27. Governmental intervention is
further illustrated by federal legislation introduced in 1991 which would require the
NCAA to afford due process to those it investigates. Robert Sullivan, Watch Out, NCAA,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 1, 1991, at 9. A Florida state commission's review of NCAA

enforcement procedures and policies as a prerequisite to possible legislation illustrates
state legislators' interest in college athletics. Douglas Lederman, FacingNationwide Challenges to its Investigative Policies, NCAA is Forced to Defend Itself at a Hearing in Florida, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 6, 1991, at A31 (noting that the states of Nevada, Nebraska and Florida have already enacted such legislation).
7. "Student-athlete" refers to college students who attend post-secondary institutions on athletic scholarships. Davis, supra note 1, at 745 n.18; Derek Quinn Johnson,
Note, EducatingMisguided Student Athletes: An Application of Contract Theory, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
96 n.1 (1985).
8. Suits by student-athletes asserting educational malpractice claims against postsecondary institutions include:Jackson v. Drake Univ., No. CC-84-49942 (Iowa Dist. Polk
County, May 7, 1990); Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. Ill. 1990);Jones
v. Williams, 431 N.W.2d 419 (1988), appeal denied, 432 Mich. 931 (1989); Echols v. Board
of Trustees of Cal. State Univ. & Colleges, No. 266-777 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, Oct.
22, 1979). Refer to Davis, supra note 1, at 746 nn.19-21, for a discussion of the facts and
issues involved in these lawsuits.
9. In Jackson v. Drake Univ., No. CC-84-49942, (Iowa Dist. Polk County, May 7,
1990), Terrell Jackson asserted breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation and civil
rights claims against Drake University. The gravamen of Jackson's lawsuit was Drake's
alleged failure to afford him an opportunity to acquire a meaningful education.
10. Id.
11. Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1319.
12. The Ross lawsuit and its underlying circumstances have attracted considerable attention from the popular media. See, e.g.,Jack Curry, Suingfor 2d Chanceto Start Over, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 1990, at B9; Charles Mount, Kevin Ross Sues Creighton, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
July 25, 1989, at C1; Matt O'Connor, Probationin Hotel Rampage, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 7,
1989, at C3.
A recent student note examines the decision rendered by the Ross court. Edmund J.
Sherman, Note, Good Sports, Bad Sports: The District Court Abandons College Athletes in Ross v.
Creighton University, 11 Loy. ENTER. L.J. 657 (1991).
13. Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1322.
14. Id.
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him to play basketball, notwithstanding the university's alleged knowl-

edge of his lack of preparedness to take advantage of the school's educational

opportunities. 15

The

essence

of Ross's

claims was

16
Creighton's conduct amounted to educational malpractice.

that

In dismissing Ross's complaint, the federal district court aligned it-

self with the majority of courts that refuse to recognize a cause of action
for educational malpractice.'

7

Adopting the reasons enunciated by

these courts, Judge Nordberg cast the dispositive issue as whether an
institution of higher education owes a duty to provide student-athletes

with a minimal level of academic competence. 18 He concluded that an
examination of relevant public policy considerations-"the likelihood of
the injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against it and the
consequences of placing that burden upon defendant" '9 -dictated a
negative response to the controlling question.
This Article examines whether a doctrinal basis exists for legally
recognizing an educational malpractice claim in tort for student-athletes

against colleges and universities. Part II begins this inquiry by summarizing the precedent for the result reached in Ross.20 In this regard, the

Article reviews the history of educational malpractice actions in the

United States. 2 1 Cases which demonstrate the judiciary's reluctance to

entertain suits for educational malpractice brought by students at all
levels of the educational process-whether it be primary, secondary or
post-secondary-are examined. 2 2 As a part of this examination, the
public policy considerations adopted by courts declining to legitimate
educational malpractice claims are closely scrutinized.2 3 This assessment reveals that although policy considerations implicate valid social
and legal concerns, they are often based on invalid assumptions and
have not been subjected to in-depth judicial evaluation. 24 The fragility
of these policy considerations becomes even more apparent when analyzed in the context of educational malpractice actions brought by stu15. See id. at 1324; Davis, supra note 1, at 745; Sherman, supra note 12, at 661.
16. Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1322. Ross also asserted claims for negligent infliction of
emotional distress and breach of contract. Id. at 1329. The court acknowledged previous
Illinois precedent, which created a cause of action under certain circumstances for negligent infliction of emotional distress on behalf of direct victims of malpractice. Id. The Ross
court ruled, however, that inasmuch as plaintiff did not possess a cognizable educational
malpractice claim, a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim would not lie. Id. at
1330. Likewise, the court rejected Ross's breach of contract claim which it viewed as
merely an attempt to circumvent its refusal to recognize a tort-premised educational malpractice cause of action. Both the emotional distress and breach of contract claims are
beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of the breach of contract claim, see
Davis, supra note 1.
17. Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1327 (citing cases rejecting educational malpractice as a viable cause of action in the context of elementary and secondary education). See infra text
accompanying notes 47-83, for an analysis of the leading cases.
18. Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1327.
19. Id.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 47-136.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 137-79.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 192-94.
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dent-athletes against their schools. 25 This section concludes by
suggesting that the judiciary's unjustified reliance on dubious policies
serves as a convenient means by which courts evade determination of
the critical issue-whether the academic interests of particular plaintiffs
26
warrant protection against the conduct of academic institutions.
Part III of this Article focuses on this critical issue within the context of the student-athlete/university relationship. It first notes that the
weakness of the policies relied on by courts to reject educational malpractice claims may alone be sufficient to warrant imposing a duty on
universities in favor of student-athletes. The Article next explores
whether an independent basis exists for creating such a duty.2 7 In this
regard, it examines whether traditional tort doctrine, either directly or
by analogy, justifies protecting a student-athlete's academic interests
from certain types of institutional conduct. 28 The inquiry begins with an
analysis of the circumstances in which the judiciary exhibits a willingness
to subject colleges to tort liability for injuries to students. 29 An examination of the in loco parentis doctrine reveals that institutions' liability to
students is not appropriately premised on that legal doctrine. 30 This
part concludes that liability has been imposed on universities in situations where a traditionally recognized special relationship is present
between academic institutions and particular students. 3 1 The case law
unequivocally demonstrates that absent such a special relationship tort
claims by students against colleges fail to present justiciable
32
controversies.
The Article next discusses the policies on which these special relationships are founded. 33 Notions of dependency and mutual dependency are understood as underlying recognition of special relationships.
Similarly, the student-athlete/university relationship is viewed not only
as one of mutual dependency, but also as a relationship in which the
university is clearly the dominant party. The Article concludes by proposing that the dependency and vulnerability of student-athletes in their
relationship with colleges create a special relationship. This relationship
is sufficiently similar to those traditionally recognized in tort to justify
imposing a duty on colleges and universities to provide an educational
34
opportunity to student-athletes.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See
See
See
Id.
See
See
See
Id.
See
See

infra text accompanying notes 180-91.
infra text accompanying notes 192-94.
infra text accompanying notes 195-252.
infra text accompanying notes 197-236.
infra text accompanying notes 197-208.
infra text accompanying notes 209-36.
infra text accompanying notes 237-48.
infra text accompanying notes 253-76.
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II.

THE HISTORY OF EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE

A. Judicial Refusal to Recognize EducationalMalpractice
A review of educational malpractice jurisprudence in the United
States is the first step in understanding the competing legal and policy
issues implicated in assessing whether to recognize a tort of educational
malpractice in favor of student-athletes. This section summarizes the
treatment the judiciary has afforded educational malpractice claims.
What appears in the case law is a common theme of judicial reluctance
and hesitancy to interject itself in disputes questioning the substantive
quality of the education conferred by institutions on their students.
1. Educational Malpractice Defined
Suits against educators traditionally have centered on issues such as
safety, supervision and student discipline.3 5 In contrast, educational
malpractice refers to complaints against academics and academic institutions alleging professional misconduct analogous to medical and legal
malpractice. 36 Educational malpractice has been viewed as premised on
the notion that academic institutions have a legal obligation to instruct
students in such a manner as to impart a minimal level of competence in
basic subjects. 37 The theory behind educational malpractice has also
been described as placing a duty on schools to provide that standard of
38
education appropriate for the particular student.
In bringing to the forefront the alleged failure of colleges to provide educational opportunity to students, 9 lawsuits by student-athletes
are premised on a similar if not the same theory. Student-athletes desire
an opportunity to derive substantive educational benefits during their
college careers. 40 They argue that institutional conduct, both passive
and affirmative, interferes with their ability to make academic progress
41
and acquire useful skills.
35. Judith H. Berliner Cohen, Note, The ABC's of Duty: EducationalMalpractice and the
Functionally Illiterate Student, 8 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 293, 299 (1978);J. COLLIS, EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE: LIABILITY OF EDUCATORS, SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS, AND SCHOOL OFFICIALS (1990).

36. Kimberly A. Wilkins, Note, EducationalMalpractice:A Cause ofAction in Need of a Call
for Action, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 427, 429 (1988).
37. Richard Funston, Educational Malpractice:A Cause of Action in Search of a Theoyy, 18
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 743, 746-47 (1981).

38. COLLIS, supra note 35, at 7-8. This definition emphasizes that the relevancy of
peculiar needs of individual students, or groups of students, may be particularly pertinent
in the context of educational malpractice claims brought by student-athletes. Arguably,
student-athletes' needs are distinctly different from those of other students due to the
circumstances that often accompany their attendance at college as well as the essence of
their relationship with their schools. See infra text accompanying notes 253-76.
39. Student-athletes seek to impose a duty on colleges and universities to provide
them with an educational opportunity in contrast to a duty to educate. Refer to Davis, supra
note 1, at 788-89, and sources cited therein for a discussion of the ramifications of defining
the duty as one to provide an educational opportunity rather than a duty to educate.
40. See id. at 789.
41. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 249-51 (discussing the types of claims student-athletes assert against colleges).
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2. Judicial Treatment of Educational Malpractice at the Primary
and Secondary School Levels
Educational malpractice suits in the context of student or parental
claims against elementary and secondary schools 4 2 typically arise in two
factual contexts. 43 In one group of cases, secondary school students allege negligent acts or omissions by their schools resulting in the conveyance of inadequate basic academic skills or intellectual damage. 4 4 These
cases can be properly classified as pure educational malpractice actions
because students challenge the quality of the academic instruction they
receive. The second category of cases typically involves grade school
students alleging improper placement in special education programs according to their academic and physical needs. For example, in Hoffman
v. Board ofEducation,4 5 a child placed in classes for the mentally retarded
after he was misdiagnosed sought damages for injury to his emotional
well-being and his inability to obtain employment. Relying on a broadly
42. COLLIS, supra note 35, at 79, 88; Funston, supra note 37, at 750.

43. COLLIS, supra note 35, at 325, 335; Wilkins, supra note 36, at 442.
44. Illustrative "pure" educational malpractice cases include: Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Donohue v. Copiague
Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979) (refusing to recognize claim alleging
plaintiff was permitted to obtain degree without having acquired basic academic skills);
Helm v. Professional Children's Sch., 431 N.Y.S.2d 246 (N.Y. App. Term. 1980) (extending policies of Donohue in refusing to recognize educational malpractice claim brought
against a private school).
45. 400 N.E.2d 317 (N.Y. 1979); see Catherine D. McBride, Note, EducationalMalpractice:Judicial Recognition of a Limited Duty of Educators Toward Individual Students; A State Law
Cause of Action for Educational Malpractice, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 475, 479 (finding Hoffman
paradigmatic of the second category of educational malpractice cases). In Hoffman, the
court framed the controlling issue as whether public policy considerations precluded recovery for the allegedly negligent evaluation of a student's intellectual capacity. Hoffman,
400 N.E.2d at 318. Relying on a broadly stated policy of non-interference in academic
matters, which it had articulated in Donohue, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate
Division's affirmance of a jury award in favor of plaintiff. In dismissing plaintiff's educational malpractice claim, the court acknowledged a distinction between educational malpractice cases involving nonfeasance, such as in Peter W. and Donohue, and those involving
the type of misfeasance raised by plaintiff. Yet the court rejected any notion that this
distinction should alter its determination not to recognize a cause of action for educational
malpractice. Id. at 319. The court held the policy concerns expressed in Donohue were
equally applicable to an educational malpractice claim alleging misfeasance. Id.
Other cases illustrating the second category of malpractice claims include: D.S.W. v.
Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981) (complaint alleging
failure to discover learning disability and improper placement dismissed for failure to state
claim); Tubell v. Dade County Pub. Sch., 419 So.2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (plaintiff
alleging school mistesting and misclassification resulted in student's improper placement
into special education program failed to state a cognizable cause of action); Hunter v.
Board of Educ., 439 A.2d 582 (Md. 1982) (holding educational malpractice claim asserting
negligent evaluation failed to state justiciable controversy in light of evaluating relevant
public policy considerations); Doe v. Board of Educ., 453 A.2d 814 (Md. 1982) (relying on
reasons set forth in Hoffman, court dismissed complaint alleging negligent evaluation and
placement of student with learning disabilities); Torres v. Little Flower Children's Servs.,
474 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985) (public policy reasons justify
dismissal of functionally illiterate student's educational malpractice claims).
Notwithstanding the preceding authority, in one particularly shocking case of alleged
improper placement, the court held for plaintiff but sidestepped creating a new tort of
educational malpractice by finding that school employees acted as medical personnel.
Snow v. State, 469 N.Y.S.2d 959 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983), af'd, 475 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1984);
COLLIS, supra note 35, at 155; Wilkins, supra note 36, at 482.
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stated policy of non-interference in academic matters, the New York
46
Court of Appeals dismissed plaintiff's educational malpractice claim.
Central to these cases is the belief that schools possess a duty to properly evaluate and place each child in a learning environment appropriate
47
to his or her needs.
Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District,48 the seminal educational malpractice case, 4 9 also represents the quintessential pure educational malpractice case. 50 The plaintiff was a functionally illiterate5 1
high school graduate 5 2 who alleged that defendant's acts and omissions
deprived him of basic academic skills such as reading and writing. This,
according to plaintiff, resulted from defendant's negligent 5 3 performance of its duty to provide him with adequate instruction and counseling
in basic academic skills. 5 4 Focusing on the duty55 element of a cognizable negligence cause of action, 56 the court rejected plaintiff's assertion
57
that the school district owed such a duty.
In so ruling, the court linked its determination of whether the
school district owed a duty to plaintiff to broader issues of public pol46. Hoffman, 400 N.E.2d at 319-21.
47. See cases cited supra note 45.
48. 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
49. Cohen, supra note 35.
50. The two categories of educational malpractice claims have been differentiated as
follows:
Hoffman represents not only the extension of Donohue to claims arising from special education, but also represents a second category of cases alleging educational
malpractice. Peter W. and Donohue can be thought of as presenting claims for negligence in the process of educating, while Hoffman is better viewed as an action for
negligence in educational evaluation.
Eugene R. Butler, Comment, EducationalMalpractice Update, 14 CAP. U. L. REv. 609, 613
(1985); see McBride, supra note 45, at 479 n.41. One commentator describes claims involving the process of educating as cases in which the adequacy or competency of the instruction is attacked. Butler, supra at 613, 615. See also Funston, supra note 37, at 758
(suggesting that the genre of cases represented by Hoffman should not be conceptualized
as educational malpractice cases since they are more closely analogous to cases imposing
liability on schools in the context of special education programs).
51. "Functional illiteracy" refers to inadequate application of basic academic skills
such as reading, writing and arithmetic to practical problems encountered daily. Wilkins,
supra note 36, at 429 n.l1.
52. Despite having attended public schools for 12 years, plaintiff attained a fifth grade
reading level. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 856 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1976).
53. Plaintiff sought recovery based upon theories sounding in misrepresentation,
breach of statutory duty and breach of constitutional duty. Id. at 856, 862; CoLus, supra
note 35, at 83.
54. Specific, allegedly negligent acts included defendant's: (1) failure to apprehend
plaintiff's learning disability; (2) assigning plaintiff to classes for which he was academically inadequately prepared; (3) promotion of plaintiff to higher grade levels despite
knowledge of plaintiff's unpreparedness to succeed academically at these levels; and
(4) permitting plaintiff to graduate from high school even though he read at a fifth grade
level. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
55. Plaintiff identified three possible sources for imposing such a duty on defendant:
(1) defendant's obligation to exercise with reasonable care its assumption of the educational function; (2) the special relationship between the student and teacher; and (3) common law duty requiring teachers to exercise reasonable care in instructing students. Id. at
858.
56. Id. at 857.
57. Id. at 861.
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icy. 58 Relying upon Rowland v. Christian,5 9 the court first discussed general policy considerations critical in evaluating whether to recognize a
duty regardless of the factual context in which the issue arose. 60 The
court next delineated policy considerations specifically applicable to the
factual scenario before it. The primary policy concerns 6 1 were characterized as the nonexistence of a standard of care for educators and the
improbability of a court arriving at such a standard.6 2 Another policy
consideration was the difficulty of establishing the causal connection between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injuries due to the multiplicity

of factors affecting academic performance. 63 Finally, the court was very
concerned about the adverse financial impact countless numbers of
claims might have on school systemsfr4

Later courts have relied upon these and additional public policy

considerations to reject educational malpractice claims. 65 In Donohue v.
Copiague Union Free School District, plaintiff's school authorites promoted
him from grade to grade despite knowledge of his learning disabilities
and awarded him a diploma, notwithstanding his failure to acquire basic
academic skills. 6 6 The court concluded plaintiff had failed to state a
cause of action, buttressing its decision with a policy of judicial noninterference in academic affairs. The court defined the policy of noninterference as founded on the judiciary's perceived lack of acumen in
matters involving education policy, as well as a lack of competence to
67
oversee day-to-day administration of public schools.

B.M. v. State68 represents the single instance 6 9 where a court recognized educational malpractice as a tort cause of action. The plaintiff al58. Funston, supra note 37, at 751.
59. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
60. These policies included: (1) the foreseeability of harm resulting from defendant's
deviation from the standard of care; (2) establishing injury with sufficient certainty;
(3) the closeness of the causal connection between defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered; (4) the moral culpability of defendant's conduct; (5) the policy of deterring future harm; and (6) the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care
with resulting liability for breach. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60; see also Rowland, 443
P.2d at 564.
61. Wilkins, supra note 36, at 437.
62. The court stated, "we find in this situation no conceivable 'workability of a rule of
care' against which defendants' alleged conduct can be measured (citation omitted) ......
Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
63. The court identified physical, neurological, emotional, cultural and environmental
as the factors external to the formal teaching process that may affect academic performance. Id.
64. Id.; McBride, supra note 45, at 476.
65. McBride, supra note 45, at 476; CoLLis, supra note 35, at 102 (noting that courts
deciding similar cases have cited Peter W. and Donohue as persuasive authority).
66. 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979).
67. Id. at 1355. According to the court, recognition of an educational malpractice
action would not only require the court to develop general education policies but would
require it to "sit in review of the day-to-day implementation" of those policies. Id.
68. 649 P.2d 425 (Mont. 1982).
69. Wilkins, supra note 36, at 442 (noting that B.M. is the one instance in which a
court has "refused to attach the fatal 'educational malpractice' label to this type of claim");
McBride, supra note 45, at 483 (concluding that Montana is the only jurisdiction to permit
relief for educational malpractice).
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leged that she was negligently placed in a special education program
when she was six years old. 70 The defendant urged the court to dismiss
the action on grounds of governmental immunity and lack of legal duty
to the improperly placed child.7 1 Although the court did not identify
the case as an action for educational malpractice, the case still falls
within the non-pure category of educational malpractice claims. 72 A
sharply divided court held that a duty of care arose out of the regulations and statutes governing student placement in special education programs. 7 3 The court also concluded, however, that absent a clear
statutory declaration, public policy considerations relating to judicial reluctance to interfere in the administration of a special education program justify refusal to recognize the duty.74 No determination was
made as to whether the duty had been breached or what damages would
75
flow from such a breach.
Arguably, B.M. is of little precedential value to plaintiffs asserting
educational malpractice actions. The court's reliance on the mandatory
statute as the source of the school's duty lends no indication that liability
might lie absent the statute. In fact, the concurring chief justice attempted to limit the reach of the majority's ruling by specifically pointing to the statute as the source of the school's duty.7 6 Because negligent
77
classification and placement were the essence of plaintiff's claims,
B.M.'s precedential value is arguably reduced in the pure educational
malpractice context, which implicates a different type of dissatisfaction
with the process of educating. Cases such as B.M. may fail to implicate
the process of educating. The dissatisfaction present in B.M. and similar
cases can be characterized as the failure of an institution to advance a
student to the educational level that he or she is actually capable of comprehending as a result of an improper evaluation of the student's capacity to learn. 78 Thus, B.M. and similar cases become readily
distinguishable from pure educational malpractice claims, which impli79
cate the substantive quality of the educational process.
If a recent case, Rich v. Kentucky Country Day, Inc.,8° reflects the cur70. B.M., 649 P.2d at 425.
71. Id. at 426. Plaintiff also urged the court to dismiss the complaint due to its alleged
immunity as a governmental entity for discretionary acts.
72. As noted by the concurring judge, the case subjudicia differed from those such as
Peter W., which involved "negligent failure to adequately educate a child in basic academic
skills." Id. at 428. See McBride, supra note 45, at 483 (comparing the facts in B.M. to those
involved in Hoffman); Butler, supra note 50, at 615 (asserting that plaintiffs' claims in both
B.M. and Hoffman were premised on negligent evaluation); Wilkins, supra note 36, at 442
(concluding the facts of B.M. resemble those of Hoffman).
73. B.M., 649 P.2d at 427.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 428 (Haswell, CJ., concurring) (distinguishing Peter W. and Donahue).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
78. Funston, supra note 37, at 747 n.13.
79. See supra note 49 (the gist of educational malpractice differs for the two categories
of educational malpractice claims which have been asserted by plaintiffs at the primary and
secondary school levels).
80. 793 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).
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rent judicial attitude towards educational malpractice claims at the primary and secondary school levels, courts will not soon depart from the
stance taken in Peter W., Hoffman and their progeny. Rich involved alleged educational malpractice stemming from improper evaluation and
placement. 8 1 Addressing an issue of first impression in Kentucky,8 2 the
Kentucky Court of Appeals relied on the policy justifications articulated
in Peter W. and Donohue to conclude plaintiff's complaint failed to pres83
ent a justiciable controversy.
3. Judicial Reluctance at the Post-Secondary School Level
a.

TraditionalClaims Against Colleges and Universities

Historically, student claims against colleges and universities have
fallen into a few broad categories. Students have most often turned to
the judiciary for relief for injuries resulting from disciplinary8 4 or academic8 5 decisions made by post-secondary institutions. 8 6 Typical examples include a student alleging denial of an academic right, such as
dismissal for poor grades, 8 7 or allegations that an institution engaged in
88
improper disciplinary action, such as suspension for cheating.
81. Id. at 834.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 836.
84. See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961) (disciplinary decisions of a public college were subject to the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause). The court held that students expelled for participating in off-campus demonstrations were denied due process when they were neither
given notice of the charges against them nor afforded a hearing. Id. at 158-59; see also Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). Dixon is widely recognized as the first case in American
jurisprudence to constrain the previously unfettered discretion universities exercised over
students. Gerard A. Fowler, The Legal RelationshipBetween the American College Student and the
College: A HistoricalPerspective and the Renewal of a Proposal, 13 J.L. & EDuc. 401, 408-09
(1984); Donald L. Reidhaar, The Assault on the Citadel Reflections on A Quarter Century of
Change in the RelationshipBetween the Student and the University, 12J.C. & U.L. 343, 346 (1985);
see Note, Judicial Review of the University-Student Relationship: Expulsion and Governance, 26
STAN. L. REv. 95, 96, 98, 99 (1973) (noting that prior to 1961, courts almost unanimously
upheld the expulsion of students from both private and public colleges).
85. Examples of suits brought alleging injurious academic decisions by colleges or
universities include: Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985); Doherty
v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1988) (former student alleging
improper denial of degree); Schuler v. University of Minn., 788 F.2d 510 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1056 (1987); Gasper v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975) (involving nursing student dismissed for academic reasons from tax-supported vocational
school); Stoller v. College of Medicine, 562 F. Supp. 403 (M.D. Pa. 1983), af'd, 727 F.2d
1101 (3rd Cir. 1984); Abbariao v. Hamline Univ. Sch. of Law, 258 N.W.2d 108 (Minn.
1977) (court holding that student claiming arbitrary dismissal from law school stated a
claim for relief); Marquez v. University of Wash., 648 P.2d 94 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982), rev.
denied, 97 Wash. 1037 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1013 (1983) (extending substantial latitude to educational institutions in academic matters including academic aid); Dillingham v.
University of Colo. Bd. of Regents, 790 P.2d 851 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (suit by a medical
student who was dismissed for academic reasons from university's medical school
program).

86. See Fowler, supra note 84, at 401.
87. Audrey Latourette & Robert King,JudicialIntervention in the Student-University Relationship: Due Process and Contract Theories, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 199, 203 (1988).
88. Id. The authors conclude that notwithstanding the "notion ofjudicial non-interference in college affairs," students enrolled in public colleges are afforded due process
protection in regard to disciplinary and academic matters, albeit to a lesser extent with
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b.

EducationalMalpractice Claims

College students pursuing pure educational malpractice claims, like
their primary and secondary school counterparts, allege denial or deprivation of a certain quantum of substantive educational benefits. Unlike
their counterparts, however, college students premise educational malpractice actions not only on tort but other substantive theories as wellprincipally breach of contract and misrepresentation. This has not,
however, translated into more favorable treatment. The judiciary, relying on the policies established in cases involving claims against primary
and secondary academic institutions, has refused to recognize educational malpractice however framed as a viable claim against colleges and
universities.
i.

Quasi-Educational Malpractice

Initially it should be noted that pure educational malpractice claims
against institutions of higher education are notable for their paucity.
Pure educational malpractice claims require a court to engage in an evaluation of the quality of the academic instruction provided by an institution. At the post-secondary level, these claims are distinguished from
those which in form may appear to allege educational malpractice but in
substance allege student dissatisfaction tangential to the substantive
quality of the educational process. These other cases involve claims
analogous to those asserted in the Hoffman and B.M. category of educational malpractice actions. Thus, they can properly be denominated as
quasi-educationalmalpractice cases since the essence of plaintiffs' actions
are peripheral to the substantive quality of education provided by colleges and universities.8 9 Differentiation between pure and quasi-educational malpractice dispels any illusion that courts exhibit a greater
willingness to recognize educational malpractice claims brought against
colleges and universities. The differentiation illustrates that courts have
had very few occasions to address the question of educational malpractice at the post-secondary level. In addition, the characterization of a
claim often impacts the ultimate resolution of the suit.
Quasi-educational malpractice claims at the post-secondary level
respect to the latter. Id. at 220, 227-29. Professors Latourette and King also conclude that
relying upon contract principles, private college students achieve the same, if not greater,
due process protections afforded public college students. Id. at 231.
Two other categories of claims beyond the scope of this paper are commonly asserted
against post-secondary institutions: those by handicapped and those by minority students
asserting discriminatory treatment. Fowler, supra note 84, at 401.
89. The "quasi" designation may be applied to cases that arise in both factual contexts-the primary/secondary and post-secondary school levels-because of the indirect
nature of the challenges to substantive adequacy of the education. It should be noted,
however, that these factual settings produce different forms of student dissatisfaction and
accordingly different types of claims. The discussion below explains that quasi-educational malpractice claims against colleges typically involve allegations of breach of express
contractual commitments and abuse of academic discretion. As discussed above, B.M. and
Hoffman are the paradigmatic quasi-educational malpractice claims at the primary and secondary school levels.
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typically include those in which students allege institutions breached an
express contractual commitment or exercised academic discretion unfairly. For example, in Dizick v. Umpqua Community College,90 plaintiffs
who enrolled in a welding technology program 9 ' alleged that, contrary
to representations contained in the college's course catalogue, certain
courses were not offered and certain materials were not available for
their use. 92 As a result, plaintiffs asserted that they were inadequately
prepared to enter the marketplace as welders upon completion of the
one-year program. They further argued that this inadequate program
was contrary to representations set forth in the school catalogue.
The Oregon Court of Appeals framed the dispositive issue as
whether the promised level of proficiency could be achieved without the
practical usage and training. 9 3 Concluding that to make such a determination would intrude upon the state's discretionary functions, the court
rejected plaintiffs' claim on grounds that such a decision should be made
by the legislature and not the judiciary. 9 4 At the same time, the court
emphasized that a different result might be warranted if the institution
had breached a specific promise to include practical training in its welding curriculum. 9 5
Even though the court made no reference to educational malpractice, such a characterization implicates the adequacy or quality of the
academic offerings. The court's transformation of what in essence was a
promissory fraud action into one for educational malpractice is underscored by the following statement: "The method of instruction and
course content obviously involve complex judgmental decisions by college officials. A jury verdict here is tantamount to a direction to the
college to provide practical use training as part of the curriculum for the
courses offered in the catalog."'9 6 Thus, the court of appeals characterized plaintiffs' educational malpractice claims as a challenge of the sufficiency of the courses offered to adequately educate the students. In
actuality, however, plaintiffs' dissatisfaction arose not from the content
of the course offering but the failure of the college to offer what it had
previously represented.
The Oregon Supreme Court correctly adopted this characterization
in reversing the lower court. 9 7 Quoting from the dissent at the court of
appeals, the supreme court stated:
While I agree that an action based on the failure of the college
90. 577 P.2d 534 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 537.
94. The court also ruled that the college was immune from tort liability for the alleged
misconduct. Id. at 539. Disagreeing with this characterization, the dissentingjudge viewed
the cases as turning on what specific representations were made regarding the machines
which would be available, not on the level of proficiency plaintiffs would attain from their
participation in the program. Id. (Schwab, C.J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 538.
96. Id. at 537.
97. Dizick v. Umpqua Community College, 599 P.2d 444 (Or. 1979).
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to include certain courses in the curriculum or teach certain
techniques in the courses would be barred by governmental immunity, I see no relevance to that position in this case. The
plaintiff sued on account
of statements made to him in order to
98
induce his enrollment.
The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that sufficient evidence was introduced to substantiate a case of promissory fraud.9 9
Woodruffv. Georgia' 0 0 provides another illustration of a quasi-educational malpractice case since it arose in an academic context but failed to
require the court to evaluate the quality of the education in order to
reach a decision. There, a student alleged inter alia that the university
negligently supervised her graduate studies program. 1° 1 Couching a
claim in this manner suggested a pure educational malpractice claim
hinging on the failure of a student's instructors to provide the guidance
necessary for her to benefit academically. The gist of plaintiff's lawsuit,
however, was that certain of the university's professors refused to submit recommendations required for her to proceed from a masters to a
doctoral program of study. 10 2 Thus, the central issue in Woodruff was
whether the academic decision rendered by the university violated plaintiff's due process rights or, as stated by the court, whether relief could
be granted for alleged impropriety in teachers' academic assessment of
plaintiff's work.

10 3

The same quasi-educational characterization can be given to Smith
v. Ohio State University.10 4 There, a graduate student sued the university
on theories of negligence and breach of contract alleging that defendant
failed to provide timely advice with respect to the researching and drafting of his master's thesis.' 0 5 Once again, despite the plaintiff's couching of his claim, the heart of the action was unrelated to the nature,
quality or adequacy of the education defendant conveyed to plaintiff.106
98. Id. at 447 (citation omitted).
99. Id. at 445.
100. 304 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1983).
101. Id. at 698.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 699.
104. 557 N.E.2d 857 (Ohio Ct. CI. 1990).
105. Id. at 859.
106. See also Chevlin v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 260 Cal. Rptr. 628 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989). In Chevlin, the plaintiff, who enrolled in a nuclear medicine technology
program offered by the defendant community college, was dismissed allegedly due to her
poor performance in the program. Plaintiff argued that her dismissal resulted in part from
the college's failure to perform its duties including supervising and training her. Id. at 631.
The court characterized plaintiff's claim as one for educational malpractice and declined
to hold the district liable for the reasons set forth in Peter W. Id. Despite the court's characterization of the claim as one for educational malpractice, the gist of the action appears to
have been wrongful dismissal and thus called into question whether the district had properly exercised its academic discretion. See also Abbariao v. Hamline Univ. Sch. of Law, 258
N.W.2d 108 (Minn. 1977) (in addition to alleging wrongful dismissal, student alleged
breach of contract).
In Ianniello v. University of Bridgeport, No. 2-748-100009, Second Circuit Court,
County of Fairfield at Bridgeport (Aug. 22, 1974), plaintiff alleged the content of the
course differed from the description set forth in the school bulletin which plaintiff had
relied on in deciding to enroll in the course. Plaintiff's allegations appeared to sound in
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ii. Pure Educational Malpractice
A survey of the few pure educational malpractice cases at the postsecondary educational level reveals a strong judicial disinclination to
sustain such claims in tort. In rejecting educational malpractice as a
cause of action at this level, the judiciary has relied on the policy justifications developed by courts which refuse to embrace educational malpractice in the primary and secondary school context.
In Moore v. Vanderloo, 10 7 an educational malpractice action arose out
of unique circumstances. The action was asserted not by a student of
the defendant but by a patient of a graduate of a chiropractic college.
The plaintiff alleged that her injuries could have been avoided if the
college had properly instructed its former student on the risks attendant
to certain techniques.' 0 8 The court viewed plaintiff's claim as implicating the quality of the education provided, thereby creating an issue of
educational malpractice. 10 9 The court began its analysis of the educational malpractice issue by acknowledging the differences between the
case sub judice and others in which educational malpractice was at issue. 10 The court noted that most of the other cases involved claims by
students against public school districts at the primary and secondary
school level. 1 ' Distinctions between various types of educational malpractice cases did not militate against adhering to the authority created
by and policies articulated in those cases. 1 12 In concluding that there
was no justiciable controversy, the court adopted the rule of law established in cases such as Peter W. and Donohue and the policy justifications
set forth therein. 113
breach of an express contractual commitment and misrepresentation. After the presentation of evidence, the court granted defendant's motion for directed verdict. Other quasieducational malpractice cases in which the defendant is alleged to have breached an express contractual promise include: Peretti v. State of Mont., 464 F. Supp. 784 (D. Mont.
1979); Zumbrun v. University of S. Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); and Stad
v. Grace Downs Model and Air Career Sch., 319 N.Y.S.2d 918 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 197 1). See
discussion infra note 134.
In Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1331 (N.D. Il. 1990), the court noted
that a different result would ensue .if plaintiff could establish breach of a specific contract
provision. In the court's view such a scenario does not implicate educational malpractice.
107. 386 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 1986).
108. Id. at 113.
109. Id.
110. According to the court, educational malpractice claims arise out of a limited
number of factual contexts and can be placed into three categories: (1) claims alleging a
public school district breached a duty to teach a student basic skills; (2) cases involving
negligent evaluation or placement of a public school student; and (3) a case involving a
physician alleging he committed malpractice due to inadequate supervision. Id.
I11. Id.
112. Id. at 114.
113. First, the court was persuaded that the absence of a standard of care by which to
measure the defendant's conduct militated against imposing a duty. It deemed itself unprepared to determine what a reasonable chiropractic institution should have taught its
students. Id. The court credited Peter W. as establishing a justification for not recognizing
an educational malpractice cause of action. Id. Second, the court relied on the perceived
inherent uncertainty in determining proximate causation in educational malpractice suits.
Id. Quoting from Donohue, the court stated "[w]e agree with the New York Court of Appeals' observation that although it may assume too much to conclude that proximate cau-
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The policies of Peter W. and Donohue were also adopted by the court
in Swidryic v. Saint Michael's Medical Center,'1 4 which involved an educa-

tional malpractice claim arising out of facts similar to those in Moore.
Plaintiff, who had been sued for medical malpractice, alleged defendant
1 15
failed to train him adequately during his medical school residency.
The critical issue was whether a physician may assert a claim for educa-

tional malpractice against his residency program.1
differences

17

6

Noting the factual

between the matter before it and cases such as Peter W,

the court concluded that the same policy concerns expressed in those
cases applied to the educational malpractice claim asserted in this particular context.' 18 The court went on to identify additional public policy
considerations specific to the facts before it. The court expressed concern that recognition of plaintiff's claim would result in: (1) unwarranted judicial intervention into the day-to-day academic decisions of a
graduate medical school;'19 and (2) an increased judicial administrative
burden which would arise if physicians were permitted to sue their
medi120
cal school every time they were sued for medical malpractice.
Wilson v. ContinentalInsuranceCos.121 established the precedent, later
relied upon by the Ross court, that educational malpractice claims at the

post-secondary level fail to present justiciable controversies. In Wilson, a
former law student initiated a negligence action against Marquette Uni-

versity. 12 2 Wilson alleged he suffered serious mental problems resulting from his participation in a mind-control program aimed towards

minority students entering the university's law school with lower admissions standards than white students. 123 He further alleged that the law

school coerced students into participating in the program (by giving
special grading consideration to participants) despite the program's adverse recommendation from the university's counseling center. 124 The
court focused on the reasonable foreseeability of the risk of harm and
sation could never be established, that 'this element might indeed be difficult, if not
impossible to prove.'" (citations omitted) (emphasis in the original). Id. The burden
which would be placed on schools and judicial reluctance to interfere in the daily operations of educational institutions were noted as two other justifications for not recognizing
educational malpractice claims. Id. at 114-15.
114. 493 A.2d 641 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1985).
115. Id. at 642.
116. Id. at 644.
117. The court identified three factual differences between this case and others such as
Peter W., which involved educational malpractice: (1) plaintiffwas a physician-not a grade
school student; (2) plaintiff's attendance was not mandatory, as is the case with primary
and secondary school students; and (3) defendant was a graduate school and not a school
board. Id. at 643-44.
118. Id.
119. In this regard, the court emphasized that the judiciary should not usurp the legislatively granted authority of the state board of medical examiners to develop standards for,
and evaluate the quality of, the medical school's academic program. Id. at 644-45.
120. Id. at 645. The court foresaw an increase in the amount of time required to try
malpractice cases and potential juror confusion. Id.
121. 274 N.W.2d 679 (Wis. 1979).
122. Id. at 680-81.
123. Id. at 681.
124. Id.
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concluded defendant could not be held liable for offering a course and
failing to discover the possible adverse psychiatric and psychological effects on particular students. 125 The court further stated that it was not
prepared to impose a duty on schools to conduct psychiatric or psychological evaluations of students in order to ascertain possible negative
susceptibility to particular educational offerings. The court enunciated
the following policy considerations as further support for its holding:
[B]ecause of the demands society places upon schools this
court will not promote a legal doctrine which would require
educational systems to litigate every suit claiming negligence in
the selection of curriculum, teaching methods, teachers or extra curricular activities. To rule otherwise would subject
schools to constant harassment in the courts. We cannot foist
such an unreasonable burden upon our schools without being
fearful of the irreparable
harm that might be done to public
126
and private education.
Even though the court made no reference to educational malpractice,
the above quoted statement is a reiteration of the fear of litigation ra1 27
tionale relied upon by courts refusing to impose a duty on schools.
In Wickstrom v. North Idaho College, 128 a group of students asserted a
tort claim against the institution for alleged failure to educate them as
promised in the school bulletin. The basis for the claim was that the
quality of provided education varied from the quality of education the
students believed to be promised in the school bulletin. 129 Due to the
students' non-compliance with the notice provision of the state tort
claims act, their tort action was dismissed.
Wickstrom is nevertheless notable for dicta stating that, notwithstanding dismissal of the tort action, plaintiffs could state a viable breach
of contract action if evidence demonstrated that the defendant failed to
comply with the terms of the implied contract between the college and
the students.1 30 As an illustration of such a breach, the court stated that
"if certain fundamentals of the course necessary to attaining qualification as an 'entry-level journeyman' were not even presented in the
course, such could be a breach of the implied contract between the college and the students."' 13 The court noted that "fundamentals" might
include the number of days or hours required to complete the subject
course. The court provided this illustration, no doubt, to ameliorate
concerns that a plaintiff might attempt to rely on this statement to pursue an educational malpractice claim under the guise of a breach of con125. Id. at 684.
126. Id. at 686.
127. Note also that plaintiff's claims are analogous to those in which students at the
primary and secondary levels allege negligent evaluation and placement.
128. 725 P.2d 155 (1986).
129. Plaintiff's specific allegation was that, contrary to statements in the school bulletin, they were not qualified as entry level journeymen upon successful completion of the
course of study. Id. at 156.
130. Id. at 157.
131. Id.
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tract action. In this regard, the court added that educational malpractice
13 2
claims implicate subjective factors such as teaching methodology.
On the other hand, the objective nature of the fundamentals identified
by the court did not implicate the policy considerations pertinent to ed13 3
ucational malpractice suits.
A strongly worded dissent disapproved of the majority's attempt to
distinguish a breach of contract action from an educational malpractice
claim. After summarizing cases rejecting educational malpractice
claims, the dissent acknowledged that a breach of contract action might
lie against an educational institution under limited circumstances which
would not involve the quality or adequacy of the instruction provided by
a school.13 4 The dissent viewed the present action as relating directly to
35
the quality and adequacy of the education supplied by the college.'
According to the dissent: "The claim requires the fact finder to enter
the classroom and determine whether or not the judgments, curricula
and teaching styles of the professional educators involved were deficient. Thus, the plaintiff's claims require an analysis of the educational
function itself."' 3 6 The dissent's concerns seem overstated. The "fundamentals" identified by the majority are similar to those forming the
basis of the breach of contract claims in the cases cited with approval by
the dissent.
Courts presented with educational malpractice claims against colleges and universities13 7 have followed the approach taken by courts
132. Id. at 157-58.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 160 (Donaldson, C.J., dissenting). The dissent gave two illustrations of
when a breach of contract action would be distinct and clearly distinguishable from an
educational malpractice action under the guise of a contract claim. One illustration occurs
when a college accepts tuition from a student but provides no educational services. Peretti
v. State of Mont., 464 F. Supp. 784 (D. Mont. 1979), is a case that appears to fall into this
category. There the state terminated an aviation technology program after plaintiff had
been enrolled in the program for three quarters. The program's elimination precluded
plaintiffs from completing their training and rendered the three quarters of course work
completed of dubious value. Id. at 786. Ruling in favor of plaintiffs, the court found the
existence of an implied contract that plaintiffs would be given an opportunity to complete
their training if they enrolled in the aviation technology program. Id. at 787.
The other illustration provided by the dissent occurs when the contract obligates the
educational institution to complete certain services and it fails to comply with this obligation such as in Zumbrun v. University of S. Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
Zumbrun arose out of a professor's early termination of a course-as an anti-war protest, he
refused to give all scheduled lectures and to give a final examination. Id. at 502. Plaintiff
alleged deprivation of her education and injuries resulting therefrom. Id. After characterizing the student/university relationship as contractual in nature, the court held that the
university had breached its contractual obligation to give a course that consisted of a certain number of lectures and a final examination. Id. at 504-05. Thus, the true essence of
the complaint went not to the quality of the education provided but rather to defendant's
failure to provide that which was promised.
Similarly in Stad v. Grace Downs Model and Air Career Sch., 319 N.Y.S.2d 918 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1971), the court held that a career training school breached a promise of a guarantee ofjob placement which was contained in its implied contract with plaintiff. Id. at 922.
135. WVickstrom, 725 P.2d at 160.
136. Id.
137. The quality of the education provided by a post-secondary institution was also
attacked in Huckabay v. Netterville, 263 So.2d 113 (La. Ct. App. 1972). A law school
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confronted with this issue at the primary and secondary school levels. In
so doing, these courts have not made an independent assessment of
whether the differences in the factual circumstances warrant reaching a
different result. Moreover, they have not undertaken a critical analysis
of the soundness of the policies on which educational malpractice claims
have been denied.
B.

Examining Public Policy Considerations

Peter W, Donohue and their progeny clearly illustrate that courts have
uniformly rejected a cause of action for educational malpractice. 13 8 Existing precedent also make apparent that the foremost obstacles to
plaintiffs asserting educational malpractice claims are concerns such as
establishing a duty of care, the courts' perceived inability to arrive at a
standard for assessing breach of that duty and demonstrating causation. 13 9 In other words, the question of whether academic institutions
owe a duty to impart a minimum level of proficiency 140 has been analyzed by the judiciary as a question of law dependent on public policy
considerations. 1 4 1 In refusing to impose a duty on educators, courts effectively conclude that policy considerations militate against imposing
such a duty. 14 2 The following examination reveals, however, that these
and other policy concerns identified by courts cannot withstand critical
evaluation.
1. Inability to Create a Standard of Care
A plaintiff asserting a negligence claim must show: (1) the existence
of a legally recognized duty of care on the part of the defendant; (2) a
graduate, who had failed a state bar examination on three occasions, alleged that his failure resulted from the inferior education he received from Southern University School of
Law. Id. at 114. The court was able to dispose of the case without making a determination
of the ultimate issue. It upheld the lower court dismissal of the action on grounds that
there had been no legislative waiver of immunity, which would permit the action to go
forward against the named defendants. Id. at 116. The court in reaching this result characterized the action as one grounded in tort rather than contract.
In Beaman v. Des Moines Area Community College, No. 158532, Polk County, Iowa
(Sept. 28, 1976), plaintiffs asserted a negligence action against the community college.
Their action arose out of defendant's alleged negligent failure to comply with standards
and guidelines regarding the qualifications of instructors and classroom equipment. Assessing the case as one presenting a novel legal issue, the court held in favor of defendant
due to plaintiffs' inability to establish the duty element of a negligence claim. In this regard, it relied on the policy arguments stated by the court in Doe v. San Francisco Unified
Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976), the intermediary opinion in Peter W.
138. CoLLs, supra note 35, at 8 (concluding no plaintiff has prevailed in a pure educational malpractice claim); Funston, supra note 37, at 750; Butler, supra note 50, at 609
(stating that only one court has recognized educational malpractice as a viable cause of
action against public educators); Wilkins, supra note 36, at 431. The term "pure" denotes
suits premised on academic negligence in contrast to suits premised on theories such as
fraud, contract, or violation of statutory or constitutional provisions.
139. See Cohen, supra note 35.
140. Funston, supra note 37, at 747-48; Joan Blackburn, Educational Malpractice: When
Can Johnny Sue?, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 117, 119 (1978).
141. W. PAGE KEETON ETAL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW oF TORTS § 37, at 236
(5th ed. 1984); Blackburn, supra note 140, at 119-20; McBride, supra note 45, at 484.
142. McBride, supra note 45, at 484.
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breach of that duty by the defendant; (3) that the breach was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury; and (4) injury to plaintiff.1 43 Thus, assuming educators owe a duty of care to students, a standard of care must
be developed in order to determine a breach of the duty. 1 44 The perceived impossibility of establishing such a standard of care has been emphasized by courts refusing to recognize educational malpractice
claims. 14 5 The Peter W court articulated this concern stating: "We find
in this situation no conceivable 'workability of a rule of care' against
which the defendants' alleged conduct may be measured .... 146
Apprehension over the feasibility of establishing a workable standard of care is somewhat justified due, in large part, to the amorphous
nature of the education process. Educators often disagree as to pedagogical techniques employed in the educating process as well as the content of instruction comprising the education process.14 7 Since a breach
of the standard of care in cases involving professional malpractice is established by expert testimony, 14 8 critics of educational malpractice
claims assert that this lack of consensus results in the inability of experts
to provide an applicable standard of care.149
Notwithstanding the merit1 50 ofjudicial concern over the inevitable
difficulties associated with developing and evaluating a standard of care,
courts deciding educational malpractice claims have made no serious effort to create such a standard. 15 1 Courts have not made an in-depth
analysis of what they have come to consider the inherently impossible
task of developing a standard of care to measure an educator's breach of
duty. i5 2 The resulting judicial approach automatically forecloses the
possibility of assessing whether, in a given situation or context, a workable standard of care can, in fact, be devised. 153 This policy concern,
143.

KEETON ET AL., supra note 141, at 164-65.

144. Id. at 205; William F. Foster, EducationalMalpractice:A Tortfor the Untaught?, 19 U.
BRrr. COLUM. L. REV. 161, 205 (1985); Funston, supra note 37, at 779; Blackburn, supra
note 140, at 126; Nancy L. Woods, Comment, EducationalMalfeasance: A Cause of Action for
Failureto Educate?, 14 TULSA L.J. 383, 396 (1978).
145. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1976).
146. Id.
147. Funston, supra note 37, at 780; Terrence P. Collingsworth, Applying Negligence Doctrine
to the Teaching Profession, 11 J.L. & EDUC. 479, 494 (1982); AliceJ. Klein, Note, Educational Malpractice: Can the Judiciary Remedy the Growing Problem of Functional Illiteracy?, 13
SuFFouc U. L. REV. 27, 39 (1979); McBride, supra note 45, at 484.
148.

KEETON ET AL., supra note 141, at 188-89.

149. One commentator articulated this argument: "In medical malpractice cases, an
expert witness can take the stand and provide evidence on the correct and accepted standard of performance to which the particular doctor should have adhered. No such expert
can offer a single clear-cut educational standard for the teacher to follow." Blackburn,
supra note 140, at 127.
150. Foster, supra note 144, at 190-91.
151. Id. at 19 1; Collingsworth, supra note 147, at 489 (arguing the Peter T. court should
have attempted to define a standard of care).
152. Foster, supra note 144, at 191.
153. Id. One advocate of imposing a duty of care on educators suggests that courts'
conclusions regarding the standard of care are based on dubious assumptions.
First, it is assumed without any deliberation that the appropriate standard of care
is that of the reasonable man on the street and not a standard drawn from the
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therefore, becomes a convenient justification for a blanket rule of nonliability.
Moreover, the judiciary has exaggerated the ambiguous nature of
the education process in buttressing its conclusion that a standard of
care cannot be devised. 15 4 Despite differences as to pedagogy, it is
likely that experts could agree on the basic goals of education as well as
the most effective methods of teaching. 155 In addition, a well-developed
body of law involving professional malpractice in other areas is available
to assist the judiciary in devising a model standard of care for educa15 6
tional malpractice.
2.

Difficulty of Establishing Causation

Intertwined with the concern of developing a standard of care is the
judiciary's perceived difficulty of establishing causation. Although
courts in educational malpractice cases rarely reach the question of causation, they nevertheless identify it as another consideration militating
in favor of non-recognition of educational malpractice claims. The argument underlying this policy concern is that a school's negligence is
but one possible cause of a student's academic failure. 15 7 In Donohue,
the court identified such factors as the "student's attitude, motivation,
temperament, past experience and home environment" as playing criti158
cal roles in the process of learning.
Indeed, the broad range of factors which potentially contribute to a
student's educational failure present a serious obstacle for a plaintiff
asserting an educational malpractice claim. Nevertheless, the law does
professional or occupational group to which educators belong. Secondly, it is
assumed that if there exists no consensus about how best to engage in or pursue a
certain activity, about whether the activity should be undertaken at all or about
the goals of the activity, then there can be no standard of care.
Id.
154. Collingsworth, supra note 147, at 494.
155. Foster, supra note 142, at 221 (remarking most educators attest the sufficiency of
their knowledge and experience to determine whether teaching methods, practices or policies are unacceptable). Also, if within a particular field there are various schools of
thought, a professional's conduct is judged in accordance with the standard common to
the field to which he or she subscribes. Sherman, supra note 12, at 680.
156. Collingsworth, supra note 147, at 496; see also Foster, supra note 144, at 224-26
(suggesting ways to establish negligent conduct by an educator); Blackburn, supra note
140, at 126 (suggesting an analogy can be drawn to the standard of care in medical malpractice cases that requires physicians to "exercise the care and skill ordinarily exercised
by other members of the profession"); Wilkins, supra note 36, at 457 (arguing the courts in
these cases, as in other professional negligence cases, will avail themselves of highly qualified expert witnesses to both establish and assess the standard of care).
157. The Peter W. court expressed its concern with the plaintiff's likelihood of establishing causation:
Substantial professional authority attests that the achievement of literacy in the
schools, or its failure, are [sic] influenced by a host of factors which affect the
pupil subjectively, from outside the formal teaching process, and beyond the control of its ministers. They may be physical, neurological, emotional, cultural, environmental; they may be present but not perceived, recognized but not
identified.
Peter IV, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
158. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1355 (N.Y. 1979)
(Wachtler, J., concurring).
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not require that a defendant's conduct be the sole cause of the plaintiff's
injury in order to establish the causation element in a negligence cause
of action. The plaintiff is only required to make a showing that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the particular injury1 59 "The test for causation is one of significance, rather than of
quantity."1 60 In short, the issue of causation is one of proof' 61 and, as
such, courts should not rely upon it as a rationale to automatically reject
educational malpractice claims.
It is one thing to recognize that establishing cause in fact in
many educational malpractice situations may be difficult and
that, in a particular case, the difficulties may prove insurmountable. It is quite another thing to conclude that merely because
difficulties may be encountered in showing causation no educational malpractice actions must be entertained and the defend162
ant, as a consequence, should be relieved from liability.
In summary, the resolution of the standard of care and causation
issues poses certain difficulties which, in a particular case, would bar recovery. Resorting to these difficulties as a rationale for adopting a broad
rule of non-liability, however, is totally unsatisfactory inasmuch as courts
conveniently dispose of educational malpractice actions without assessing the interests of the alleged victims. Finally, this approach precludes
a case-by-case determination of educational malpractice claims and the
possibility of recovery by a student who could otherwise establish a standard of care and causation. 1 63
3.

Non-Interference Premised on Judicial Incompetence

The judiciary buttresses its refusal to recognize a tort action for educational malpractice by pointing to a policy of non-interference in matters of education. This policy is premised on the belief that courts lack
the expertise to formulate workable standards for teaching and learning 16 4 or to address the types of complex educational issues inevitably
involved in educational malpractice suits. 1 65 This argument serves as a
159. KEETON ET AL., supra note 141, at 267.
160. Blackburn, supra note 140, at 131.
161. Collingsworth, supra note 147, at 498; Foster, supra note 144, at 234 (concluding
this ultimate question of proof is the most serious impediment to educational malpractice
claims).
162. Foster, supra note 144, at 237.
163. Id. at 191.
164. Funston, supra note 37, at 797. Critics of educational malpractice argue that the
judiciary lacks training in substantive educational policy issues to make informed evaluations. Id. The critics claim that "Ithe determination of the requisite level of instructional
quality within a school system and how to attain it is a fundamental policy-making function
that educators are better equipped to handle than are courts. Thejudicial process, therefore, should eschew discretionary decisions of educator competence." Id. at 798. See McBride, supra note 45, at 485 (courts would have difficulty formulating an appropriate
standard of care due to the diversity of opinions as to the nature of the learning process).
165. Funston, supra note 37, at 793; McBride, supra note 45, at 485; Wilkins, supra note
36, at 431-32 (judicial reluctance to intervene in matters of education stems from the
complexities of the education process, which require educators and administrators to exercise professional judgments on a daily basis).
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surrogate for the basic policy consideration: the legitimacy of the judici16 6
ary to participate in matters of educational policy.
As is true of policy concerns relating to causation and standard of
care, the courts exaggerate the lack of judicial expertise rationale as a
justification to reject educational malpractice claims. 16 7 This argument
loses its force in view of judicial involvement in the areas of medicine,
law, accounting, psychiatry and other professional fields where courts
are willing to review policy making-activities. 168 Moreover, courts intercede in matters requiring the assessment of the quality of educational
programs and substantive educational issues such as those in desegregation cases. For example, courts must evaluate the quality of education in
racially segregated schools and, in financing cases, assess the impact financing has on the quality of the education meted out.169
This rationale also rests on the unsound premise that those with
special expertise should be afforded absolute deference to safeguard the
various interests which the law protects. 170 Although the "formulation
and implementation" of educational practices and policies are best left
to school teachers and administrators, courts should not afford total deference and abandon the problem of educational malpractice to
educators. 171
4.

Excessive Litigation

The final specific policy concern influencing courts is the fear of
adverse consequences to the educational process if educational malpractice causes of action are legally recognized. This concern has typically
been expressed in terms of the potential imposition of unlimited liability
on school systems. 172 Those who agree with this concern argue that
recognizing an educational malpractice cause of action would burden
schools with substantial damage awards and further divert resources
available to provide education. 173 In other words, courts fear a flood of
claims, many of which would be either frivolous or feigned. 174 The
166. Klein, supra note 147, at 37.
167. Id. at 38.
168. Id. at 40; John Elson, A Common Law Remedy for the Educational Harms Caused by
Incompetent or Careless Teaching, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 641, 670 (1978) (suggesting the difficulty
in understanding issues related to educational malpractice is likely to be less than that
encountered in determining issues involved in complex cases such as antitrust, patent infringement and products liability).
169. Robert H. Jerry II, Recovery in Tortfor EducationalMalpractice: Problems of Theory and
Policy, 29 KAN. L. REV. 195, 203 (1981); COLLS, supra note 35, at 367 (the judiciary has
decided matters in the education sphere ranging from school finance, expulsion and discrimination to teacher incompetency and dismissals); Klein, supra note 147, at 38; McBride, supra note 45, at 489; Wilkins, supra note 36, at 440.
170. Elson, supra note 168, at 669.
171. Id. at 677-78.
172. Funston, supra note 37, at 793; McBride, supra note 45, at 486 (stating the potential expense to public schools is another reason for denying educational malpractice
claims).
173. Funston, supra note 37, at 801; Klein, supra note 147, at 36, 41; McBride, supra
note 45, at 492.
174. Funston, supra note 37, at 793.
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court in Peter W. summarized this objection as follows:
To hold them to an actionable "duty of care," in the discharge
of their academic functions, would expose them to the tort
claims-real or imagined-of disaffected students and parents
in countless numbers. They are already beset by social and financial problems which have gone to major litigation, but for
which no permanent solution has yet appeared ....

The ulti-

mate consequences, in terms of public time and money,
would
75
burden them-and society-beyond calculation.'
Despite the legitimacy of this concern, justice should not be denied
and wrongs should not go uncorrected simply because of an increase in
litigation.' 76 It is inappropriate for a court to deny a meritorious claim
due to uncertainties related to how such claims will be handled or be177
cause such claims will lead to the filing of other meritorious claims.
In addition, the time and expense of such litigation-attorneys fees, expert witness fees and court costs-render it unlikely that a flood of litiga1 78
tion would ensue if this cause of action was given recognition.
Moreover, imposing liability for educational malpractice might encourage institutions "to develop ... effective internal procedures for the
79
fair out-of-court resolution of conflicts over.., educational injuries."1
C. Policy Concerns in the Student-Athlete/University Context
The foregoing criticism of the policy reasons given to reject educational malpractice actions apply with equal, if not greater, force in the
student-athlete/university context. First, the types of misconduct alleged by student-athletes do not in fact challenge educational methods.' 80 Rather, student-athletes complain of active and passive conduct
175. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979) (citations omitted).
176. Collingsworth, supra note 147, at 504 (arguing a fear of increased litigation does
not justify leaving a deserving plaintiff without a remedy); Wilkins, supra note 36, at 439;
Woods, supra note 144, at 395.
One educational malpractice critic disagrees and argues that these generalized objections to the excessive litigation rationale lose their muster when particularized to the educational malpractice context. Funston, supra note 37, at 795-96. Professor Funston asserts
that these critics overlook the sheer number of potential litigants if educational malpractice becomes a viable cause of action. Id. at 796. But see Foster, supra note 144, at 195
(arguing there is a lack of empirical evidence to support such a conclusion). This conclusion can only be supported if there is a substantial number of successful malpractice
claims, which is an unlikely result given the reasons previously discussed. Professor Foster
also attempts to discredit this concern by arguing that educational institutions are in a
considerably better position than students to distribute the losses resulting from educational malpractice. Foster notes that institutions can shift the losses to the public through
taxes or procure liability insurance. Id.
177. COLLIS, supra note 35, at 384; accord WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 51 (1983)
("It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a
'flood of litigation,' and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court
ofjustice to deny relief on such grounds.").
178. COLLIS, supra note 35, at 386-87; Foster, supra note 144, at 192-93;Jay M. Pabian,
Note, Educational Malpracticeand Minimal Competency Testing: Is There a Legal Remedy at Last?,
15 NEw ENG. L. REv. 101, 108 (1979-80).
179. Elson, supra note 168, at 657.
180. Sherman, supra note 12, at 682.
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by colleges and universities impeding their ability to acquire an educational opportunity. Improper conduct appears with failing to provide
sufficient study time or independent and satisfactory counseling and
tutoring, with disregarding student-athletes' progress towards education, with channeling student-athletes into classes which lack substantive
education merit and with passing student-athletes to higher levels to
maintain their academic eligibility.' 8 1
The above-described conduct also assists in establishing the causation element of negligence that presents a significant evidentiary hurdle
that the student-athlete must traverse.18 2 The evidentiary burden arising from the necessity of establishing causation is justifiable inasmuch as
183
the student-athlete shares the responsibility for his or her education.
Nevertheless, the joint nature of the responsibility does not lead to an
inescapable conclusion that a causal connection cannot be established
between the university's conduct and its failure to afford the studentathlete an educational opportunity.
The principle that causation can be established notwithstanding the
existence of several contributing factors is equally applicable to this context.184 Therefore, to establish causation, a court would be required at
a minimum to focus on two categories of conduct-that of the studentathlete and that of the institution. With respect to the former, the student-athlete would be required to proffer evidence demonstrating an innate intellectual capacity to learn and the motivation, diligence and
intention to pursue a course of study, which would result in the acquisi18 5
tion of basic educational skills.
Proving that the institution's conduct was a substantial factor in the
resulting harm can be accomplished through evidence focusing on several factors including:
(1) the breadth of the student athlete's curriculum; (2) the
type of guidance offered; (3) the number of absences occasioned by athletic commitments; (4) compilation of exams, papers and assignments; (5) a record of complaints by the
student and/or his guardian; (6) the school's standing and reputation in a given athletic sport; (7) evidence of passing grades
in courses never attended; and (8) evidence tending to show
that the student placed an inordinate degree of trust in the
86
coach and his staff.1
Evidence related to these and other forms of the institution's conduct
181. See Davis, supra note I, at 789-90; Sherman, supra note 12, at 679-80 (identifying
the types of negligence typically alleged by student-athletes).
182. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 121 (noting the onerous evidentiary burden confronting the student-athlete); Sherman, supra note 12, at 684 (difficulties inherent in establishing causation provide a defense institutions can assert against these claims).
183. Johnson, supra note 7, at 121.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 155-60.
185. See Foster, supra note 144, at 238-39;Johnson, supra note 7, at 121; Sherman, supra
note 12, at 684; Michael N. Widener, Note, Suits by Student-Athletes Against Collegesfor Obstructing Educational Opportunity, 24 ARiz. L. REv. 467, 481 (1982).
186. Johnson, supra note 7, at 121; see supra text accompanying note 181 (describing the
nature of potential improper conduct by colleges and universities).
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will enable the trier of fact to determine the causal connection between
the conduct and the student-athlete's failure to obtain an educational
opportunity. Moreover, due to the nature of the alleged harm, creating
a standard of care will not constitute an insurmountable task. Whether a
university breached its duty of care could be determined by focusing on
the above-described conduct. All of these instances of improper conduct are capable of assessment under professional standards commonly
used in education such as state accreditation standards and the educa1 87
tional standards the student-athlete's university has adopted.
In addition, colleges would not be subjected to the same potential
exposure as public schools. 18 8 First, the duty imposed on universities
would be limited to student-athletes and thus would create a smaller
pool of possible litigants. 18 9 Second, the scope of the duty could be
defined to balance and protect the interests of the student-athlete and
his or her school. Defining the duty as providing an educational opportunity instead of a guarantee would limit the potential liability of the
institution. 190 Finally, student-athletes would have to overcome evidentiary obstacles in proving their claims. "In order to succeed in asserting
educational malpractice, a student would have to withstand evidence
that he or she did not attend class, missed tutoring sessions, failed to
complete assignments, showed a non-cooperative attitude, and didn't
[sic] participate in class or tutoring sessions."' 91
D.

Consequences of Focusing on Policy Concerns

The foregoing discussion illustrates the basic weaknesses in policy
rationales traditionally employed by courts to justify denial of educational malpractice claims. By adhering to what has become a blanket
rule of non-liability for educational malpractice, courts automatically
preclude meritorious claims from consideration.' 9 2 This is particularly
disturbing given that victims of educational malpractice incur real and
measurable injuries. 193 One writer observed:
[R]efusal to recognize the cause of action is incompatible with
accepted tort principles, and that a cogent theory supporting
187. See Sherman, supra note 12, at 681.
188. Id. at 682.
189. Davis, supra note 1, at 785-86 (discussing the justifications for limiting the university's duty to student-athletes). The author of a recent student note argues that it is improper to compare public schools to universities. The latter are under no obligation to
engage in intercollegiate competition but do so because of the benefits perceived as flowing from college athletics. Since colleges voluntarily create major sports programs to further these objectives, they should not be able to take advantage of the fear of litigation
rationale as a shield to potential liability arising out of the manner in which they conduct
their sports programs. Sherman, supra note 12, at 682-83.
190. Davis, supra note 1, at 785.
191. Sherman, supra note 12, at 683.
192. Woods, supra note 144, at 395. Commentators have been troubled by the courts'
failure to allow action on educational injuries given the plight of illiterate high school
graduates who cannot read at a level sufficient to function in a modem, information-intensive work environment. Klein, supra note 147, at 39-40.
193. Wilkins, supra note 36, at 432.
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nonrecognition cannot be articulated within the confines of the
accepted principles and the general policies upon which those
principles are based. If special policies justifying nonrecognition exist, then that result should be legislatively prescribed,
rather than judicially pronounced in a manner that
is antitheti19 4
cal to the recognized, traditional tort principles.
Equally disturbing is that undue reliance on these dubious policy
considerations channels the judiciary away from the ultimate issuewhether a particular plaintiff's interests are entitled to protection
against the defendant's conduct. The remainder of this Article focuses
on this critical issue in the context of the student-athlete/university
relationship.
In attempting to respond to the ultimate question, the foregoing
discussion arguably shows that courts should recognize an educational
malpractice action in the student-athlete/university context merely due
to the weaknesses of the policy justifications relied on to reject educational malpractice claims. While the weaknesses are clear, this Article
goes beyond a criticism of the foregoing policy reasons. Rather, within
the confines of traditional tort doctrine and thus independent of these
criticisms, the academic interests of student-athletes are deserving of
protection against the conduct of their institutions, which deny them an
educational opportunity. In other words, traditional tort doctrine, directly or by analogy, provides precedent compelling courts to create a
common law duty on the part of colleges and universities to confer an
educational opportunity to student-athletes.
III.

ESTABLISHING A SOURCE FOR THE

DUTY

A duty recognized by law is the threshold element of a negligence
cause of action. 195 As a general proposition, no duty exists absent a
special circumstance. 1 96 This rule of law has been applied to absolve
universities from liability to students, although not without exception.
Courts demonstrate a willingness to impose a duty on colleges to protect students where a special relationship exists. These circumstances
and the justifications for imposing a duty of care are discussed below.
A.

Tort Liability of Post-Secondary Institutions to Students
1. Liability Premised on In Loco Parentis?
In the early part of this century, the doctrine of in loco parentis19 7 -

194. Jerry, supra note 169, at 196.
195. KEETON ET AL., supra note 141, at 164-65.
196. Theodore C. Stamatakos, Note, The Doctrine of In Loco Parentis, Tort Liability and
the Student-College Relationship, 65 IND. LJ. 471, 472 (1990).
197. The doctrine of in loco parentis originally appeared during the late 18th Century in
England as a defense to civil and criminal actions brought by parents against private tutors
responsible for administering corporal punishment to students. Id. at 473; see also William
M. Beaney, Students, Higher Education, and the Law, 45 DENy. LJ. 511, 514 (1968); Perry A.
Zirkel & Henry F. Reichner, Is the In Loco Parentis DoctrineDead?, 15J.L. & EDuc. 271, 273
(1986) (employing doctrine as a defense to assault and battery actions against teachers).
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"in the place of a parent"' 9 8 -defined the student/university relationship. In its fullest form, in loco parentis permitted colleges to not only
devise, implement and administer student discipline, but to foster a student's physical and moral well-being. 19 9 Focusing on this latter notion
of the physical welfare of students, consideration was given to whether
the authority that permitted colleges to govern student conduct carried
with it a correlative legal duty owed by institutions to protect students. 20 0 Thus, the question arises whether in loco parentis, the paradigmatic model for the student-college relationship, 20 creates a special
relationship between students and colleges such that a duty is imposed
on the latter to not only exercise control over their students' conduct
20 2
but, reciprocally, to protect their students' welfare.
Serious doubt has been cast over whether the in loco parentis doctrine
ever provided the basis for imposing tort liability on colleges for injuries
to students. This uncertainty arises in part from the dearth of reported
cases 20 3 identifying in loco parentis as the theoretical justification for imThe judiciary developed the notion that surrogate parents such as tutors or schoolmasters
possessed the same authority to punish children as the children's parents. Beaney, supra,
at 514. Thus, a school authority had the right to control and discipline the child since the
school was viewed as standing in the place of the parent. Jonathan Flagg Buchter, Note,
Contract Law and the Student-University Relationship, 48 IND. LJ. 253, 253-54 (1973); David M.
Rabban, Note,Judicial Review of the University-Student Relationship: Expulsion and Governance,
26 STAN. L. REv. 95, 97 n. 15 (1973) (stating in loco parentis transferred the parental discretionary authority to academic institutions).
The doctrine was first applied formally to higher education in Gott v. Berea College,
161 S.W. 204 (Ky. Ct. App. 1913). VictoriaJ. Dodd, The Non-ContractualNature of the Student-University ContractualRelationship, 33 KAN. L. REv. 701, 705, n.35 (1985); Buchter, supra,
at 253 n.4; Stamatakos, supra note 196, at 473-74. In Gott the court stated:
College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and moral welfare and mental training of the pupils, and we are unable to see why, to that end,
they may not make any rule or regulation for the government or betterment of
their pupils that a parent could for the same purpose. Whether the rules or regulations are wise or their aims worthy is a matter left solely to the discretion of the
authorities or parents, as the case may be, and, in the exercise of that discretion,
the courts are not disposed to interfere, unless the rules and aims are unlawful or
against public policy.
Gott, 161 S.W. at 206.
Due to the increasing complexity of modern disputes between students and educational institutions, the judiciary abandoned its reliance on the in locoparentisdoctrine. Beaney, supra, at 515 (explaining that many courts found the doctrine inadequate to provide
the foundation for determining the rights of participants in complex university affairs);
Dodd, supra, at 705 n.35 (noting that in loco
parentis was supplanted in later years by contractual theories since the doctrine was too narrow to resolve the myriad of educational
disputes satisfactorily); Buchter, supra, at 254 (stating the limited applicability of the doctrine, as in disputes over academic performance, increased the need for alternative
theories).
198. Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 197, at 271.
199. Stamatakos, supra note 196, at 474.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 476 n.21.
202. Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1979).
203. Brigham Young Univ. v. Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 1941), has been identified by some as an illustration of a court's reliance on the in loco parentis doctrine to impose liability on a college. In Lillywhite, a student sustained personal injuries resulting
from an explosion in a chemical laboratory experiment. Id. at 838. The court relied in
part on the plaintiff's student status to impose liability grounded on improper supervision
by her instructor. Id. at 840-41. The court reasoned that the university stood in the place
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posing liability on a college or university. 20 4 Moreover, a reexamination
of the few cases previously believed to illustrate instances premising a
college's tort liability on in loco parentis further challenges the proposition that the doctrine once provided a doctrinal basis for liability for
20 5
student injuries.
The 1960s saw the demise of the in loco parentis doctrine as students
challenged the rigid controls that the doctrine authorized institutions to
exert over students' affairs. 20 6 A subsidiary effect of greater student
control of their affairs is that students no longer expect or demand to be
protected by universities. 20 7 Thus, rejection of the doctrine as a basis of
of the student's parents and owed a duty to protect the student from physical harm. See
also Barr v. Brooklyn Children's Aid Soc'y, 190 N.Y.S. 296 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921), where the
court acknowledged that a college or university could be held liable for a student's injuries
caused by the institution's servant. Id. at 297.
204. James J. Szablewicz & Annette Gibbs, Colleges' Increasing Exposure to Liability: The
New Loco Parentis, 16J.L. & EDUC. 453, 456 (1987).
205. A recent scholarly debate addresses the issue of whether the in loco parentis doctrine ever served as a viable theory for imposing tort liability on colleges and universities
for negligence. Szablewicz and Gibbs examined three cases, which they contend support
the notion that a new in loco parentis doctrine is developing as a basis for imposing tort
liability on universities. The authors argue that the extraordinary circumstances under
which negligence liability was imposed in these cases can only be explained by virtue of
relying on elements of the doctrine of in loco parentis. Id. at 461. Szablewicz and Gibbs
contend that:
[I]n each case, the court has struggled with traditional legal theories short of in
loco parentis to define the relationship between the student and college. It is clear,
however, that none of these theories supports the courts' ultimate decisions.
Rather, only something akin to in loco parentis adequately serves to resolve these
cases.
Id. Finally, the authors argue that the limited use of in loco parentis as the basis of a tort
action against a college or university may have arisen not from the inapplicability of the
doctrine but from sovereign immunity, which protected educational institutions from liability. Id. at 455.
A recent student note challenges these assertions. In Stamatakos, supra note 196, the
author concludes that, although elements of the doctrine continue to exist (e.g. providing
for the health and safety of students), the doctrine of in loco parentis is no longer legally
tenable in the college context. Id. at 475. Indeed, the author argues that a close reading of
cases such as Lillywhite reveals that the courts failed to specifically utilize the doctrine in
reaching a determination of institutional liability. The author further argues that the alternative contract, fiduciary and unitary theories are also inappropriate for determining an
institution's tort liability to students. Id. at 476-77.
In the wake of in loco parentis' demise, courts and theoreticians proposed four
models of the student-college relationship: constitutional, contractual, fiduciary
and 'unitary.' All four models suffer from a systemic deficiency that cripples their
use when courts examine institutional tort liability: Not one of the models is
designed to adequately define the student-college relationship when student sues
college for personal injury. It is no surprise, then, that these models only have
been used, if ever, in litigation concerning the college disciplinary rules and regulations, student fees, and facilities use. The models simply do not inform personal injury suits by students against colleges.
Id. at 481.
206. Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 139-40 (colleges once used the doctrine to impose strict
regulations on student conduct but students demanded the right to define and regulate
their own affairs).
207. Dodd, supra note 197, at 705 n.35 (concluding that in loco parentis was supplanted
by contractual theories); Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 204, at 456 (noting that the relationship premised on in loco parentis was replaced by an arms-length relationship between
colleges and students); Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 197, at 282 (contractual and constitutional doctrines have replaced in loco parentis as a source of protection for students);
Buchter, supra note 197, at 254 (indicating that courts turned from in loco parentis to the
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the exercise of authority carries a corresponding rejection of the doctrine as a basis to impose tort liability on institutions. 20 8 Therefore, in
loco parentis cannot be looked to as precedent or a doctrine to support
imposition of a tort duty on universities in favor of student-athletes.
2.

Liability Premised on Special Relationships

In the 1970s and 1980s, courts manifested greater willingness to
impose tort liability on post-secondary institutions for physical injuries
to students.2 0 9 The judiciary, however, has narrowly limited the situations in which a university will be held liable for such injuries.2 10 Institutional liability has been limited to those instances where a special
relationship exists between a college and a student.2 1 1 It is important to
note, however, that the arguably unique relationship between students
and colleges is not the basis of the special relationships on which liability
has been premised. 2 12 In other words, courts have turned to special
relationships which exist independent of any relationship arising merely
from a plaintiff's status as a student.2 1 3 This judicial attitude has been
summarized as follows:
Courts have largely disregarded the fact that the*college/university-student relationship is a unique one. The institution is
often the center of the student's life-in addition to classroom
education, the institution may provide a place for the student to
live and may be the site
of many if not all of the student's extra2 14
curricular activities.
Judicial reluctance to recognize a special relationship arising merely out
of the student/university relationship is premised on the belief that institutions are not insurers of student safety since students are consid2 15
ered adults capable of caring for themselves.
written contract between students and universities to define the relationship); Stamatakos,
supra note 196, at 477 (courts have turned to contract which predated the demise of in loco
parentis doctrine as an alternative model).
208. Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 204, at 456 (courts reject claims against colleges
for negligence which may have been successful under the in loco parentis doctrine).
209. Stamatakos, supra note 196, at 485.
210. Tia Miyamoto, Comment, Liability of Colleges and Universitiesfor Injuries DuringExtracurricularActivities, 15 J.C. & U.L. 149 (1988); Stamatakos, supra note 196, at 489.
211. Stamatakos, supra note 196, at 485.
212. Miyamoto, supra note 210, at 151-52, 175; BarbaraJ. Lorence, Note, The University's Role Toward Student Athletes: A Moral or Legal Obligation?, 29 DuQ. L. REv. 343, 353
(1991) (claims premised on student status have been unsuccessful). One author notes:
Thus far, courts have not held institutions liable for extracurricular injuries occurring off campus. Courts have been willing to hold institutions liable for injuries sustained by students in a limited number of cases. This disparity in
treatment is largely due to the fact that in an on-campus injury case, the plaintiff
can argue that the institution's status as landowner imposes a duty of care. This
duty has been more readily recognized in the higher education context than a
duty arising from the in loco parentis doctrine, a duty to supervise, or a duty to
control third persons ....

Stamatakos, supra note 196, at 486-87.
213. Lorence, supra note 212, at 353.
214. Miyamoto, supra note 210, at 151-52.
215. Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979); Miyamoto, supra note 210, at
162, 175.
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Courts have turned to traditionally recognized tort "special relationships" as a basis for imposing a duty on universities to protect the
interests of students. 2 16 For example in Peterson v. San Francisco Community College District,2 1 7 the California Supreme Court determined whether
a college possessed a'duty to protect a student from an on-campus physical assault. 2 18 The plaintiff alleged that the college's duty arose out of a
special relationship between herself and the institution. 21 9 In holding
for the plaintiff, the court first explained that as a general matter a duty
might be found where: "(a) a special relation exists between the actor
and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the
third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor
and the other which gives the other a right to protection. '2 20 It concluded that the student's status as an invitee and the college's status as a
possessor of premises created a special relationship sufficient to impose
a duty on the latter in favor of the former. 2 2 1 Thus, in finding a duty of
care on the part of the college, the court turned to a long-recognized
2 22
special relationship-that between a possessor of land and an invitee.
A similar result was reached in Stockwell v. Board of Trustees of Leland
StanfordJunior University.223 A student sustained personal injuries after
being struck in his eye by a bullet fired from a BB gun. 224 The student
alleged that the University failed to use reasonable care in maintaining
its premises in a safe condition. 2 25 Evidence presented by plaintiff
demonstrated knowledge by the University that the small firearms (including BB guns) were being used in the area where the injury occurred,
216. Miyamoto, supra note 210, at 162. The special relationships sufficient to impose
liability are those articulated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). For
example,
[u]nlike the argument that a special relationship exists between a postsecondary
institution and its students which warrants a duty to control another, the duty
arising from an institution's landowner status has clearly been recognized by the
courts, as exemplified by Stockwell and Mortiboys. However, the acceptance of the
landowner duty in the college and university context has nothing to do with the
unique relationship between postsecondary institutions and their students.
Miyamoto, supra note 210, at 173 (citing Stockwell v. Board ofTrustees of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 148 P.2d 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944); Mortiboys v. St. Michael's College, 478
F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1973)).
217. 685 P.2d 1193 (Cal. 1984).
218. Id. at 1195.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1196 (citations omitted).
221. Id. at 1198.
222. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 provides in part:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business
purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the
land for such a purpose, for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or
intentionally harmful acts of third persons ... and by the failure of the possessor
to exercise reasonable care to (a) discover that such acts are being done or are
likely to be done, or (b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid
the harm, or otherwise to protect them against it.
Id.; accord Richmond v. Ohio State Univ., 564 N.E.2d 1145, 1147 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1989) (university could be liable to a student by virtue of its status as an occupant of premises and
the student's status as an invitee).
223. 148 P.2d 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944).
224. Id. at 406.
225. Id. at 405.
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notwithstanding signs prohibiting the possession of guns therein. 22 6
Relying on the duty of a landowner to protect invitees from dangerous
conditions on the premises, 22 7 the court reversed the lower court's
grant of a nonsuit. As was true in Peterson, the court relied on the wellrecognized and accepted special relationship between landowner and in2 28
vitee to impose liability on the University.
In Bearman v. University of Notre Dame,22 9 plaintiff sued the University
for injuries sustained after she was knocked down by a drunk after a
football game. 23 0 The issue on appeal was whether the University owed
a duty of care to plaintiff for injuries resulting from the acts of a third
party. The court answered affirmatively, holding that the University's
duty to plaintiff arose out of the duty of a landowner to protect an invi23 1
tee from the harmful acts of third persons.
Notwithstanding the foregoing illustrations, in the majority of cases
involving suits brought by students, courts have refused to impose negligence liability on colleges and universities for injuries students have sustained. Even in denying liability, however, the judiciary has recognized
the notion that the existence of a special relationship is a sufficient basis
on which to impose duty on colleges and universities. This is illustrated
in the leading case of Bradshaw v. Rawlings,23 2 where the Third Circuit
awarded recovery to a college student injured in an off-campus automo2 33
bile accident, which occurred on his return from a class picnic.
The college's liability hinged on whether it owed plaintiff student a
duty of care. 23 4 After discussing the evolution of the student/university
relationship and the demise of the doctrine of in loco parentis, the court
held that, absent a special relationship, plaintiff was incapable of establishing a duty owed by the university to him. The court went on to reject
the notion that beer-drinking by under-age college students alone created a special relationship upon which to predicate liability. 23 5 By so
226. Id. at 406.
227. The court characterized the principle that creates the special relationship between
a landowner and invitee as follows: "[A] person invited upon the premises of another may
recover damages from such owner for injuries received owing to the dangerous condition
of the premises known to the owner and not known to the person so injured .... " Id. at
408.
228. See also Mortiboys v. St. Michael's College, 478 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1973) (recognizing special relationship of college as landowner and student as invitee as providing foundation on which to establish duty owed by college to student).
229. 453 N.E.2d 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
230. Id. at 1197.
231. Id. at 1198. The special relationship relied on by the court to impose a duty on
the college is defined in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f (1965). See also
Nieswand v. Cornell Univ., 692 F. Supp. 1464, 1469 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (the court refused to
recognize a special relationship between a student and a university but found that liability
could be based on the university's status as a landowner in operating, maintaining and
supervising its dormitories).
232. 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979).
233. Id. at 137.
234. Id. at 138.
235. Id. at 142. The court refused to impose such a duty based in part on the substantial burden that would be placed on colleges. Other courts followed the view that liability
will not be imposed absent a special relationship. See Fox v. Board of Supervisors of La.
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concluding, the court denied the existence of a unique special relationship between student and university, which could provide the foundation of a duty of care owed by universities to their students.
Nevertheless the court left the door open for liability to be premised on
a traditionally recognized special relationship such as that found in section 320 of The Restatement (Second) of Torts, which creates a special relationship when a person takes custody of another under circumstances
236
where the other is deprived of his normal power of self-protection.
B. Justificationsfor Creating Special Relationships
In a notable recent case, University of Denver v. Whitlock, 23 7 the Colorado Supreme Court refused to hold a university liable for personal injuries to a student, but recognized that liability could be premised on a
special relationship. The court framed the dispositive issue as whether
the University owed the student a duty of care to take measures to protect him from the injuries he sustained. 238 Differentiating nonfeasance
from misfeasance, 23 9 the court held that with the former, liability can
State Univ., 576 So.2d 978, 981-82 (La. 1991) (since the university was not the insurer of
student safety, it was not liable for failing to supervise activities of a rugby tournament
during which a student from another college was injured absent a showing of a special
relationship between the visiting student and university); Crow v. State, 271 Cal. Rptr.
349, 358 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (university not liable for negligent supervision of intoxicated
third-party student who assaulted another student since university did not stand in a special relationship with either student); Baldwin v. Zoradi, 176 Cal. Rptr. 809 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981) (the relationship between university and students, without more, does not create a
special relationship placing the university under obligation to protect students from unforeseeable harm); Campbell v. Board of Trustees of Wabash College, 495 N.E.2d 227,
232 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (nonexistence of a special relationship precluded injured student
from recovering damages from college); Allen v. Rutgers Univ., 523 A.2d 262, 266 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div.) (facts established university neither sold nor served alcoholic beverages, therefore the institution could not be held liable for injuries to student on grounds
of special statutory and common law duties imposed upon a licensee not to serve alcoholic
beverages to an intoxicated person), cert. denied, 527 A.2d 472 (N.J. 1987).
236. Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 140. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 320 (1965) defines
the duty of a person having custody of another to control the conduct of third persons:
One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal power of
self-protection or to subject him to association with persons likely to harm him, is
under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct of third persons as to prevent them from intentionally harming the other or so conducting
themselves as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to him, if the actor
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the conduct of
the third persons, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity
for exercising such control.
Id.
For criticisms of the Bradshaw court's holding that the evidence did not support the
existence of a special relationship, see Rita Mankovich Irani, Recent Decision, 19 DuQ. L.
REv. 381 (1981); Miyamoto, supra note 210, at 165-66; Comment, The Student-College Relationship and the Duty of Care: Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 14 GA. L. REv. 843, 854 (1980).
237. 744 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1987). In r1hitlock, injuries resulting from a trampoline accident rendered plaintiff a quadriplegic. The trampoline was located on a fraternity's premises. Reversing the trial court's order granting defendant judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the university owed the student a duty to
either remove the trampoline from the fraternity premises or supervise its use. Id. at 56;
see Whitlock v. University of Denver, 712 P.2d 1072 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
238. Wl'hitlock, 744 P.2d at 57.
239. The court distinguished the concepts as follows:

1992]

EXAMINING EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE

only attach if there is a special relationship between the parties, which
imposes a duty to act on the defendant. 240 Identifying certain recognized special relationships, 24 1 the court noted that underlying the recognition of a duty of care in situations involving a special relationship
are the notions of dependence and mutual dependence. The court concluded that student status does not create a special relationship and thus
24 2
fails to provide the basis to impose a duty on the University.
Similarly, the court in Beach v. University of Utah,24 3 in refusing to
hold a university liable to a student absent the existence of a special
relationship discussed the assumptions that underlie special relationships. According to the court, judicially recognized special relationships
arise when one assumes responsibility for another's safety or when one
deprives another of normal opportunities to protect his or her interests. 24 4 The Beach court further stated that at the heart of these special
relationships is the idea of dependence by one party upon the other or
mutual dependence between them. 24 5 The court concluded that the
student/college relationship alone does not constitute a special relationship. 246 According to the court, a realistic assessment of the modem
student/university relationship-the essence of which is education and
not custody-justified the refusal to find a special relationship between
colleges and adult students. It found that since the evidence failed to
demonstrate a special relationship, the University possessed no obliga24 7
tion to protect or supervise the injured student.
C.

Is the. Relationship Between Student-Athletes and Colleges Special?

The foregoing discussion leads to the critical inquiry: whether the
student-athlete/university relationship has attributes that warrant its
In determining whether a defendant owes a duty to a particular plaintiff, the law
has long recognized a distinction between action and a failure to act-'that is to
say, between active misconduct working positive injury to others [misfeasance]
and passive inaction or a failure to take steps to protect them from harm [nonfeasance] . . . .' Liability for nonfeasance was slow to receive recognition in the law.

'The reason for the distinction may be said to lie in the fact that by 'misfeasance'
the defendant has created a new risk of harm to the plaintiff, while by 'nonfeasance' he has at least made his situation no worse, and has merely failed to benefit
him by interfering in his affairs.'
Id. (quoting KEETON Er AL., supra note 141, § 56, at 373).

240. Id. at 58.
241. The court noted that judicially recognized special relationships include "carrier/
passenger, innkeeper/guest, possessor of land/invited entrant, employer/employee, parent/child, and hospital/patient." Id.
242. In reaching the conclusion that the student/university relationship is not one
based on dependence, the court relied on the analysis and policy rationale enunciated in
Bradshaw and its progeny. Id. at 59-61.
243. 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986).
244.
245.

Id. at 415 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1964)).
Id. at 415-16 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A cmt. b (1964)).

The concept of dependence as the essence of special relationships was also noted by the
court in Baldwin, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 814, where the court refused to impose liability on a
college for personal injuries suffered by a student during an accident that occurred in the
aftermath of drinking on college grounds.
246. Beach, 726 P.2d at 416, 419.
247. Id.
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designation as a special relationship. If such a relationship exists, it arguably provides the basis that the court in Ross deemed a prerequisite to
imposing tort liability on postsecondary institutions for failing to provide student-athletes with an educational opportunity. Judge Nordberg,
in refusing to create a negligence cause of action sui generis for studentathletes, wrote that "a new rule declared through the evolutionary process of the common law ought fairly be deduced from existing doctrine-something that cannot be said for Ross's claim."' 248
1. The Misfeasance/Nonfeasance Distinction
In determining whether the student-athlete/university relationship
is special, this Article assumes that the institutional conduct of which student-athletes complain would constitute nonfeasance. If student-athletes incur emotional and intellectual harm due to failure of colleges and
universities to take affirmative action to provide them with an educational opportunity, the existence of a special relationship must be
demonstrated in order to impose a duty on these institutions to act.
This is in no way intended to suggest that the alleged improper conduct
cannot be characterized as misfeasance and that a strong case 2 49 does
not exist for imposing tort liability based upon an institution's failure to
exercise reasonable care in carrying out an assumed duty.250 Indeed the
argument can be made that, in the context of educational malpractice
actions by student-athletes, the alleged improper conduct amounts to
both nonfeasance and misfeasance. 25 1 Yet, this Article defines the purported negligent conduct as nonfeasance in order to focus more directly
on the question of whether a duty exists arising independently of any
248. Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1330 (N.D. Il1. 1990).
249. Student-athletes may argue that the express contractual relationship with the university contains an educational commitment on the part of the latter. See Davis, supra note
1, at 743. The contract would establish the parameters of the duty. Thus, the university's
failure to use reasonable care in fulfilling its duty would not only constitute a breach of
contract but would also provide grounds for a negligence action. KEETON ET AL., supra note
141, at 660-61 (noting that American courts have extended tort liability for misfeasance in
contract actions where defective performance results in injury to the promisee and the
misperformance involves a foreseeable, unreasonable risk to the interest of the promisee).
250. Historically, liability is easier to find in cases of misfeasance than those involving
nonfeasance. KEETON ET AL., supra note 141, at 378.

251. Id. at 374 (in practice, determining where to draw the line between conduct that is
active misfeasance, and passive nonfeasance, is not easy); FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE

LAW OF TORTS, § 18.6, at 729 (2d ed. 1986) (commenting on the tenuous nature of the
distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance).
Student-athletes have alleged conduct by their schools that can be characterized both
as active misconduct (misfeasance), and passive inaction (nonfeasance). KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 141, at 373. For example, in his complaint Terrell Jackson alleged that Drake
University failed to provide sufficient study time or independent and satisfactory academic
counseling and tutoring, and disregarded his progress toward an undergraduate degree.
Compl. at 38, Jackson v. Drake Univ., No. CC-84-49942 (Iowa Dist. Polk County, May 7,
1990). Such conduct might constitute nonfeasance. On the other hand, Jackson alleged
conduct that could be characterized as misfeasance such as Drake's requiring plaintiff to
take classes that lacked substantive education merit, and requiring plaintiff to submit
plagiarized papers. Id. Similar allegations are contained in the complaint filed by Kevin
Ross against Creighton University. Am. Compl. at 8-9, Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F.
Supp. 1319 (N.D. Il1. 1990) (No. 89-C-6463).
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duty that may be owed to students by virtue of the express contract. In
other words, does traditional tort doctrine provide a basis for imposing
liability on universities for failing to provide student-athletes with an educational opportunity independent of the "manifested intent, '2 5 2 which
resides in their express contract?
2.

The Nature of the Student-Athlete/University Relationship
a. Express ContractualRelationship

The student-athlete/university relationship is generally recognized
as based upon an express contract. 2 53 The Letter of Intent and the
Statement of Financial Aid, 254 which the parties execute, operate as the
primary sources of this express contractual relationship. 255 These documents define the formal relationship between student-athletes and universities and set the parameters of their respective rights and
obligations. 25 6 For example, by executing a Letter of Intent, a studentathlete commits to attend a particular school and restricts his ability to
2 57
participate in intercollegiate athletics at other schools.
While these documents evidencing the express contract provide
some indicia of the essence of the student-athlete/university relationship, they fail to present a complete picture. A complete understanding
of this relationship is achieved by examining the circumstances surrounding, and the conduct that manifests during, the performance stage
of this relationship. 25 8 An analysis of the parties' conduct reveals attrib252. KEETON ET AL., supra note 141, at 656.
253. Davis, supra note 1, at 769 (citing to cases recognizing, and commentators arguing, that a student-athlete's relationship with his school is contractual).
254. For a description of these documents as well as an analysis of their legal effect, see
Davis, supra note 1, at 769-72; Michael J. Cozzillio, The Athletic Scholarship and the College
National Letter of Intent: A Contract by Any Other Name, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1275, 1290-92
(1989); Johnson, supra note 7, at 114-16; Widener, supra note 183, at 469-70.
255. See Cozzillio, supra note 254, at 1290.
256. See Davis, supra note 1, at 777 (arguing that due to the vague expression of institutions' educational commitment to student-athletes, it is appropriate to utilize the duty of
good faith and fair dealing as an interpretative tool to define the substance and breadth of
this commitment).
257. See Cozzillio, supra note 254, at 1290 (student-athlete waives right to participate in
sports at another college by executing the Letter of Intent); Davis, supra note 1, at 771
(discussing implications of student-athlete's execution of Letter of Intent).
258. The strictly contractual relationship may also evidence a relationship marked by
dominance and dependence. See supra text accompanying notes 246-50. The first indicator
occurs during the bargaining stage where student-athletes are presented with standardform agreements; the parties do not engage in negotiations over the terms of the boilerplate agreement. In short, universities are in a superior bargaining position with studentathletes and their parents. James V. Koch, The Economic Realities ofAmateur Sports Organizalion, 61 IND. Lj. 9, 23-24 (1985) (arguing the ability of student-athletes to bargain with
their schools is constrained by collusion between and among universities and noting the
inability of student-athletes to negotiate the terms of these standard contracts); Alfred D.
Mathewson, IntercollegiateAthletics and the Assignment of Legal Rights, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 39,
74-75 (1990) (recognizing that student-athletes, and those acting on their behalf, are at a
bargaining disadvantage with universities); Johnson, supra note 7, at 111 (discussing the
inequities in the bargaining process and the superior bargaining position of universities).
It may also be argued that the restrictions placed on student-athletes by the express
contract denote not only the inequality of the bargaining process, but are consistent with a
relationship of dominance and dependence. SPERBER, supra note 2, at 239-40 (identifying
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utes-mutual dependence between student-athletes and their institutions with the latter as the dominant party in the relationship-that
justify denominating the relationship as special. Therefore, while the
contract creates the relationship between student-athletes and their colleges, the duty on the part of the latter can be viewed as arising independently of the implied or express terms of the contract by virtue of the
259
special relationship between them.
b.

Mutual Dependency

A college's dependency on its student-athletes arises out of the institution's need for the athletic abilities and services that student-athletes bring to the relationship. In short, colleges depend on studentathletes to provide services that in turn generate substantial revenues
from intercollegiate competition. 2 60 Student-athletes are dependent on
their schools to provide them with an education. 26 1 Athletic scholarships enable student-athletes to gain access to the potential academic
benefits, which are found at colleges and universities. 2 62 Yet the formal
attributes of this relationship fail to reflect the pervasive nature of student-athletes' dependency on their schools. It also creates the illusion
of a reciprocal relationship where neither party is in a position of dominance 2 63 and obscures the magnitude of the subservience of the student-athlete in this relationship.
c.

InstitutionalDominance and Student-Athlete Subordination

The degree of student-athlete dependency arises out of the pervasiveness of the control and dominance that schools through their athletic departments exert over every aspect of a student-athlete's college
NCAA restrictions which tilt the relationship in favor of universities); id. at 207-10 (discussing how one year renewable scholarships vest institutions with significant control over
student-athletes); Johnson, supra note 7, at 114-16 (arguing the Letter of Intent protects
and promotes the university's interests by inflicting severe consequences on student-athletes who wish to play for another school, and noting that universities reserve the right to
retract athletic scholarships).
259. Note, however, that the contract itself may provide additional grounds for liability. See Davis, supra note I.
260. Lorence, supra note 212, at 353 (discussing the financial dependency of institutions on their athletes); see Davis, supra note I, at 748-51 (exploring the financial attributes
and implications of the student-athlete/university relationship); Koch, supra note 258, at
11 (characterizing colleges as university-firms creating products such as athletic entertainment, which require the input of people, the most essential of whom is the student-athlete). See generally PATRICIA A. ADLER & PETER ADLER, BACKBOARDS & BLACKBOARDS:
COLLEGE ATHLETES AND ROLE ENGULFMENT 83 (1991) (observing that student-athletes per-

ceive themselves as quasi-employees of colleges); SPERBER, supra note 2, at 208 (providing
a detailed account of the intricacies of intercollegiate finances, and arguing that since the
services of student-athletes are essential to college athletic programs they are akin to employees of the institutions).
261. Lorence, supra note 212, at 353.
262. Performing athletic services for institutions allows student-athletes access to education. SPERBER, supra note 2, at 104-05, 209.
263. See supra text accompanying note 252 (arguing that the formal contractual relationship is skewed in favor of the university).
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life. In the academic realm, this dominance manifests itself as control
over academic decision-making.
Unlike other students, athletes did not look over course descriptions, schedules, or general education requirements.
Rather, they were registered into specific colleges (business,
engineering, arts and sciences, etc.), majors, and class by ...
the assistant coach in charge of academics. They were usually
(although not always) consulted in the selection of their college
and major, 2but rarely asked about which courses they would
like to take.

6

The end result of athletic department control is limited autonomy of
student-athletes over academic decisions 265 and their inability to handle
such matters independently. 2 66 The intimate involvement of an athletic
department in student-athletes' affairs leads student-athletes to become
dependent on agents of their schools to protect their academic
2 67
interests.
This relationship of dependence and trust which develops in the
academic arena also appears in the social aspects of student-athletes'
lives. For example, student-athletes are required to participate in athletically related social activities such as booster functions that divert time
away from studying and social activities of their choosing. 2 68 More important is the role of coaches who exert control and influence over both
ADLER, supra note 260, at 66-67.
265. Id. at 221. Athletic departments are guided by the goal of maintaining their athletes' eligibility to compete. Thus, they often steer student-athletes into courses that will
help them achieve this goal despite the lack of intellectual depth and challenge. Davis,
supra note 1, at 786-87; Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust; Should College Students Be Paid to
Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 256-57 (1990) (asserting academically unprepared student-athletes are channeled by schools into "gut" courses that devalue their education);
Widener, supra note 185, at 472 (describing the effects of athletic department control over
student-athletes).
266. Adler and Adler state as follows:
The players, uninvolved in academic decision-making, had little direct contact
with professors (beyond simple class attendance), academic counselors, or academic administrators. As a result, the players did not learn how to handle these
academic matters, nor-in many cases-were they interested in doing so. They
did not worry that these academic decisions were being made for them, or that
they did not have to process their own academic paperwork; they took it for
granted that this was the way things were.
ADLER & ALDER, supra note 260, at 130.
The adverse consequences of this dependency may extend beyond academics. "I have
seen so many football players struggle with the basics of day-to-day living once they were
out from under their coaches' wings-players who had trouble renting apartments, showing up for work on time, simply doing things on their own." RIcK TELANDER, THE HUNDRED YARD LIE: THE CORRUPTION OF COLLEGE FOOTBALL AND WHAT WE CAN Do TO STOP IT
103 (1989).
267. ADLER & ADLER, supra note 260, at 131. The authors argue that this assumption of
responsibility by athletic departments not only creates a relationship of trust, but reinforces the importance of student-athletes' athletic identities to the detriment of their academic identities. Id. The overall consequence of this and other conduct on the part of
institutions is to change the educational orientation of student-athletes from one that
might have prepared them for careers after collegb to one that maintains their athletic
eligibility. Id. at 221. The ultimate impact is that student-athletes are "partly socialized to
failure." Id. at 230.
268. Id. at 95.
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the social and academic spheres of student-athletes' college careers. 2 69
Coaches often become surrogate parents for student-athletes who can
significantly influence their social identities during their college tenure. 2 70 Moreover, because of their role, coaches assume they can influence both academic and non-academic decisions made by studentathletes. 271 As one author notes, because young people "tend to internalize personal-social characteristics of adults whom they admire and respect ... coaches have the potential for powerfully influencing attitudes
and values of their athletes. ' 27 2 Coaches can exert this influence in a
number of ways, including discouraging particular majors because the
resulting time demands might conflict with a student-athlete's time commitment to his sport. 273 In summary, a student-athlete's position at
a college or university can be characterized as "institutionalized
'2 74
powerlessness.
D.

The Special Nature of the Student-Athlete/University Relationship as a
Basisfor Tort Liability

The foregoing demonstrates that, while the student-athlete/university relationship is one of mutual dependency, the institution is clearly
the dominant party in the relationship. As a result, student-athletes are
vulnerable and particularly dependent on their institutions. 2 75 This dependence and reliance is particularly true with respect to student-athletes' academic affairs. In short, colleges and universities exercise
dominion and control over the affairs of student-athletes. As such, a
quasi-fiduciary relationship is created, which mandates that these institutions give at least as much attention to protecting the interests of student-athletes as to protecting their own. In the academic realm, such
attention in a particular case may require the institution to engage in
affirmative conduct to assist student-athletes in taking advantage of the
educational opportunities colleges offer. The requirement that institutions engage in affirmative conduct is particularly justifiable given the
economic advantages that accrue to colleges and universities as a result
276
of their relationships with student-athletes.
269. Coaches develop a relationship of trust and confidence with student-athletes that
typically begins during recruitment. See ALEXANDER WOLFF & ARMEN KETEYIAN, RAW RE-

CRUITS 136 (1990); Davis, supra note 1, at 786-87.
270. ADLER & ADLER, supra note 258, at 85, 120-25. One author asserts that coaches
are "experts at brainwashing, at keeping their players subservient." TELANDER, supra note
266, at 90.

271. Steven G. Poskanzer, Spotlight on the Coaching Box: The Role of the Athletic Coach
Within the Academic Institution, 16J.C. & U.L. 1, 9 (1989).
272. Id. at 10 (quoting Sage, An OccupationalAnalysis of the College Coach, in SPORT AND
SOCIAL ORDER: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT, 418-19 (Donald W. Ball &
John W. Loy eds., 1975)).
273. Alessandro, supra note 5, at 293.
274. ADLER & ADLER, supra note 260, at 224.

275. Attributes of the traditionally recognized special relationships are vulnerability
and dependence by one party. KEETON ET AL., supra note 141, at 374.

276. Special relationships typically involve some existing or potential economic benefits to the defendant. Id.
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Thus, the student-athlete/university relationship contains all of the
elements to which courts look in determining whether to characterize a
relationship as special for purposes of imposing a duty of care. Because
of the trust and dependence that student-athletes place in their institutions, the latter possess both a moral and legal obligation to engage in
affirmative conduct providing student-athletes with an educational opportunity. Failure to engage in such conduct should constitute actionable negligence.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Ross court's failure to inquire into the true essence of the student-athlete/university relationship eliminated from consideration the
concept of special relationships as the precedent the court believed was
required for it to recognize an educational malpractice action on behalf
of student-athletes. Yet, as we have seen, residing within the studentathlete/university relationship are attributes justifying the expansion of
the judicially recognized special relationships to include this relationship. Indeed, such an expansion is not unwarranted as exhibited by recent instances where courts have relied upon the concept of the special
277
relationship to create a duty of care and thereby impose tort liability.
In addition, the notion of the special relationship as the source for
requiring a party to engage in affirmative conduct to protect the affairs
of another is a well-recognized legal doctrine. Consequently, imposing
a tort duty on colleges and universities in favor of student-athletes
would not be as novel and unprecedented as it might first appear. To
the contrary, creating such a duty is consistent with and falls within the
contours and strictures of well-recognized tort doctrine. Thus, it renders ineffective and inapplicable to the student-athlete/university context the analysis and justifications that the judiciary has traditionally
employed in rejecting educational malpractice claims.
[Author's Note: On March 2, 1992, the Seventh Circuit issued its
decision in Ross v. Creighton, No. 90-2509 (7th Cir. Mar. 2, 1992), affirming in part and reversing in part the lower court's judgment. Relying on the policy justifications articulated by the district court, the
277. Story v. Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767, 776 (Mont. 1990) (breach of contract may give
rise to tort damages where special relationship exists); Arnold v. National County Mutual
Fire Insurance Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987) (special relationship between insured and insurer creates duty of good faith and fair dealing which may give rise to tort
liability); Dutton v. Mitek Realty Corp., 463 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)
(knowledge of a dangerous condition at the time city issued certificate of occupancy creates special relationship establishing independent duty on part of city to prevent foreseeable harm); Bodewig v. K-Mart Inc., 635 P.2d 657, 661 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (employer and
employee special relationship justified employee's tort recovery for emotional distress
arising out of employer's outrageous conduct); Tedder v. Raskin, 728 S.W.2d 343, 348
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (expanding special relationship concept to impose duty on landlord
to protect tenants from third-party crimes committed on premises); see Basaloco-Lapo v.
United States of America, No. 89-15348, 1991 WL 172381 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 1991) (denying recovery but recognizing that the special relationship between physician and patient
may give rise to tort liability).
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Seventh Circuit concluded the Illinois Supreme Court would not recognize the tort of educational malpractice. Id. at 8. For the same reasons,
it held that Illinois would reject any claim for "negligent admission." Id.
at 9. With respect to Ross's contract claim, the court first noted that a
breach of contract claim challenging the sufficiency of the educational
instruction would fail since it constitutes an "attempt to repackage an
educational malpractice claim as a contract claim." Id. at 12. The court
reasoned, however, that a breach of contract action may be available
where the essence of the complaint is the defendant's failure to honor an
"identifiable contractual promise." Id. Reading Ross's complaint as alleging that the University failed to honor a specific promise that he
would be able meaningfully to participate in the school's program of
study, the court remanded the matter for consideration of whether Ross
was barred from "any participation in and benefit from the University's
academic program... ." Id. at 14.]

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYEE
NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS
EDWARD M. SCHULMAN*

I. INTRODUCTION
An employee will often enter into a noncompetition agreement with
his employer under which the employee's right to work for a competitor,
or engage in a certain type of business, is restricted after his current
employment is terminated.' Usually such an agreement restricts the
employee's right to engage in a similar business within a certain geographic area for a period of time and prohibits the employee from soliciting customers he dealt with while working for his former employer.
Although such an agreement does not completely restrict the employee's future work options, its restrictions could be so onerous that
the employee will remain with his current employer rather than attempt
to engage in business elsewhere. Occasionally the restrictions of such
an agreement are absolute, completely prohibiting the employee from
2
ever engaging in the business anywhere.
Under the common law, an employee noncompetition agreement is
a restraint of trade, for it is "a promise [which in] its performance would
limit competition in any business or restrict the promisor in the exercise
* A.B. 1985, Princeton University;J.D. 1990, Harvard Law School. I am grateful for
comments from Professor Steven Shavell and for support from theJohn M. Olin Foundation through the Harvard Program on Law and Economics. The opinions expressed
herein remain solely my own.
1. There are no modem surveys that gauge the extent to which noncompetition
agreements are used in the employment context. One older study revealed that of 86
corporations surveyed in 1965, 83 attempted to protect trade secrets through contractual
arrangements with employees. 12 Bus. ORGANIZATIONS § 3.02, at 3-8 (1983), cited by Phillip J. Clossius & Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The CurrentJudicialEnforcement
of Employee Covenants Not to Compete-A Proposal For Reform, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 531, 532
(1984).
The case law shows that employee noncompetition agreements have been used in a
large variety of occupations. See 43 A.L.R. 2d 94 & Supp. 1991 (organizing the case law of
restrictive employment agreements by occupation, with categories for accountant, barber
and beauty specialist, bill collector, business executive, construction company, driver for
hire, employment agency, engineer, exterminator, house-to-house salesman, insurance
agent, management consultant, managerial personnel, office worker, optician, optometrist, performer, physician, photographer, real-estate agent, repairman, salesman, stenographer, stockbroker, teacher, technician, tree surgeon, undertaker, veterinarian.
Occupations in the miscellaneous category include pilot, real-estate appraiser, and cook.).
For a thorough compilation of modem cases that indicates occupations affected by restrictive employment agreements, see Milton Handler & Daniel E. Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade
and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 669, App. B (1982).
2. Such an agreement would certainly be an unreasonable restraint of trade and
either voided or modified by a court. See, e.g., Nature House, Inc. v. Sloan, 515 F. Supp
398 (N.D. Il.1981); Guffey v. Shelnut & Assoc., Inc., 278 S.E.2d 371 (Ga. 1981). Presumably, employers use such agreements either out of ignorance of the law or in an effort to
intimidate unsophisticated employees.
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of a gainful occupation." 3 Naked restraints of trade-i.e., agreements
whose sole purpose is to limit competition-are invalid under the common law.4 An employee noncompetition agreement, however, is not a
naked restraint of trade because the agreement is ancillary to the offer
and acceptance of employment, an otherwise valid transaction. In the
absence of an employment relationship, the employer would not pay an
individual for his promise to restrict his work options; conversely, without such a promise, the employer might not hire the individual.
The common law does not regard as per se unreasonable an agreement that restrains trade but is part of an otherwise valid transaction. 5
A court will only strike down or modify such an agreement upon a finding of unreasonableness based on the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction. In determining whether an employee noncompetition agreement is reasonable under the circumstances, courts
use a "rule of reason" analysis under which an employee noncompetition agreement will be deemed enforceable if it imposes no greater restriction than is needed to protect the legitimate interests of the
employer. In this regard, courts frequently cite the following three part
balancing test: an employee noncompetition agreement will be enforceable if (1) it is no more restrictive than needed to protect the employer's
legitimate interest, and the employer's need is not outweighed by (2) the
hardship imposed on the employee and (3) any likely injury to the public. 6 Although courts often employ this test, any consideration of hardship to the employee and injury to the public is usually subsumed by the
analysis of the employer's protectable interest. That is, the main issue
courts examine is whether the employer has a legitimate interest and
whether the agreement is not overbroad in light of that interest. Once
that hurdle is passed, a court will rarely, if ever, reject an agreement on
7
grounds of employee hardship or injury to the public.
A determination of what constitutes the legitimate, protectable interests of the employer and whether the restrictive covenant is narrowly
tailored to protect those interests, is, as would be expected, very dependent on the specific facts of each case. In general, an employer is
deemed to have a legitimate interest if a noncompetition agreement is
being used to prevent an employee from using confidential business in8
formation or customer contacts in competition against the employer. If
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186 (1981).
4. Id. § 187.
5. Id. §§ 187, 188(2)(b).
6. Id. § 188(1).
7. One exhaustive survey concluded that "the common law treats undue hardship
and public injury as the general rubric for characterizing overbroad noncompetition covenants as unreasonable" and that "[plublic injury or personal hardship alone have never
been dispositive elements for not enforcing noncompetition covenants otherwise reasonable in purpose, geographic scope, and duration." Handler & Lazaroff, supra note 1, at
719, 73 1. See also Harlen M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625,
649 (1960).
8.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRATS § 188 cmt. b (1981); Lessner Dental Lab.,

Inc. v. Kidney, 492 P.2d 39 (Ariz. 1971); New England Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, 363
N.E.2d 526, 528 (Mass. 1977); All Stainless, Inc. v. Colby, 308 N.E.2d 481, 486 (Mass.
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a court does find a protectable interest, the restrictive covenant is en-

forceable as written only if it is no broader than necessary to prevent the
employee from using the information or customer contacts in a manner
that damages the business of the employer. 9
For an illustration of an agreement that was held to be reasonable
and not overbroad, consider Amdar, Inc. v. Satterwhite, 10 in which a dance

studio successfully enjoined a former employee from becoming an instructor at a competing studio in violation of a noncompetition agree-

ment. The court upheld the agreement under which the employee had
promised not to accept employment for compensation in ajob related to
dance instruction for one year and within tWenty-five miles of the studio.
In enforcing the agreement, the court noted that the defendant had "ob-

tained benefits of compensation, further training and practice and continued knowledge of and experience in the secrets and methods of
plaintiff's business."'" The court also stated that the plaintiff had
demonstrated the loss of one customer to the defendant's new employer
12
and the possibility of further loss.
In Johnson v. Lee,' 3 the defendant, an office equipment repairman,
had signed an employment agreement with the plaintiff in 1968 under
which the defendant agreed to refrain from competitive business within
fifty miles of Valdosta, Georgia, for a period of five years after his employment terminated. When the defendant quit in 1978 and attempted
to open a competing business, his former employer successfully enjoined him. Upholding the agreement as reasonable, the court noted
that the defendant did have substantial customer contact as well as access to customer records that showed when maintenance contracts
would be up for renewal.' 4 The court therefore enjoined the defendant

from working in the business of unpacking, adjusting, installing and
servicing office machines within the geographic and time limitations of
1974). See also Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9J.
LEGAL STUD. 683, 685 (1980); Handier & Lazaroff, supra note 1, at 729. But see Angela M.
Cerino, A Talent is a Terrible Thing to Waste: Toward a Workable Solution tothe Problem of Restrictive Covenants in Employment Contracts, 24 Dug. L. REv. 777, 809 (1986) (While the courts of
"many states, such as Pennsylvania, give lip service to the notion of nonenforcement of
restrictions that are unnecessary for the protection of the employer's legitimate business
interests, there is no overt consideration given to what those interests actually are - and
are not. There appears to be an assumption that if the employer perceives the restrictions
to be necessary, then they must be necessary."); Clossius & Schaffer, supra note 1, at 544.
9. Frequently, a court will hold that the employer has a protectable interest but that
the geographic, time or activity limitations of the noncompetition agreement are broader
than necessary. Different jurisdictions take different approaches to enforcement in this
case. In some, the whole agreement will be declared unenforceable. In others, the court
will excise unreasonable provisions if they are severable from the contract and enforce the
remaining provisions. In some jurisdictions, the court will modify the contract without
attempting to sever the unreasonable provisions. For a discussion of these three approaches, seeJeffery G. Groody, Note, PartialEnforcement of Post-Employment Restrictive Covenants, 15 CoLuM.J. L. & Soc. PROB. 181, 196-214 (1979).
10. 246 S.E.2d 165 (N.C. App. 1978).
11. Id. at 166.
12. Id. at 168.
13. 257 S.E.2d 273 (Ga. 1979).
14. Id. at 275.
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his noncompetition agreement.1 5
Behnke v. Hertz Corp. 16 is an example of a case in which there is no
legitimate, protectable interest of the employer. Behnke hired Kreft to
work as a clerk at a car rental desk in the Milwaukee airport. Kreft
signed an agreement stating: "I agree not to work for any car rental
competitor in the city of Milwaukee for one year if and when the present
job is terminated." When Kreft quit her job to work for Hertz, Behnke
sued Hertz for inducing Kreft to breach her contract and won $982 compensatory and $10,000 punitive damages. On appeal, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court reversed. 17 The court noted that since there was no
evidence that Kreft could take trade secrets or customers away from the
plaintiff, the restrictive covenant was unnecessary for the protection of
8
the employer and hence unreasonable.'
It should be noted that in a few jurisdictions, statutes have displaced or limited the common law. In Louisiana, for example, an employee cannot be contractually restricted for more than two years from
competing against a former employer. 19 In Colorado, all employee covenants not to compete are void, with some exceptions, e.g., a "contractual provision providing for recovery of the expense of educating and
training an employee who has served an employer for a period of less
than two years."'20 In California, all employee noncompetition agreements are void. 2 ' More commonly, states that address the issue merely
codify existing common law.22
In evaluating the current state of the law in this area, academics
have reached sharply different conclusions. Those who believe that contracts made in a free market enhance the contracting parties' welfare
argue that these contracts should be subject to regular contract law and
not to a reasonableness test.2 3 Under that approach, almost all employee noncompetition agreements would be upheld. Others argue that
an employer's legitimate interests are already protected by trade secret
and principal-agent law and that noncompetition agreements therefore
give employers no protection beyond what they already have. Under
this view, noncompetition agreements are not used to protect the employer's legitimate interests, but rather to intimidate workers from going
15. Id.
16. 235 N.W.2d 690 (Wis. 1975).
17. Although the verdict was reversed on appeal, the fact that the plaintiff could get
the case before a jury and win large damages supports the contention of those who claim
that noncompetition agreements, even unreasonable ones, create enough uncertainty in
the minds of employees and future employers that these agreements unnecessarily inhibit
mobility and deter competition. Therefore, some claim that all noncompetition agreements should be prohibited. The employer would still receive protection from unfair competition through trade secret and agency law.
18. Behnke, 235 N.W.2d at 693.
19. 16 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C) (West 1985 & Supp. 1990).
20. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113(2) (1990).
21. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1987).
22.

See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (West 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.33 (West 1988 &

Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT. § 103.465 (West 1988).
23. Maureen B. Callahan, Comment, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 703 (1985).
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into competition.
This Paper focuses on the dynamics of the bargain between employer and employee and measures the impact of a noncompetition
agreement on the welfare of the contracting parties and society. Part II
makes some preliminary remarks about the economic approach that will
be used. Part III discusses four reasons why an employer and employee,
under perfect competition, might enter into a noncompetition agreement. It addresses, for each reason, the potential gain from trade and
whether market imperfections lead to sub-optimal agreements. Where
appropriate, the question of whether an agreement's anticompetitive aspects diminish social welfare is also addressed. Part IV summarizes the
conclusions reached and outlines a rational legal regime.
II.

ECONOMIC APPROACH

In a perfect market, a freely made contract will increase the overall
welfare of all parties involved. This conclusion stems from the basic
principle that a person will only engage in a trade if he feels the trade
will make him better off-that is, if there are gains to be made from the
trade. The economist's traditional support of free markets is a result of
the welfare-enhancing nature of trade.
One conventional definition states that a market is perfect when the
following five conditions are met: (1) all buyers and sellers are atomistic
(no individual can affect the price of the good through large sales or
purchases); (2) there are no externalities (all costs and benefits are reflected in the price of the good); (3) there is free mobility of resources
(with costless entry and exit from the market); (4) all parties have perfect
information (they know exactly what the bargain entails); and (5) the
product in the market is homogeneous (all products are identical, so
buyers choose a seller based solely on price).
Trade in a given market will not maximize welfare if one of these
five criteria is not met. In that case, government intervention may be
justified, whether by statutory or judicial regulation of trades, government efforts to supply information to the market or the taxation of behavior that produces externalities. In addition, if a certain type of
bargain will lead to imperfect competition in the future, government intervention is necessary. For example, it is widely accepted that governments should prohibit agreements that lead to cartels even though the
agreement is beneficial to the contracting parties.
It is commonly agreed among economists that labor markets are not
perfect. 25 Wages tend to be sticky and do not fluctuate with short-term
swings in supply and demand, as one would expect in a perfect market.
Because of sticky wages, periods of excessive unemployment often occur, even though perfect competition would suggest that this is impossi24. Clossius & Schaffer, supra note 1.
25. For a general discussion of how the labor market differs from a perfectly competitive market, see LESTER C. THUROW, DANGEROUS CURRENTS: THE STATE OF EcONOMICS

173-215 (1983).
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ble. In addition, monopsonistic buyers of labor exist in some
communities, a problem made possible by the lack of easy and costless
labor mobility.
Nevertheless, in analyzing the efficiency of noncompetition agreements, it is useful to start with the presumption that perfect competition
exists and that noncompetition agreements enhance the welfare of both
the employer and employee. The next section begins, therefore, with
the presumption that whatever value the employer gains from a noncompetition agreement (e.g., assurance that employees won't use secrets
or customer contacts in competition, or assurance that employees won't
quit frequently due to the difficulty they will have transferring their
skills) exceeds whatever loss the employee incurs as a result of hindered
mobility. Under this assumption, because the gain to the employer exceeds the loss to the employee, the employer will be able to compensate
the employee-in salary or training or in some other manner-by an
amount that more than covers the employee's loss.
This starting point forces identification of what both parties hope to
gain from such an agreement. Once a potential gain from trade under
perfect competition is identified, it is possible to consider whether a
market imperfection leads, in fact, to sub-optimal trades or whether the
agreement itself causes a market imperfection going forward and should
therefore be prohibited.
III.

A

WELFARE ANALYSIS OF FOUR POTENTIAL GAINS FROM TRADE

Academics have identified four potential gains provided by employee noncompetition agreements. These gains stem from bargains
over employee goodwill, the disclosure of business secrets, the undertaking of expensive training by the employer and the stabilization of
wages. Although for analytic purposes we will examine each gain separately, in any particular case the bargain may involve more than one of
these reasons.
A.

Employee Goodwill

Often an employee enhances a firm's value in a way that depends on
the employee's continuing presence. For example, customers may grow
to like and trust an employee enough that they would follow him if he
moved to another firm or started his own business. Even in the absence
of customer contact, an employee's consistent presence can help lift the
productivity of all workers-high employee turnover is usually associated with low productivity, partly because people work best together
26
when they have had time to develop a team mentality.
The value that an employee adds to a firm by his presence may be
called employee goodwill, just as a business name or location is said to
have goodwill. Some analysts argue that an employer pays a wage to an
employee to develop employee goodwill. Not only would it be wrong to
26. Id. at 205.
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allow the employee to leave the firm and appropriate the goodwill for
himself by taking customers or employing trade secrets elsewhere, but
the prospect of such a departure could chill the employer's desire to hire
the employee in the first place. 27 In this analysis, noncompetition agreements are justified as enabling an employee to sell goodwill to an employer for a wage, just as a noncompetition agreement enables the
28
owner of a business to sell his business's goodwill.
Many noncompetition agreements are entered into, and upheld by
courts, specifically to protect an employer's interest in employee goodwill. For example, often an employee covenants that after termination
of his employment he will not solicit customers with whom he came into
regular contact. 29 Even in the absence of such an explicit covenant,
courts often uphold agreements with geographic restrictions on the employee's post-employment activity if the restriction corresponds to the
geographic range of the employee's customer contact.3 0 Hence, it is importaht to analyze carefully whether a noncompetition agreement in this
context actually maximizes social welfare.
Our analysis of the labor market indicates that no employee with
perfect information will enter into a noncompetition agreement in order
to sell his employee goodwill. By restricting attractive employment opportunities in the future, a noncompetition agreement forces a prospective employee to make a long-term commitment to a firm. Only if an
employee underestimates the value of the goodwill he will bring to or
develop at a firm will he be willing to enter into such a long-term
contract.
In an efficient market, employees earn a return equal to their marginal revenue product of labor (MRP), which is the increase in revenue
that a firm experiences when it hires an additional employee but holds
all other inputs of production constant.3 1 If by hiring an additional employee, but adding absolutely nothing else, a firm's revenues increase by
$X per year (i.e., $X is the employee's marginal revenue product), then,
27. Cerino, supra note 8 at 807.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Group Ass'n Plans, Inc. v. Colquhoun, 292 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1968),
vacated on other grounds, 466 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (enforcing restrictive covenant that
barred insurance broker from soliciting business from concerns that were his employer's
customers during his term of employment).
30. See, e.g., Marshall v. Covington, 339 P.2d 504 (Idaho 1959) (enforcing restrictive
covenant between medical clinic and physician requiring physician not to practice
medicine or surgery for three years within twenty-five miles of clinic if physician left clinic
for any reason, noting that the territorial scope of a restrictive covenant is reasonable if
not broader than the territory throughout which the employee established contact with the
employer's customers); Standard Register Co. v. D.C. Kerrigan, 119 S.E.2d 533 (S.C.
1961) (enforcing noncompetition agreement in which sales representative coveted that for
two years after leaving employer he would not sell, in competition with employer, to accounts or in territory in which he performed duties for employer).
31. The conclusion that an employee's wage equals his marginal revenue product (i.e.,
his contribution to the firm's revenue) holds true only when the firm incurs no additional
capital costs by hiring the employee. If additional capital costs are incurred, the em-'
ployee's wage will equal his marginal revenue product discounted by an amount to cover a
fair rate of return on the additional capital required.
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under perfect competition, the employee will be compensated $X per
year.3 2 If he were paid less than $X per year, it would be profitable for a
competing firm to hire the employee at a slightly higher wage. This process would continue until an equilibrium wage of $X was reached. An
employee's contribution to a firm's revenues includes the revenue resulting from the employee goodwill he develops. In a perfect market,
therefore, a worker will always be fully compensated for his employee
goodwill.
A simple illustration will demonstrate this. Suppose that I am a
haircutter and have just started working in a hair salon. Assume that
because of the vast size of the salon and the large supplies it has on
hand, the salon incurs no additional costs when my presence is added
(while this is clearly an unrealistic assumption, it leads to clarity of exposition with no change in conclusion). 3 3 Suppose I know that after a
short time with the salon I will generate $40,000 worth of business on an
annualized basis. Of this amount, $25,000 will represent revenue from
customers who like and trust me and will move to another shop if I
move. The value of my employee goodwill will therefore be $25,000.
The other $15,000 will be revenue derived from walk-in customers or
customers who like the shop and its location. Thus, $15,000 of my revenue will result from business goodwill. Since this is a perfect market,
with perfect information, what will my salary be? It must be $40,000 per
year.
At this point, one might interject that this can't be the result if the
going salary for haircutters under these circumstances (i.e., when no additional capital costs need be incurred by a salon) is, say, $25,000. If
that's the case, one might assert, then the hair salon will refuse to pay
me $40,000 and will find someone else at the going rate of $25,000.
The salon will earn the difference ($15,000) as a supernormal return on
investment. This argument, however, fails to take into account that
$25,000 could not be the equilibrium wage if the cost of haircuts were
such that haircutters generated $40,000 in additional revenues each year
(with no increase in capital costs). Firms would bid the salary up to
$40,000 in an effort to obtain the difference between the salary and the
$40,000 revenue.
Thus, in an efficient market I will always be compensated by an
amount equal to my marginal revenue product. The portion of my revenue that results from employee goodwill is irrelevant to this determination. With perfect information, I will have no desire to enter into a
noncompetition agreement, which will restrict my mobility, unless I am
compensated by more than my MRP. But no employer would ever agree
32. Some may find it counter-intuitive that an employee could earn his contribution to
revenues, for it then appears that the firm reaps no benefit. This result is based on the
economist's definition of "zero" or "normal" profits as profits that provide a fair rate of
return on capital given the risk to which the capital is exposed. That is, if the return on
capital is no greater than the return that could be gained in other ventures of equal risk,
then the firm is said to earn normal (or zero) economic profits.
33. See supra note 3 1.
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to pay a wage that exceeded my contribution to revenues. Hence, if the
salon and I are willing to enter into an employment agreement, which
contains a noncompetition clause, either the salon has overestimated my
contribution to its revenues (my MRP) or I have overestimated it. One
of us is operating with imperfect information.
For a number of reasons, it is reasonable to assume that it is the
employee who systematically miscalculates his MRP. The firm deals with
many employees and is, therefore, more familiar with the marginal revenue product of labor. In the case where additional capital inputs are
required, the firm also has more information about the quantity and cost
of such inputs. Most importantly, if a firm did systematically overestimate employee goodwill, and thus was able to induce workers to enter
long-term contracts by implicit or explicit 34 promises of wages above
MRP, the firm would be driven out of the market by competitors who
operate at a lower cost by not entering into such agreements. Workers,
however, will continue to work, even in the long run, if locked into suboptimal wage agreements.
In the hair salon example, this reasoning would apply as follows. As
a new haircutter, I am not as knowledgeable as the salon about the
number of customers I will see each week. Further, I know little about
the cost of renting and running a shop. Thus, I cannot accurately calculate my contribution to the firm's revenues or a fair discount to cover
associated capital costs. If the firm offers me a salary that appears generous, but has a noncompetition agreement, I may take it. Later, when I
learn more about the revenues and costs associated with running a salon, I will want to leave because I will realize that my salary is sub-optimal. At that point, however, I will be immobilized by the
noncompetition agreement.
To summarize the above argument: It is not to an individual's advantage to restrict his mobility unless he is promised more than what he
believes his MRP will be. Since employers have more accurate information about the average employee's MRP, and since employers can't remain solvent in the long run if they pay employees more than their MRP,
it is unlikely that employers systematically pay excessive wages. Thus,
only employees who underestimate their current or future MRP are willing to restrict their mobility by entering into noncompetition agreements, and as a result they earn suppressed, noncompetitive wages. 3 5
34. An explicit wage promise would be a contractual agreement about future wages.
An implicit wage arrangement would be one in which a potential employee examines the
salaries currently being paid to employees of varying tenure. If the employee believes that
the firm must maintain the current wage pattern to preserve its reputation in the labor
market, he will use the current wage pattern as a reliable indication of the wages he can
expect in the future.
35. Under pure competition, an employee would know his MRP just by looking at
competitive wages (e.g., learning what other hair salons pay starting haircutters). Clearly,
market imperfections or anomalies prevent the employee from learning what his competitive wage should be. This paper will not examine those imperfections, except for two
speculations:
(1) The market has devolved to a state where all employers offer noncompetiuon em-
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Thus, noncompetition agreements are not the result of the efficient
sale by rational workers of their employee goodwill, and these agree36
ments cannot be analogized, though some commentators have tried,
to the sale of business goodwill by firms. In fact, employees are only
assured of receiving a fair price for their goodwill if they retain the right
37
to move whenever their wages do not reflect their MRP.
Some may argue that if the sale of employee goodwill through the
use of noncompetition agreements was prohibited, employees would be
able to expropriate value that was due not to their contribution, but to
the employer's. Thus, in the haircutter example, one might argue that it
is unjust for the employee to use the employer's facilities and capital
investment to build a loyal clientele that will follow the employee when
he leaves. To accept such an argument, however, is to be led down a
slippery slope with no logical stopping point. Certainly, all workers enhance their human capital and become more valuable through work experience, and workers are willing to accept wages that do not reflect
their full contribution to a firm if they are developing general skills that
enhance their value.3 8 But, any general increase in value from on-thejob experience cannot justify indentured servitude. To say that a haircutter unjustly expropriates value from his firm when he leaves with
$25,000 worth of customers is the same, analytically, as saying that a
journalist (or banker or lawyer) who was hired for $15,000 per year but
is now worth $40,000 should not be permitted to leave his firm if a competitor offers a salary more commensurate with the individual's current
value to firms.
B.

Business Secrets
1. Effect on the Contracting Parties

Sometimes a firm's profitability depends in part on secret processes
or formulas used by the firm. The firm may be able to expand its output
most efficiently if it can teach new employees these secrets. If, however,
ployment contracts at suppressed wages. This would explain why individuals enter into
noncompetition agreements but would not justify their prevalence.
(2) The labor market is not a spot market in which all workers have the same productivity and earn the exact same wage. Employees have varying levels of productivity based
on their innate ability; further, an employee's productivity will change over time (presumably it will rise). At the time the employee enters a long-term contract he is trying to predict his innate and future productivity and judge the long-term wage offer against that
estimate. There is no easily available market information that will help the employee earn
a fair wage under these circumstances. The employer is in a much better situation to
estimate the average worker's present and future productivity. For a general discussion of
how individuals make decisions under uncertainty, see Amos Tversky and Daniel
KahnemanJudgmentunder Uncertainty: Heuristicsand Biases, in UNCERTAINTY IN ECONOMICS
19 (Peter Diamond & Michael Rothschild eds., 1978).
36. See, e.g., Cerino, supra note 8, at 807.
37. It is important to note that this conclusion does not diminish the possibility that
employees might have other rational reasons to enter noncompetition agreements, e.g.,
obtaining expensive training, communicating business secrets or stabilizing wages. These
possibilities are examined in the sections that follow.
38. This conclusion, which is widely accepted by economists, is discussed more fully
below.
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the employer fears that employees will leave the firm and use confidential information at a competing firm, the employer may decide to limit
the number of employees and forego expanding output. Alternatively,
the employer's response to a fear of disclosure may be to expand output
but expend resources to prevent employees from fully understanding
the firm's secrets. For example, the firm could carefully divide work
among different classes of employees to make sure that no single employee understands "the big picture," even if this work flow is not the
most efficient.3 9 In either event, the firm's profits are below what they
would be if the firm could just reveal the secrets to employees without
fearing that employees will "steal" the information.
It is true that some confidential business information will be given
"trade secret" status under the law. As defined in the Restatement of Torts,
a trade secret is:
[A]ny formula, pattern device or compilation of information which is used in one's business and which gives him an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do
not know or use it....
...Some factors to be considered in determining whether
given information is one's trade secret are: (1) the extent to
which the information is known outside of his business; (2) the
extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in
his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard
the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information
to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or
money expended by him in developing the information; [and]
(6) the ease or difficulty with which the information
could be
40
properly acquired or duplicated by others.
A trade secret is generally regarded as taken unlawfully when it is discovered by an improper or deceitful means or its disclosure or use by a
party constitutes a breach of confidence. 4 1 Anyone unlawfully taking a
trade secret, including former employees, can be sued for damages, and
an injunction can be obtained preventing the use of the trade secret.
Trade secret litigation is difficult and risky, however. First, it is difficult to detect the unlawful use of a trade secret by another party. 4 2 The
difficulty of detection is what made the secret possible in the first place.
For example, if the trade secret involves a process for making widgets at
a lower cost than the competition, the process could remain a secret
because simple examination of a widget does not reveal the process, or
perhaps that even some unusual process was used. Therefore, it would
be difficult to discern that a former employee had in fact revealed the
secret process to a competitor and that the competitor was now using it.
In addition, trade secret litigation involves a risk that the secret will
39. Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J.
LEGAL STUD. 93, 97 (1981).
40. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 7 cmt. b (1939).
41. Id.
42. Kitch, supra note 8, at 690.
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be revealed, for the plaintiff must at least reveal the existence of a secret.
Although courts have devised methods for keeping the actual secret
confidential, risk of disclosure is inherent whenever the details of a se4
cret are organized, documented and communicated.
A noncompetition agreement enables an employer to reveal trade
secrets to employees more freely. It is easy to detect that an employee
violated a noncompetition agreement and litigation over the contract
entails less risk of trade secret disclosure. 44 Because an employer can
increase profits by revealing secrets to employees and expanding output, the employer will desire these agreements.
When an employer is assured by a noncompetition agreement that
confidential information will not be diverted to competitors, the employer will divulge trade secrets and other confidential business information 4 5 to an employee. This will raise the employee's MRP, for an
employee to whom secrets can be divulged can be trusted with broader
and more meaningful assignments and will therefore contribute more to
the firm's revenues. Part of this incremental increase in the employee's
value will be used to compensate the employee for giving up a large
degree of mobility. Thus, when noncompetition agreements are used in
a perfect labor market 46 solely to protect trade secrets and confidential
information, the agreement does enhance the welfare of both parties.
It is worthwhile to consider how the increase in profits (resulting
from the incremental increase in a worker's MRP) is divided between the
firm and the employee. Although the employee may know the MRP of
his general skills, he has no way of knowing what the secret is ahead of
time, and no way of knowing, therefore, what his value to the firm will be
when the secret is divulged. Although he will demand to be compensated for the restricted mobility he will incur by signing a noncompetition agreement (let us call this the immobility premium), he will not know
how much further he can bargain with the firm. Furthermore, in a competitive labor market, he will be unable to ask for more than the immobility premium: if the premium is fair compensation for immobility,
many workers will be willing to accept the job offer.
A simple example will illustrate this. Suppose I am a cook with general skills. My marginal revenue product is $15,000; I know my MRP
because it is my competitive wage in a perfect market. 4 7 I value mobility, it gives me the assurance that if my work environment becomes unpleasant or if my general skills should become worth more than my
employer can pay, I can move to another restaurant at will. I would be
43. Id. at 691.
44. Id. at 690-9 1.
45. In our discussion, we use the term "business secret" or "confidential business
information" to mean confidential business information in a broad, general sense, whether
or not it would be deemed to be a trade secret under the common law with concomitant
property rights.
46. That is, a market that is perfect in all respects except for the existence of trade
secrets. Under perfect information, of course, secrets could not exist.
47. Again, a market that is perfect except for the existence of restaurants with trade
secrets.
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willing, however, to sacrifice mobility for an extra $3,000 per year. Most
other cooks'have an identical immobility premium.
A restaurant renowned for its expensive but secret-recipe dishes decides to hire another cook to expand its output. The restaurant insists
that any cook hired enter into a noncompetition agreement so that the
restaurant will be assured that its secret recipes are not divulged to competitors. The restaurant knows that, all other things being equal (i.e., no
additional capital is required), the incremental increase in revenue resulting from hiring another cook (the cook's MRP) will be $25,000.
Since the competitive wage for a cook is $15,000, the restaurant will
generate supernormal revenues of $10,000 because it can charge high
prices for the unusual dishes the new cook will prepare.
The firm will only have to pay me $18,000 per year-the value of
my general skills plus the immobility premium. I won't know to ask for
more;4 8 further, if I did insist on more, plenty of other cooks would be
willing to work for $18,000 per year. Thus, the firm will gain $7,000

from entering into the noncompetition agreement and I will gain
$3,000. This arrangement is not unfair to me. I am getting what I consider a beneficial deal or I would not have signed the agreement.
This analysis assumes, of course, a perfect labor market. As the
analysis in the previous section illustrated, there is reason to believe that
employees systematically enter sub-optimal long-term agreements concerning their wage because of asymmetric information about the employee's initial productivity and probable increase in productivity.
2.

Effect on the market

Even though the employer and employee may benefit when they
enter into a noncompetition agreement that makes it possible to more
fully exploit a secret, the agreement is not economically efficient if it
does not maximize social welfare. In this section, the effect of noncompetition agreements on the market is examined using the concepts of
consumer and producer surplus. This is an approach heretofore unexplored by commentators..
Many commentators have argued that noncompetition agreements
are good because, by assuring firms that they will be able to expand
output while retaining secrets, they give firms an incentive to develop new
processes and ideas and to exploit these innovations. 49 It is certainly true
that enabling firms to derive maximum profits from secrets encourages
them to invest in research and exploit unique findings. That does not,
however, answer the question of whether, on balance, the increase in
research and exploitation improves social welfare by more than the loss
caused by the introduction of monopolistic competition. The bold as48. Although I know the price charged by the restaurant for its dishes, because the
recipes are secret I do not know the cost of preparing the dishes. Thus, I do not know how
much the restaurant earns with each sale. I also do not know how much the restaurant
spends to research and develop its recipes.
49. See, e.g., Callahan, supra note 23, at 715.
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sertion made by these commentators has the same analytic merit as saying, without theoretical or empirical backing, that monopolies are good
because the supernormal returns they earn will give them an incentive to
develop new products.
The key to understanding the welfare effects of noncompetition
agreements used to protect business secrets is this: secrets lead to monopoly power. It is true that many secrets involve the manufacturing of
an existing good by a new low cost method or the provision of a unique
good or service. While society benefits from new goods and lower production costs, the introduction of monopoly power leads to inefficient
production decisions.
The following analysis will show that when the motivation for a
noncompetition agreement is to enable a firm to expand output while
retaining a secret, the net effect on social welfare is indeterminate.
One's assumptions about market behavior also drastically affect the predicted results. For purposes of this analysis, assume that n firms compete in a perfect market and sell a total of q units of a good at a price, P1,
equal to marginal cost, incl. Each firm initially sells an equal amount, q/n
units. Assume further that the marginal cost of each unit is constant
over the relevant production range so that each firm's supply curve is
horizontal. Suppose now that one firm, F, discovers a secret process for
making the good at a lower marginal cost, mc 2. (Again, F has a horizontal cost function, but its cost function is now below the prevailing cost
function of other firms.) F must now choose its desired output and
price. In order to expand output, F will have to hire new employees and
reveal the secret process to them.
Two situations must be considered:
(a) Noncompetition agreements are not legal. If noncompetition agreements are not legal, then the firm will fear that employees will "steal"
the idea and reveal it to competitors. In this case, the firm will not hire
additional employees and will keep output at its current level, q/n, and
sell the good at the going price, incl. The firm will make noncompetitive, or supernormal, profits of q/n(mc, - mc 2). Because no change in
consumer surplus results, the only gain to society is the small savings in
resources that come about by Fs production of qin units at a lower
price. That is, the small gain in net social welfare equals Fs profits of q/
n(mc - mc 2).
(b) Noncompetition agreements are legal. If noncompetition agreements
are legal and are easily enforceable, then F will be able to hire employees, expand output, and take over the market. Society will gain in the
sense that more units will now be made at a lower cost than before. As
we will see, however, the monopolistic pricing that may result will cause
inefficiencies. The net effect on social welfare will be indeterminate.
Consider the following two pricing policies. First, imagine that F
can charge a monopoly price, P2, above mc1 . Other firms, which can produce and sell at mc1 , will fear entering the market because they know that
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F can undercut them at will. 50 The firm will produce units until the
marginal revenue from an additional unit equals the marginal cost of a
unit. In Illustration 1, this will occur at q2 units; the firm will charge P2,
the price which results in a quantity demanded of q2 units. In this case,
consumer surplus will fall from the shaded areas DAB to D. Producer
surplus will rise from nothing to CA. The change in net social welfare
(NSW) will depend on the relative sizes of area B, the deadweight loss
resulting from lost consumer surplus, and area C, the gain resulting
from production at a cost lower than mcl. (Area A represents a transfer
in surplus from consumers to F.) The sizes of areas B and C will depend
on the elasticity of demand and the cost savings enabled by the new
secret process. Under this pricing policy, we cannot categorically say
whether social welfare is improved by allowing noncompetition
agreements.

llustration 1

MCI = inchstry margnal cost
MC2 =i -m F nrainal cost

d2
qanty
q2

q

A second policy by F would be to charge a price just below mc in
order to keep competitors out of the market. For ease of exposition, in
Illustration 2 firm F is shown as charging mcl. In this case, there is no
change in consumer surplus. Firm F earns producer surplus equal to
the shaded area B. The gain in net social welfare is equal to B, the savings that come from producing q units at a lower cost than before.
50. Undercutting by F will not amount to predatory pricing, in violation of the antitrust laws, as long as F charges more than its marginal cost of mc 2. Barry Wright Corp. v.
IT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 231-33 (Ist Cir. 1983).
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Illustration 2

MCI = industry marginal cost

P1
MC2 = firmF marginal cost

Marginal Re Ienue

Demand

i

quantity

q

Thus, with respect to the exploitation of business secrets, it is unclear whether noncompetition agreements improve net social welfare
because the exploitation of a secret leads to monopoly power. Under
traditional monopoly pricing, the effect on net social welfare is indeterminate. If monopolistic competition leads to pricing at just below the
marginal cost of other firms, there is a gain in NSW; it is unclear, however, whether one can expect this pricing policy.
This Paper will not develop a model of investment in research and
the effect of noncompetition agreements on innovation. It is expected,
however, that a simple model would be even more ambiguous and indeterminate than the model for the exploitation of business secrets.
The common law and statutes take a strong stance against restraints
of trade in general, under the theory that the loss to society caused by
monopoly pricing exceeds whatever gain a monopolist or cartel might
conceivably bestow on society as a result of earning supernormal profits.5t Given this strong disapproval of monopoly power, it is curious
that academics and courts have justified noncompetition agreements on
the grounds that they will encourage firms to invest in research and fully
exploit ideas. As shown above, it is difficult to justify this assertion using
simple economic theory. Casual empiricism suggests that the assertion
51. For example, under the federal antitrust statutes the following pro-restraint arguments have been rejected: that a professional society can prohibit competitive bidding by
engineers to prevent low bids that might result in inferior work, National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), and that manufacturers of women's garments can agree among themselves that each manufacturer will boycott any
retail store that sells cheap "knock off' copies of another manufacturer's garments in order to police and deter illegal, tortious acts by retailers, Fashion Originators' Guild of
America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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is not true. For example, California, a state known for its vigorous and
innovative high technology industries, does not allow noncompetition
52
agreements that restrict employees.
Perhaps noncompetition agreements are accorded special treatment
for a "natural rights" reason. Unlike other restraints, in which a producer does nothing of special value but attempts to increase profits
through collusive agreements with other producers, in the case of a noncompetition agreement the producer has done something of value by
creating an idea or process desired by society. Courts and commentators may feel that one should be allowed to protect this intellectual
property if one is willing to pay others (through higher wages) in order
53
to maintain sole ownership.
On balance, it appears that any loss in social welfare from noncompetition agreements related to business secrets is neither great nor systematic. Clearly, in a well-functioning labor market, employees who
sign noncompetition agreements will benefit from the payment of an
immobility premium. As for the costs and benefits of monopoly power,
simple economic theory shows that net benefits occur in some instances
and net losses in others, depending on the supply and demand curves of
the particular case. This is in contrast to the use of naked restraints of
trade through collusive agreements, in which case there is always a net
loss to society because monopoly pricing is introduced without innovations (low cost production methods, new products) that provide countervailing benefits.
As shown by the discussion of employee goodwill, there is reason to
believe that employees systematically make sub-optimal decisions when
an agreement calls for an estimate of long-term productivity. A firm has
better information than a new employee about the employee's current
value to the firm as well as the general potential for productivity growth
in the industry. State legislatures might therefore approach an equitable
balance by limiting the term of those noncompetition agreements
designed to protect business secrets so that, after a definite number of
years, an employee would be free to leave the firm and immediately
enter a position of competition against his former employer. For example, a noncompetition agreement could have a maximum statutory term
of six years, after which time the employer and employee would be required to renegotiate the noncompetition agreement. This would impose limits on employers, who might be constrained from imparting
secrets to an employee as the statutory expiration of a noncompetition
agreement approached, but this concern is counterbalanced by the protection such a statute would afford employees.
52. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1987). See also James H. A. Podey, Restrictive Employee Covenants in California, 4 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 251
(1988); Kitch, supra note 8, at 710.
53. As noted above, one is given special proprietary rights in trade secrets, but the
nature of trade secrets and traditional remedies make it difficult to prevent the disclosure
of the trade secrets by former employees who join competitors.
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Training

Many firms expend significant resources training employees. Following Gary Becker's analysis of human capital,5 4 economists have classified training in two categories: general training, in which the skills an
employee learns are of value to many competing firms, and specific
training, in which the skills the employee learns are of value only to the
firm doing the training. Teaching a junior bank officer how to analyze
loan requests is an example of general training, for the skills the employee learns can be utilized at many competing banks. But teaching the
employee how that bank organizes its files and forms is an example of
specific training, for that knowledge is of no use to competitors who
have their own systems in place.
According to Becker, a firm will not subsidize the cost of teaching a
worker general skills because the worker can easily transfer those skills
to another firm. In fact, if the firm did pay for a worker's general training, after the training the firm would lose the worker to firms that do not
train workers and can therefore afford to pay higher wages. Thus, employees themselves must pay for general training through wages that are
below the marginal product of labor. For example, if an untrained
worker has a marginal product of labor of $100 per week, and training
costs $20 per week, the employee will accept a wage of $80 per week
during the training period. This assumes, of course, that $20 is an efficient level of training-that is, the present value of the future increase in
productivity is equal to or greater than $20.
An employee will not pay for the cost of specific training, however.
Because specific skills cannot be used at competing firms, an employee's
competitive wage will not rise with an increase in specific skills. Therefore, firms must pay for all specific training. During and after the training period, the employee will receive a wage equal to the marginal
productivity of his general skills-his competitive wage. Thus, a novice
cook will accept a depressed salary if he is learning how to prepare
dishes for that training increases his future value. An accomplished
chef, however, will not accept depressed wages to learn how a restaurant's kitchen is organized because that specific knowledge does not increase the chef's value to other firms.
In this analysis, there is no need for a long-term contract between
employer and employee. A firm that pays for specific training need not
fear the loss of an employee because the firm can always match competing wage offers. To retain the employee the firm need only pay the prevailing wage the employee could earn at other firms. This the firm will
gladly do, since it values the employee more highly because of the employee's specific skills. On the other side of the coin, an employee who
pays for general training through lower wages need not seek a long-term
contract with the employer; after his training, many firms will seek him
out for his general skills and pay him a competitive wage for those skills.
54.

GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (1964).
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Becker's analysis is not robust, however, because it fails to take into
account the situation where the cost of general training exceeds the employee's wage. 5 5 For example, suppose that the cost of training an airline pilot is $300,000 per year for three years. Even if this were an
efficient investment, few employees could afford to pay for this training
directly, and none could afford to pay for it by accepting decreased
wages during the training period. Of course, since the ability to pilot a
plane is a general skill desired by competing firms, under Becker's analysis no airline will pay for this training.
If an employee could commit to work the number of years necessary
for the airline to recoup its investment, the airline would then be willing
to make the investment. Such contracts, which smack of indentured servitude, are not enforceable under the Constitution and the common
law.5 6 A noncompetition agreement, however, enables the pilot essentially to bind himself to the airline; as long as the airline pays the pilot
more than he could earn in other industries, the pilot will stay with the
airline. Thus, while the pilot cannot enter an enforceable contract that
explicitly requires him to serve the airline for a set number of years, the
pilot can indirectly accomplish much the same result by entering into a
noncompetition agreement. The noncompetition agreement thus induces the employer to make the long-term investment in expensive
training. Gains can be made from investing in training and the employee and employer can share these gains through higher lifetime
57
wages and profits.
The argument that noncompetition agreements are needed to induce employers to spend large sums training workers has much analytic
merit. One can imagine many situations in which the cost of general
training is so high that employees cannot pay for the training either directly or through reduced compensation. 5s In such cases, a noncompetition agreement serves as an effective long-term contract between
55. Callahan, supra note 23, at 717; Rubin & Shedd, supra note 39, at 96.
56. See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944) ("The undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment as implemented by the Antipeonage Act was not merely to end slavery
but to maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United
States."); Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310, 317-18 (7th Cir. 1894). The court in American
Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Wolf succinctly summarized the development of this
principle:
Courts of equity historically have refused to order an individual to perform a
contract for personal services. Originally this rule evolved because of the inherent difficulties courts would encounter in supervising the performance of
uniquely personal efforts. During the Civil War era, there emerged a more compelling reason for not directing the performance of personal services: the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude. It has been strongly
suggested that judicial compulsion of services would violate the express command of that amendment. For practical, policy and constitutional reasons, therefore, courts continue to decline to affirmatively enforce employment contracts.
420 N.E.2d 363, 366 (N.Y. 1981) (citations omitted).
57. The airline industry avoids this problem altogether; most pilots receive their training in the Air Force and later join private industry. Callahan, supra note 23, at 717.
58. Economists have studied why capital markets fail to provide financing for individuals who are capable of making an efficient investment in education and training. For a
brief summary of why the capital market fails in this regard, see LESTER C. THUROW, INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL 77-78 (1970).
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employer and employee, assuring the firm that it will have time to
recoup its investment. 5 9
Most noncompetition agreements, however, provide that if the employee ever leaves the firm, the noncompetition restrictions will apply.
Let us call these infinite noncompetition agreements. Even though the employment contract or the courts will limit the duration of the restrictions
once the employee has left the firm, these agreements are infinite in the
sense that the duration of the restrictions does not begin until the employee has left. This means that no matter how many years the employee serves his firm, he still faces a severe burden upon termination of
his employment.
Infinite noncompetition agreements are not necessary to support
efficient, long-term investment in training. In fact, one would expect
that in a world of perfect information, bargaining would lead to contracts specifying that if the employee left the firm within X years, he
would not be allowed to compete, where X years of service at an express
or implied wage of $Y was a period sufficient for the firm to recoup its
60
investment in training. Let us call these limited noncompetition agreements.
Suppose, as in an earlier example, that it costs $300,000 per year
for three years to train an airline pilot. It may be that, given a pilot's
value to an airline during and after training, an airline will recoup its
investment in ten years if it pays a pilot a salary of $70,000 per year for
ten years. After implicitly or explicitly assuring a prospective pilot of
such a salary, an efficient employment agreement would therefore provide that if the pilot leaves the airline within ten years he will not work
for a competitor. As long as the pilot can earn no more in some other
line of work, the airline need not fear that the pilot will quit during the
ten-year duration of the limited noncompetition agreement.
One could design an infinite noncompetition agreement for the
above example that would also be fair. It might be that, given the average starting pilot's life expectancy, an airline that paid for the cost of
training would, on average, recoup its investment if it paid a pilot a salary of $85,000 for the rest of his career. While infinite noncompetition
agreements are not necessarily inefficient, it can be concluded that they
are unnecessary, for one could always design a limited noncompetition
agreement that would induce the optimum investment in training.
If the reason for a whole class of noncompetition agreements is that
they are needed to induce investment in training, then it is curious that
almost all noncompetition agreements appear to be of the infinite vari59. The traditional legal doctrine in this area, supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text,
does not include consideration of the employer's investment in training. Rubin and
Shedd, supra note 39, argue that the courts act in a manner that takes employer investment
in training into account even though a different rationale is put forth.
60. Both Rubin and Shedd, supra note 39, and Callahan, supra note 23, argue that
noncompetition agreements enable efficient investment in human capital. Neither recognizes, however, that infinite noncompetition agreements are not needed to induce employer investment and in fact may be detrimental to employees who lack the information required
to make long-term contracts concerning their productivity.
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ety. 6 1 For the same reasons discussed in the section evaluating employee goodwill, it is reasonable to conclude that employees are at
particular risk of making sub-optimal contracts when they make longterm decisions involving their future productivity. That is, an employee
is in a bad position to evaluate his current and future value and is, therefore, highly likely to strike a bad bargain with a firm operating with fuller
information.
Given that limited noncompetition agreements can be used to induce efficient levels of training, there is no reason to allow infinite noncompetition agreements if their purpose is to induce investment in
human capital. A statute that limits the duration of a noncompetition
agreement to, say, six years of service with a firm (after which the noncompetition covenant would expire), and requires the firm to make
some showing of how it calculated training costs and derived a reasonable noncompetition term, would go far toward protecting employees.
Colorado seems to follow this logic by making all employee noncompetition agreements unlawful except for those that provide for the recovery of the expense of educating and training an employee who has
62
served the employer for less than two years.
D.

Implicit Contracts to Stabilize Wages

In a labor market characterized by perfect competition, the equilibrium wage will equal the marginal revenue product of labor. The MRP
depends, in turn, on the price that the product sells for, the quantity
sold and the cost of other inputs. Because these characteristics fluctuate
constantly, especially over the term of a business cycle, labor's marginal
revenue product fluctuates constantly. In a perfect market in which labor is sold as in a spot auction, wages should therefore move up and
down frequently.
In fact, most workers' wages remain fairly stable. Rather than abandoning the spot auction model, however, many economists have theorized that stable wages may be the result of optimizing behavior between
risk averse workers and risk neutral firms. 6 3 Workers are averse to having their wages fluctuate and would prefer a stable wage that has the
same present value as a fluctuating stream. Firms, or their stockholders,
can diversify their sources of income and rely on capital markets more
readily; for this reason, firms are risk neutral and are willing to make
actuarially fair bets. One economist summarized the potential gain from
trade in this way:
By agreeing to accept some of the risk of wage variation,
employers implicitly offer an insurance service to workers. This
61. Almost all cases that are litigated involve infinite noncompetition agreements. It
is possible that limited noncompetition agreements are often used but don't lead to litigation. This seems unlikely, however, since the courts and commentators rarely consider
limited noncompetition agreements when discussing the issue.
62. COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-2-113 (1986 & Supp. 1990).
63. Mark P. Taylor, The Simple Analytics ofImplicit Labour Contracts, 39 BULL. ECON. RES.
1 (1987).
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is attractive to workers because of their risk aversion and is relatively costless to the firm because of its risk neutrality. Thus,
"Risk-reducing policies are the cheapest and hence most profitable way of attracting any given work force." 64
The arrangement between the firm and the employee has been
called an implicit contract by economists because one rarely sees an actual long-term contract spelling out the wages that the employee will
receive. If these implicit arrangements do exist, perhaps one reason
they are never subject to contractual agreements is that it is too difficult
to state ahead of time the exact manner in which a worker's lifetime
wages will be smoothed out. A worker's wage will still vary as his productivity changes (e.g., he is promoted to a higher position) and as the
long-term health of the industry changes. What is filtered out by an implicit contract is short-term changes in the productivity of labor resulting from "noise"-in the market.
An employee may be willing to enter into this arrangement with a
firm based on the firm's reputation. That is, an employee may be willing
to accept a wage that is temporarily below his marginal revenue product
because the firm has a reputation for maintaining stable wages. This
reputation is valuable in attracting new workers and so the employee is
fairly assured that the firm will not renege by lowering the wage when
the productivity of labor temporarily falls.
But what stops an employee from reneging on his end of the agreement? An employee earning a stable wage above his MRP from firm A
could, when his MRP rises above that stable wage, move to firm B, which
pays its workers a fluctuating wage tied to worker productivity. Workers
do need to protect their reputation because firms that pay stable wages
will be wary of workers who change jobs frequently. An employee can,
however, mask the fact that he is reneging on a stable wage arrangement, whereas a firm generally cannot. Employees can cite a multitude
of reasons for leaving a firm-geographic preference, dissatisfaction
with management, a desire for a slightly different job or work environment, etc.
Thus, the argument goes, the firm wants some assurance that the
worker is making a long-term commitment. A noncompetition agreement, by essentially binding the employee to the firm, serves as an effective commitment and thus induces the firm to enter the optimizing
arrangement of stable wages.
Upon closer examination, however, this argument fails. Both theory and causal empiricism suggest that an employee has no need to
make a long-term commitment to a firm in order to enter a stable wage
arrangement. Assuming that most workers are risk averse, all firms
would offer implicit, stable wages. That is, it would be in no firm's interest to offer fluctuating wages, because the firm would not be able to
attract workers. Therefore, a firm that offers stable wages need not fear
64. Id. at 4 (citing Martin N. Baily, Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand, 41
REv. ECON. STUD. 37 (1974)).

1992]

EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS

119

that a worker will be motivated to leave to take advantage of wages that
are temporarily higher at a competitor that pays fluctuating wages. This
explains why stable wages are the norm in most labor markets, including
those in which noncompetition agreements are not typical (e.g., food service, janitors, librarians and guards).65 Thus, it is unlikely that noncompetition agreements facilitate implicit contracts relating to stable wages.
A review of the cases and the literature reveals no instance in which
implicit contracts were cited as a potential justification for enforcing a
noncompetition agreement. This is not surprising. The implicit arrangement does not fit the legal requirements of a contract (a meeting
of the minds, offer and acceptance or identifiable consideration). Furthermore, it is unlikely that a firm would argue that it is obligated to pay
employees a certain implied wage, even if this lends credence to the
firm's effort to enforce a particular noncompetition agreement.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Paper has examined four potentially welfare-enhancing bargains between employer and employee that have been said to explain
the existence of employee noncompetition agreements. Those bargains
involved employee goodwill, the disclosure of business secrets, investment in expensive training and stable wages. A close economic analysis
of these potential gains revealed the following:
1. Noncompetition agreements should not be enforced when the
sole justification by the employer is the need to protect his interest in
employee goodwill-that is, in revenue that depends upon the worker's
continued employment, such as the revenue a worker generates through
close customer contact. In a perfect market an employee will earn a
wage equal to his marginal revenue product, including revenue generated by the goodwill the employee develops. If an employee is being
compensated on this basis, a firm need not fear that he will leave. The
fact that many employees do enter noncompetition agreements related
to employee goodwill indicates that employees systematically underestimate their long-term value and enter sub-optimal long-term agreements
because of asymmetric information in the labor market.
2. A noncompetition agreement induces a firm to disclose business
secrets to employees. This disclosure enables an expansion in output,
and, hence, an increase in the firm's profits. Part of the increase in profits will be used to compensate employees for giving up a large degree of
mobility. Thus, in a perfect labor market, a noncompetition agreement
related to business secrets will enhance the welfare of the contracting
parties. There is strong reason to believe, however, that labor markets
are not perfect and that employees make sub-optimal long-term agreements due to asymmetric information about their productivity.
When a noncompetition agreement is related to the disclosure of
business secrets, the effect on the market is indeterminate. These agree65. Rubin & Shedd, supra note 39, at 99.
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ments encourage firms to develop and exploit secrets, but they also introduce monopoly pricing. Net social welfare will increase in some
instances and decrease in others.
3. An employer will expend large amounts of time and resources
teaching an employee general skills only if the employer can be assured
that the employee will not leave the firm to join a competitor shortly
after the end of the training period. By prohibiting attractive employment options, noncompetition agreements effectively bind an employee
to the firm and can thus induce investment in training. But most noncompetition agreements are of unlimited duration in the sense that they
do not expire after a given period of employment. Under such agreements, an employee's mobility is restricted no matter how long he has
served his employer. A noncompetition agreement that expires after a
reasonable period of employment (a period long enough for the firm to
recoup its investment in training) will also induce expensive training of
employees. Such an agreement has the benefit of permitting the employee to leave and immediately assume a competitive position after
serving his employer for a reasonable period of time.
4. It is unlikely that implicit arrangements between a firm and its
workers to stabilize wages give rise to employee noncompetition agreements. Employees have no need to bind themselves to employers to
induce stable wages.
Given the above, a rational legal regime should hold noncompetition agreements enforceable only under the following circumstances.
First, a noncompetition agreement would be appropriate when the employer spends direct and quantifiable funds educating employees and
needs assurance that the firm will be able to recoup that investment over
time. The burden should be on the firm to show that the duration of the
restriction is reasonable in light of the direct investment in training.
Once an employee has served the employer for a reasonable period in
light of the training costs, the employee should be free to join competitors without further restrictions. Second, a noncompetition agreement
would be enforceable when the firm has trade secrets of substantial
value which are routinely taught to employees. To prevent employees
from making sub-optimal long-term commitments, the duration of noncompetition agreements should be limited by statute. For example, a
statute could require that these restrictive covenants expire within a definite period not to exceed six years. Six years after entering an agreement containing a noncompetition covenant, the covenant would expire
and the employee would have an opportunity to renegotiate the agreement. Such a rule would protect employees and have no other serious
effect on welfare.

USE OF AGENCY DELIBERATIONS
BY REVIEWING COURTS
JAN

I.

G.

LAiTOS*

INTRODUCTION

In a court challenge to a state administrative agency action, may the
attack be based on the decisionmaking deliberations of the agency members, and may a reviewing court overturn the agency decision on the
basis of the deliberations? These issues were recently posed to the Colorado Court of Appeals in a 1991 case, Board of County Commissioners of
Park County v. Water Quality Control Commission (Park County).' The Colorado district court in Park County overturned a rulemaking action of the
Water Quality Control Commission (Commission), basing its decision
largely on the Commission's deliberations. 2 'In upholding the district
court's ruling, the court of appeals held that when a trial court reviews
agency rulemaking, it may "consider [the agency's] deliberations, in
conjunction with the rest of the record .... The question presented to the Colorado Court of Appeals was a
matter of first impression in Colorado. Because no appellate court decisions from other states address the issue, the Park County case is important precedent and influential in the practice of state administrative law.
The ability to use agency deliberations to attack agency action should be
helpful to lawyers who practice before state agencies. Prior to Park
County, attorneys based their challenges on the record before the
agency. After Park County, an attack on an agency rule may be based on
extra-record transcripts of agency deliberations.
The Park County rule will also affect the manner in which multiheaded state boards and commissions conduct their deliberations. Unfortunately, the most likely effect of Park County will be to discourage
free and open debate among agency members during deliberations. If
an agency member knows that comments made during deliberations
may be used as grounds for appealing the agency's decision, an agency
member may choose to refrain from speaking during deliberations. If
there are deliberative discussions, the statements may either be extremely guarded and self-censored, or carefully articulated in order for
* Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. The author was a member of the Colorado Water Quality Control Commission, the agency involved in the Park
County case discussed below, from 1985-1991.
The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Priscilla McLain and
Elena Eisenberg, students at the University of Denver College of Law, in the preparation
of this paper.
1. 809 P.2d 1107 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 1991 Colo. LEXIS 853 (Dec. 3,
1991).
2. See id. at 1109.
3. Id.
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attorneys to better attack (or defend) the eventual agency decision. The
absence of meaningful deliberations and the use of self-censored deliberations or deliberations designed strictly for judicial review, seem inconsistent with what is probably the key purpose of deliberations-to
permit a multi-headed agency to freely examine facts, law and policy
with the goal of reaching a consensus prior to making a decision.
This Article considers the question of whether agency deliberations
may, or should, be used by courts reviewing the validity of agency
rulemaking actions. This question is answered in part by the Colorado
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), a statute similar to APAs adopted
by other states. Of particular importance are the provisions of the APA
addressing:
(1) the materials comprising the official agency rulemaking
"record;"' 4 (2) the requirement that the record include a statement of
basis and purpose outlining the agency's reasons for adopting a particular rule; 5 (3) the extent to which the record constitutes the exclusive
basis forjudicial review of agency action; 6 and (4) the grounds provided
reviewing courts for setting aside agency action. 7 The question is also
answered by considering the deferential standard of review that has
evolved in Colorado and other jurisdictions for courts reviewing agency
rulemaking actions. 8 The Article addresses these matters after briefly
summarizing the facts of the Park County case and the reasoning used by
the district court and court of appeals to justify the use of deliberations.
The Article argues that the Park County holding and rationale appear
wrong, both as a matter of law and in light of the reality of administrative decisionmaking. As a matter of law, permitting reviewing courts to
use agency deliberations is grossly inconsistent with well-established
norms governing judicial review of agency action. These norms include:
(1) traditional exclusive reliance on the written record presented to the
agency; (2) statutory recognition of the agency's reasons for adopting a
rule being contained only in the official agency statement of basis and
purpose; (3) the extremely deferential judicial standard of review used
when considering agency actions; and (4) the philosophy behind the
well-established mental process rule. As a matter of administrative
agency decisionmaking and contrary to the court of appeals' view,
agency deliberations are not analogous to legislative history. Moreover,
courts should not consider agency deliberations to be a reliable source
of agency intent.
II.

THE PARK COUNTY CASE

The facts in Park County appear quite frequently in state multiheaded agency proceedings, particularly when these agencies are engaged in rulemaking and the purpose of the rule is to establish an envi4. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103(8.1)(b) (1988).
5. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103(4)(a)(c) (1988).
6.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103(8.1)(c) (1988).

7. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-4-106(7) (1988).
8. See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
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ronmental standard. State agencies typically set environmental
standards without the benefit of perfect information. 9 When the available data is incomplete or of questionable reliability, a multi-headed
agency must decide how, or whether, to use the data in establishing
standards. This usually entails considerable debate among agency members during deliberations.
Such was the case when the Commission held a hearing and conducted deliberations regarding water quality standards for various metals found in a segment of the South Platte River within Park County,
Colorado. The hearing was held because the City of Denver (Denver)
asked the Commission to make the water quality standards for these
metals more lenient in order to reflect the ambient levels of those metals
found in the segment. 10 Denver had previously compiled water quality
data for the metals in question in conjunction with its investigation of
the proposed Two Forks dam and reservoir project." During the hearing, the Colorado Water Quality Control Division and the Colorado Division of Wildlife argued against using Denver's data to make water
quality standards more lenient. 12 Since Denver's data was at or near the
detection limits for the metals, these agencies were concerned that the
data was "skewed" and would result in an inflated water quality standard
when incorporated into the Commission's mean-plus-standard-deviation methodology.' 3
9. See generally Michael A. Fitts, Can IgnoranceBe Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive
Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 917 (1990); Alyson C. Flournoy, Legislating
Inaction: Asking the Wrong Questionsin Protective EnvironmentalDecisionmaking, 15 HARV. ENv'rL.
L. REv. 327 (199 1); Vern R. Walker, The Siren Songs of Science: Toward a Taxonomy of Scientific
Uncertaintyfor Decisionmakers, 23 CONN. L. REv. 567 (1991).
10. In March, 1987, the Colorado Water Quality Control Commission held a triennial
review hearing concerning water quality standards and classifications for the South Platte
River Basin as required by COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-202(l)(f) (1989). In the course of that
review, the City and County of Denver (Denver), acting by and through its Board of Water
Commissioners, proposed that certain changes be made in specified numeric standards for
water quality in the mainstream of the North Fork of the South Platte River. Denver proposed a change in the numeric standards for lead, cadmium and silver for Segment Four of
the North Fork to reflect ambient levels actually found in Segment Four. Volume II of
Record at 270, 273, 354, Park County v. Water Quality Control Comm'n (Park County
Colo. Dist. Ct. Nov. 27, 1989) (No. 88CV75) [hereinafter Record]. See also Park County, 809
P.2d at 1108.
11. Denver compiled and developed extensive water quality data on Segment Four as
part of the Environmental Impact Statement for the Two Forks project. The data convinced Denver that the existing numeric standards for the three metals did not reflect
ambient water quality in the segment. The data also convinced Denver that the Commission's standards did not accurately reflect then-existing ambient water quality when the
standards took effect in 1981 because there were no new human-made sources of pollution
to account for any change since that time. Record, supra note 10, at 354, 358. See Park
County, 809 P.2d at 1108.
12. Record, supra note 10, at 693, 811. See also Park County, 809 P.2d at 1110 ("All
parties to the rule-making proceeding agreed that the data concerning cadmium and lead
were severely skewed rather than normally distributed.").
13. Record, supra note 10, at 693, 811-813. The mean-plus-standard-deviation methodology is a statistical technique sometimes used by rule-making agencies in determining
standards based on empirical data. The methodology assumes the presence of normally
distributed data. Using the methodology, a numerical standard is established by adding
one standard deviation to the mean (average) of all the data points. The standard deviation will vary according to the scattering of the data. The more widely scattered the data is
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After closing the record, the Commission began to deliberate.
Transcripts of the Commission's deliberations reveal that several commissioners were troubled by the data.' 4 Concerns were expressed about
selecting representative years for the data base, treatment of data at detection limits and the water quality standards that might result when the
mean-plus-standard-deviation was calculated from the data.' 5 One
commissioner stated that the lack of "normal" data would produce a
metals standard that was "real arbitrary."' 16 Nonetheless, by a vote of 71, the Commission adopted new relaxed standards based largely on the
data supplied by Denver. 17 This new standard was accompanied by a
"statement of basis and purpose," which was adopted by the Commission.18 . The APA requires agencies to submit the statement with every
agency rule, indicating the reasons officially adopted by the agency for
the rule.1 9
The Commission's new standards were then challenged before a
Colorado trial court, which ruled that the standards were both "unsupported by substantial evidence in the record" and "arbitrary and capricious. '"20 The trial court referred to comments during deliberations
where individual commissioners voiced concerns about the adequacy of
the data, concluding "it appears . . . that the additional data used to
'2 1
support the proposed change [in the standards] was highly suspect."
The Colorado Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court may consider agency deliberations in reaching its decision. 2 2 The court of appeals offered two reasons for this conclusion. First, the court decided
that the "mental process" rule, which otherwise prohibits inquiry into a
decisionmaker's reasoning, is inapplicable when the agency is not acting
from the fiftieth percentile (e.g., between ten and ninety percent), the larger the standard
deviation. The less scattered the data (e.g., between forty-five and fifty-five percent), the
smaller the standard deviation. See also Park County, 809 P.2d at 1108 (construing Department of Health Regulation No. 3.8.8(V)(7), 5 COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 1002-8 (1989)).
14. Agency deliberations are open to the public under the Colorado "Sunshine Law."
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-402 (1988).
15. Record, supra note 10, at 155-202.
16. Id. at 189.
17. Opening Brief at 3, Board of County Comm'rs v. Water Quality Control Comm'n,
809 P.2d 1107 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991)(No. 90CA0077).
18. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103(4)(c) (1988).
19. Id.
20. Park County v. Water Quality Control Comm'n, No. 88CV75, at 4, 7 (Park County
Colo. Dist. Ct. Nov. 27, 1989).
21. Id. at 4. A close reading of the trial court's decision reveals an important ambiguity. The trial court stated that "the record" does not support the Commission's action,
and the court expressly relied on the Commission's "deliberations" to justify its conclusion that the standards were unsupported by the evidence and arbitrary and capricious. Id.
at 3-4.
However, a transcript of the deliberations was erroneously included in the record filed
with the trial court. It is unclear from the trial court's decision whether its "record" included the deliberations. If the record included the deliberations, then the trial court may
have erred in assuming that the official agency record includes the deliberations. If the
record did not include the deliberations, then the trial court may have assumed, perhaps
erroneously, that deliberations may be used apart from the record to review agency action.
22. Park County, 809 P.2d at 1109 ("Therefore, it was permissible for the trial court to
consider the Commission's deliberations ... in conducting its review.").
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in a quasi-judicial proceeding. 28 Since the Commission was engaged in
rulemaking, the mental process rule was not a bar to the use of Commission deliberations. 24 Second, the court of appeals reasoned that agency
deliberations concerning an administrative rule are analogous to legislative history concerning a statute. The court concluded that since legislative history is available to reviewing courts, transcripts of agency
deliberations should also be accessible on review. 25
III.

ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AN AGENCY ACTION

The Colorado APA permits a reviewing court to set aside agency

action that is either "arbitrary or capricious" or "unsupported by substantial evidence when the record is considered." 26 Conceptually, a trial
court has three choices when deciding whether to use these two grounds
to reverse an agency action. The trial court may: (1) rely only on the
administrative record; (2) base its decision entirely on deliberations
without reference to the record; or (3) consider the agency's deliberations in conjunction with the record.
A. JudicialReview Based Only on the Record
1. Traditional Exclusive Reliance on the Record
Reviewing courts rarely overturn agency actions. 2 7 However, when
they do, and when the basis for the court's decision is a finding of
agency action deemed "arbitrary and capricious" or "unsupported by
substantial evidence," the finding is inevitably based on judicial examination of the record before the agency. If a court characterizes an
agency action as arbitrary and capricious, the result is usually due to the
agency's disregard of the evidence presented at the hearing, and thereby
23. Id. ("Although Colorado has adopted the 'mental process rule' prohibiting inquiry
into a decision-maker's mental process ... this rule is inapplicable if the administrative
action does not result from a quasi-judicial proceeding.").
24. Id. The case cited in the court of appeals' opinion to support this proposition,
Hadley v. Moffat County Sch. Dist. RE-l, 681 P.2d 938 (Colo. 1984), held that the mental
process rule is inapplicable when two conditions are present: (1) the agency's action is
not quasi-judicial, and (2) there are specific allegations of agency misconduct. Id. at 94445. The second condition, agency misconduct, was not raised in the Park County case.
25. Park County, 809 P.2d at 1109. Again, the case cited by the court of appeals to
support this proposition, Colorado Dep't. of Social Serv. v. Board of County Comm'rs,
697 P.2d I (Colo. 1985), involves a different issue altogether. The court held that "postpassage testimony of a legislator concerning [a statute] should not be admitted into evidence on the question of legislative intent." Id. at 21.
26. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 24-4-106(7) (1988). The Park County trial court used both
grounds in its decision overturning the Commission's standards. Park County, 809 P.2d at
1108 ("the trial court ruled.., that the [Commission's] new standards are unsupported by
the record and are arbitrary and capricious.").
The APA also permits courts to hold unlawful agency action that is "otherwise contrary to law." CoLo. REv. STAT. § 24-4-106(7) (1988). These are actions that are in excess
of statutory authority or inconsistent with proper procedures. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Industrial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 999, 1001 (Colo. 1987).
27. Courts generally employ an extremely deferential standard of review regarding
agency actions. See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LI W REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1

made part of the record. 28 If a court concludes that an agency decision
must be set tside, it is because the court believes that the evidence in the
29
record does not support the agency's action.
Reliance on the record would seem to preclude judicial use of
agency deliberations to overturn agency actions. The APA specifically
lists what "the agency rulemaking record shall contain," 30° and agency
deliberations are not included. Since by non-inclusion the APA excludes
deliberations as part of the record, and since the record is the traditional
basis for judicial overturning of agency action, it follows that extra-record deliberations should not be used as the basis for setting aside an
agency action.
2.

The Agency's Statement of Basis and Purpose as Part of the
Record

Although the APA fails to include deliberations as part of the
agency record, the APA expressly states that the agency's record shall
include the agency's statement of basis and purpose.3 1 This statement,
required to be submitted with each agency rule, provides the reasoning
process of the agency in adopting the rule.3 2 The statement of basis and
purpose is a consensus summary of the reasons why agency members
decided to take a particular action. The statement is adopted by agency
vote before the rule becomes final.
In Citizensfor Free Enterprise v. Department of Revenue,3 3 the Colorado
Supreme Court explained that the statement of basis and purpose requirement was added to the APA to provide reviewing courts a basis for
testing the agency's reasoning. The court stated:
Absent a statement of basis and purpose, a court can only guess
at the reasoning process that led to the adoption of the administrative regulation .... The statement of basis and purpose

...serves to provide a reference point against which the validity of the rule can be measured. It removes the review process
from the realm of speculation and provides a context within
34
which meaningful judicial review can occur.
The Citizensfor Free Enterprise opinion also suggests that when a court is
considering an agency rulemaking action, judicial review should be limited to two sources: (1) the record before the agency at the time of
adopting the rule, and (2) the statement of basis and purpose explain28. See, e.g., Webster v. Board of County Comm'rs, 539 P.2d 511, 513 (Colo. Ct. App.
1975).
29. See, e.g., Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n v. Public Util. Comm'n, 760 P.2d 627, 641
(Colo. 1988); Home Builders Ass'n v. Public Util. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 552, 562 (Colo.
1986); Colorado Dept. of Social Serv. v. Davis, 796 P.2d 494, 496 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
30. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-4-103(8.1)(b)()-(IX) (1988).
31. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-4-103(4)(a), (c), (8.1)(b)(V)-(VI) (1988).
32. "The written statement of the basis ... and purpose of a rule... shall include an
evaluation of the ... rationale justifying the rule." COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103(4)(c)
(1988).
33. 649 P.2d 1054 (Colo. 1982).
34. Id. at 1062.
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ing the reasons for the rule. The Citizensfor Free Enterprise court observed
that requiring "an administrative regulation be defensiblb in terms of
the agency's statement of basis and purpose, and with reference to the
administrative record... serves to... assure the effectiveness of subse35
quent judicial review."
The Citizensfor Free Enterprise case seems to preclude the judicial use
of agency deliberations. The court assumes that the agency's record
(without deliberations) and the statement of basis and purpose should
be the sole evidence of agency reasoning. Jurisdictions other than Colorado have likewise concluded that an agency's statement of reasons obviates the need to consider the deliberations. One California appellate
court stated that "the requirement [that] the agency state [its] findings
makes it unnecessary to delve behind the findings for evidence of the
agency's actual deliberations; the full findings and administrative record
provide a sufficient basis for meaningful judicial review." 3 6 Similarly,
the federal rule states that "where an agency has issued a formal opinion
or a written statement of its reasons for acting, transcripts of agency
deliberations at Sunshine Act meetings should not routinely be used to
'3 7
impeach that written opinion."
Despite this persuasive rationale from jurisdictions outside Colorado and the Citizensfor Free Enterprise precedent within Colorado, both
the Park County district court and the court of appeals chose to ignore
the Commission's statement of basis and purpose. Neither the trial
court nor the court of appeals mention the existence of the statement of
basis and purpose. Both of these courts assumed instead that deliberations, especially statements during deliberations by individual commission members, were a better indication of the entire Commission's
reasoning. This judicial use of deliberations, while ignoring the statement of basis and purpose, is exactly what the Citizensfor Free Enterprise
decision wished to avoid-a review process tainted with guesses and
38
speculation.
B. JudicialReview Based Only on Deliberations,
If the APA does not include deliberations as part of the agency record, then how could the Park County trial court base its decision on the
Commission's deliberations and not the Commission's statement of basis and purpose? The answer seems to lie in a key section of the APA,
not cited by the trial court, which provides that "[t]he agency rulemak35. Id. at 1063. See also Anderson v. State Dept. of Personnel, 756 P.2d 969, 978
(Colo. 1988) (judicial review of an administrative agency determination should be limited
to the record before the agency).
36. County of San Diego v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. Rptr. 484, 492 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986).
37. Kansas State Network, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 720 F.2d 185,
191 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 50 (1983) ("an agency's action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the
agency itself.").
38. Citizens, 649 P.2d at 1063 (use of "the agency's statement of basis and purpose"
[prevents] the courts [from being] "cast in the role of second-guessing the agency.").
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ing record need not constitute the exclusive basis for agency action on
that rule or for judicial review thereof."'3 9 This APA language gives the
court of appeals some statutory authority for its conclusion that courts
are "vest[ed] with discretion, in appropriate circumstances, to consider
40
the deliberations of the decisionmaking body in reviewing its actions."
Therefore, it may be somewhat irrelevant whether deliberations are always part of the record or whether the Park County district court incorrectly assumed that the Commission's deliberations were part of the
record. 4 1 The APA flatly states that reviewing courts are not limited to
the record. Since the APA allows judicial review of extra-record materials, the question becomes whether agency deliberations may be the exclusive basis for a court's decision, or whether they may, or should, be
considered only in conjunction with the record.
The Park County trial court seems to have based its decision almost
entirely on the Commission's deliberations, without much reference to
the record before the Commission when it made its decision. Such exclusive reliance on agency deliberations by reviewing courts seems contrary to the language of the APA and to Colorado case law. While it is
true that the APA states that the record "need not constitute the exclusive basis . . .for judicial review,"'4 2 this language does not state that
deliberations without the record may constitute the sole basis for judicial review. The APA permits, at most, the use of deliberations as a complement to the record. Use of the record has also been a necessary
condition to judicial review in virtually every Colorado case where an
appellate court has supported a reversal of agency action. 43 The general rule has been clearly articulated by the Colorado Supreme Court:
"In determining whether to disturb the determinations of [agencies],
the reviewing court must search the record .... 44
C. JudicialReview Based on Deliberationsand the Record
In recognition of the critical role played by the agency record when
there is judicial review, the Park County court of appeals' opinion provides trial courts with "discretion, in appropriate circumstances" to consider agency deliberations "in conjunction with" the record. 4 5 This
holding seems to grant reviewing courts an open-ended license to use
deliberations whenever the court believes it to be "appropriate," as long
as the record is also considered. There are four difficulties with providing courts such limitless discretion to use agency deliberations.
39. COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-4-103(8.1)(c) (1988).
40. Park County, 809 P.2d at 1109.
41. The transcript of the deliberations was mistakenly submitted as part of the record
filed with the trial court. See supra note 19.
42. Park County, 809 P.2d at 1109.
43. See, e.g., Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n v. Public Util. Comm'n, 760 P.2d 627 (Colo.
1988); Colorado Dept. of Social Serv. v. Davis, 796 P.2d 494 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990). See
supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
44. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 763 P.2d 1037, 1041
(Colo. 1988).
45. Park County, 809 P.2d at 1109.
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1. Use of Deliberations Changes the Standard of Review for
Agency Actions
When a court considers the validity of an agency action, the general
46
rule is that the standard of review is deferential minimum scrutiny.
The standard of review is not strict scrutiny where a reviewing court
makes a searching inquiry into the motivation and rationale behind the
agency rule. Yet, to permit the Park County district court to closely examine deliberations, ignore the reasons set forth in the statement of basis and purpose and overturn an agency action based on the review of
deliberations is not limited deferential review, but a form of strict scrutiny. 4 7 The change in the standard of review to strict scrutiny approved
by the Park County case is contrary to well-established Colorado precedent regarding judicial review of agency action. Colorado courts have
consistently held that reviewing courts should seek to sustain, not overturn, agency rulemaking decisions.
This principle of judicial deference is reflected in six commonly
cited "rules of review" that have guided courts considering challenges
to agency action. Each of the six rules seems contrary to the liberaljudicial use of agency deliberations to overturn agency decisions permitted
by the Park County case. First, a rule adopted pursuant to an administrative rulemaking proceeding is presumed to be valid. 48 The Commission's decision was not presumed to be valid in Park County. Second, in
determining whether to disturb the determinations of an agency, a reviewing court must search the record for evidence favorable to the
agency. 49 In Park County, the reviewing court searched extra-record material for evidence unfavorable to the Commission. Third, a reviewing
court should accord substantial deference to an agency exercising special expertise in choosing among conflicting inferences.5 0 Although the
Commission was exercising its special expertise in choosing among conflicting standards, the reviewing court did not accord substantial defer46. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978).
47. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 568-74 (2d ed. 1988);
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTTLIONAL LAw 448-49 (12th ed. 1991). See also Deukmejian v.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 751 F.2d 1284, 1325-26 (D.C. Cir. 1984), where the court
stated:
Were courts cavalierly to supplement the record [with agency deliberations], they
would be tempted to second-guess agency decisions in the belief that they were
better informed than the administrators ....
The accepted deference of court to
agency would be turned on its head: the so-called administrative state would be
replaced with one run by judges ....
48. City of Aurora v. Public Util. Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1280, 1287 (Colo. 1990); AMAX,
Inc. v. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 790 P.2d 879, 883 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); People ey
rel. Woodard v. Brown, 770 P.2d 1373, 1376 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); Agnello v. Adolph
Coors Co., 689 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Mitchell v. Charnes, 656 P.2d 719,
720 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
49. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 763 P.2d 1037, 1041
(Colo. 1988); see also U-Tote-M, Inc. v. City of Greenwood Village, 563 P.2d 373, 376
(Colo. Ct. App. 1977).
50. G & G Trucking v. Public Util. Comm'n, 745 P.2d 211, 216 (Colo. 1987).
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ence to the Commission's action. Fourth, when an agency rule is based
on a policy judgment, a reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. 5 1 Although the Commission made a policy
judgment when it chose its standard, the reviewing court substituted its
judgment for that of the Commission. Fifth, judicial review of quasilegislative rulemaking actions of agencies is limited, and a court may not
substitute its opinion for that of the agency's. 5 2 Although the Commission was undertaking a quasi-legislative rulemaking action, the reviewing court substituted its opinion for the Commission's determination.
Sixth, whenever there is competent evidence in the record to support
the agency's decision, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment
for the agency's conclusion. 53 Although there was evidence in the record to support the Commission's ruling, including the data supplied by
Denver, the reviewing court substituted its judgment for that of the
Commission.
2.

Use of Deliberations Disregards the Mental Process Rule

By permitting the unlimited use of agency deliberations on review,
both the Park County trial court and the court of appeals disregarded the
"mental process rule." This rule, adopted by Colorado and the federal
courts, prohibits judicial inquiry into the deliberative processes of administrative agency officials. 54 The United States Supreme Court articulated the separation of powers rationale for the rule in United States v.
Morgan :55
[I]t [is] not the function of the court to probe the mental
processes of the [agency official]. Just as a judge cannot be
subjected to such scrutiny, so the integrity of the administrative
process must be equally respected. It will bear repeating that
although the administrative process has had a different development and pursues somewhat different ways from those of
courts . . . the appropriate
independence of each should be
56
respected by the other.
The mental process rule is primarily applicable to administrative pro51. Anderson v. State Dept. of Personnel, 756 P.2d 969, 974 (Colo. 1988); See also
Regular Route Common Carrier Conf. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 761 P.2d 737, 743 (Colo.
1988) ("proposed rule involves a policy judgment relating to the effective implementation
of a statutory purpose .... ").
52. See Colorado Land Use Comm'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 604 P.2d 32, 35
(Colo. 1979); Tihonovich v. Williams, 582 P.2d 1051, 1053-54 (Colo. 1978); AMAX, Inc.
v. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 790 P.2d 879, 883 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); Bruce v.
School Dist. No. 60, 687 P.2d 509, 510 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
53. Sangre De Cristo Elec. Ass'n v. Public Util. Comm'n, 524 P.2d 309, 310 (Colo.
1974); Saint Luke's Hosp. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, 702 P.2d 758, 761 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1985).
54. Public Util. Comm'n v. District Court, 431 P.2d 773, 777 (Colo. 1967); Board of
Educ. v. District Court, 483 P.2d 361, 362 (Colo. 1971); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n
v. Matthew, 557 F.2d 325, 333 (2d Cir. 1977); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d
63, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Braniff Airways v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 379 F.2d 453, 460 (D.C.
Cir. 1967). See also 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 17.5, at 295-

97 (2d ed. 1980).
55. 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
56. Id. at 422 (citations omitted).
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ceedings that are quasi-judicial in character. 57 Nonetheless, the rule
should also be applied to quasi-legislative rulemaking actions because
judicial review of such actions is more limited than the review of quasijudicial administrative matters. 58
There are two exceptions to the mental process rule, but neither
exception applies to the facts in the Park County case. First, the rule does
not apply when there are allegations of illegal or unlawful action, misconduct, bias or bad faith on the part of agency members. 5 9 Second,
judicial examination of the decisionmaking deliberations of administrative agency officials is allowed where there is an inadequate basis stated
for the agency's decision. 60 Absent these two exceptions, the mental
process rule should act to discourage judicial review of agency
deliberations.
3. Agency Deliberations Are Not Analogous to Legislative
History
The Park County court of appeals reasoned that agency deliberations
should be made available to reviewing courts because such deliberations
"are analogous to legislative history ... concerning a statute. ' 6 1 This
analogy is flawed for two reasons. First, the use of legislative history to
provide an authoritative interpretation of statutory text is increasingly
considered by judges as constituting an unacceptable form of judicial
"psychoanalysis" of the legislature. 62 Similarly, reliance on agency deliberations rather than the agency's statement of basis and purpose encourages risky judicial second-guessing, while simultaneously depriving
the agency of its officially adopted statement of reasons.
Second, to the extent that legislative history is used by courts, it is
only as a means of ascertaining the intention of unclear or ambiguous
statutory language. 6 3 In Colorado, the rule is that "while the statements
of individual legislators may be helpful in determining the proper con57. Hadley v. Moffat County Sch. Dist. RE-I, 681 P.2d 938, 944-45 (Colo. 1984).
58. Bruce v. School Dist. No. 60, 687 P.2d 509, 510 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Polk v.
School Bd., 373 So. 2d 960 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
The Park County court of appeals' decision states that the mental process rule "is inapplicable if the administrative action does not result from a quasi-judicial proceeding." 809
P.2d at 1109. The case cited for this proposition, Hadley, instead holds that the rule is
inapplicable when there are specific allegations that the agency members acted improperly
(i.e., with bias or bad faith), and the agency's action does not resemble a quasi-judicial
proceeding. Hadley, 681 P.2d at 944-45. The Park County court of appeals' reliance on
Hadley seems misplaced in light of Hadley's requirement concerning allegations of agency
misconduct as a necessary condition to the rule's inapplicability.
59. Public Util. Comm'n v. District Court, 431 P.2d 773, 777 (Colo. 1967).
60. County of San Diego v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. Rptr. 484, 492 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986).
61. Park County, 809 P.2d at 1109.
62. See Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2490 (1991) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Public Util. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953)
(Jackson,J., concurring)). See also Chisom v. Roemer, I11 S. Ct. 2354, 2376 (1991) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("When we adopt a method that psychoanalyzes Congress rather than reads
its laws, when we employ a tinker's toolbox, we do great harm.").
63. United States v. Stuart 489 U.S. 353, 373 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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struction of statutory language, such statements... will seldom be sufficient
to prove an impermissible legislative motivation." 4 Conversely, when
the meaning of a statute is clear it is improper to resort to legislative
65
history to divine legislative intent.
If the analogy regarding agency deliberations and the judicial use of
legislative history is viable, agency deliberations are relevant only if the
agency rule is so ambiguous that its construction needs further clarification. When a rule is completely unambiguous, as was the Commission's
rule in Park County, it should be considered improper to use deliberations to "discover" agency motive or intent.
4. Agency Deliberations Are Not Evidence of Agency Intent
A judicial rule permitting reviewing courts to use agency deliberations to overturn agency action is, in effect, judicial approval of the notion that deliberations are an accurate and reliable indicator of agency
intent. Such a rule presumes that statements during deliberations by
individual agency members may reveal to judges whether the ultimate
agency decision was arbitrary, capricious or not supported by evidence
in the record. This presumption is wrong for several reasons. First, oral
deliberations of a multi-headed agency regarding a complex evidentiary
record by nature focus only on certain aspects of the record, usually the
most controversial. Limitations of time and energy prevent a detailed
discussion of the entire record. As a result of this reality of the deliberative process, a transcript of agency deliberations presents a very incomplete view of the record. Second, a transcript of deliberations is nothing
more than a series of statements by individual agency members. It is
foolish to impute to the entire decisionmaking body the comments expressed during deliberations by one or a few members of that organization. This is a principle that is well established in the case law. 66 Even
the vigorous opposition of an agency member to an agency rule "does
not demonstrate, or even suggest, that the [agency] acted in an arbitrary
or capricious manner."' 6 7 Similarly, statements by individual legislators
during their deliberations on a proposed statute are seldom sufficient to
prove impermissible legislative motivation. 68 Third, even if the statements of individual agency members during deliberations reflect general
agency sentiment, it is impossible to know the motivation behind any
64. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State, 690 P.2d 177, 184 (Colo. 1984) (emphasis
added).
65. Commercial Energies, Inc. v. Cheney, 737 F. Supp. 78, 79 (D. Colo. 1990).
66. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) ("We have eschewed reliance [for
finding the Legislature's intent] on the passing comments of one Member .. ");Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 (1982). See also News and Film Service, Inc. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 787 P.2d 169, 174 (Colo. 1990) (a comment by one member of a multi-headed
agency should not be interpreted as determinative of agency intent).
67. News and Film Service, 787 P.2d at 174. In light of the News and Film Service rationale, it would be improper to assume that the Commission's rule in Park County was arbitrary and capricious because one commissioner stated during deliberations that the lack of
normal data would produce a standard that was "real arbitrary." Record, supra note 10, at
693, 811.
68. Archer Daniels Midland, 690 P.2d at 184.
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statement made or question posed during deliberations. It is improper
to infer that such statements and questions reflect an individual agency
member's viewpoint. An agency member may make a statement or ask a
question during deliberations to prompt further discussion, assist an undecided colleague, solidify another member's opinion or play "devil's
advocate."' 69 Whatever the motivation, it is impossible for reviewing
courts to know the reason behind any given statement or question appearing in the transcript of an agency's deliberations. To assume otherwise is to encourage courts to 70engage in judicial "psychoanalysis," a
thoroughly discredited practice.
If a court wishes to review the reasoning underlying an agency rule,
it should consult the agency's statement of basis and purpose, not the
spontaneous statements of individual agency members during deliberations. As the Colorado Supreme Court urged in Citizens for Free Enterprise,7 1 rather than initiating a de novo inquiry into whether the agency
rule is grounded in fact, "the court is directed to the administratively
'7 2
compiled record [and the statement of basis and purpose]."
IV.

CONCLUSION

The rule articulated in Park County-that agency deliberations may
be used by reviewing courts to overturn agency actions-is poorly reasoned precedent. The rule is wrong as a matter of law and policy. Park
County will result in a disastrous chilling of free, open and candid discussion during agency deliberations. 73 If the statements of agency members during deliberations may be used against them by a reviewing
court, individual agency members may likely arrive at their own conclusions before the deliberative process begins, thereby rendering deliberations meaningless. In such a case, deliberations will not be a dynamic
exchange of views aimed at reaching a consensus. Rather, deliberations
will be a series of canned, prepared statements inserted to appease reviewing courts.
To avoid such a result, reviewing courts should use agency deliberations in only three limited circumstances: when the agency rule is unclear, when there are allegations of agency misconduct, or when there is
an inadequate basis stated for the agency's decision. If a rule is ambigu69. This point is appreciated by attorneys who have experienced oral argument
before an appellate court. It is impossible to gauge the way ajudicial panel will vote solely
on the questions posed'at oral argument.
70. See supra text accompanying note 61.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
72. Citizens for Free Enter. v. Department of Revenue, 649 P.2d 1054, 1062 (Colo.
1982).
73. Inclusion in the record of documents recounting deliberations of agency
members is especially worrisome because of its potential for dampening candid
and collegial exchange between members of multi-head agencies. While public
disclosure stifles debate to some extent,judicial disclosure would suppress candor
still further since off-hand remarks could turn out to have a legal significance they
would not have if barred from the record on review.
Deukmejian v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 751 F.2d 1287, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1'

ous, resort to agency deliberations is analogous to judicial resort to legislative history to construe an unclear statute.7 4 When there are
allegations of agency misconduct or an inadequate explanation for the
agency action, the use of deliberations is accepted when courts review
quasi-judicial agency action.7 5 This use should be extended to agencies
engaged in rulemaking.

74. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.

LAMPF v. GILBERTSON: RULE

TIME HAS
I.

10b-5's

COME

INTRODUCTION

Individuals accused of violating Rule lOb-5, promulgated under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), have faced substantial uncertainty in determining the applicable statute of limitations.' Since
1946, circuit courts have looked to different provisions of state law to
borrow limitation periods because section l0b of the 1934 Act does not
articulate such a period.2 These periods ranged from one to six years
depending upon the state and source of the applicable limitation period. 3 In addition to states having different statute of limitations for the
same action, courts have added to the confusion by borrowing limitation
periods from different causes of action within each state. The area,
therefore, lacked uniformity, predictability and a semblance of justice.
The United States Supreme Court recently provided a uniform, federal limitation period in Lampf v. Gilbertson.4 The Court held the "one
year from discovery, three years from the event" statute of limitations,
derived from other sections of the 1934 Act, applied to all private Rule
10b-5 actions. 5 In doing so, the Court rejected the traditional practice
of borrowing a statute of limitations from an analogous state cause of
action. The majority also rejected an argument by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to adopt a five-year limit of repose from
6
the recently enacted Insider Trading Act.
This Comment will survey the Rule lOb-5 statute of limitation problem which gave rise to the Lampf decision. The Comment will provide a
foundation to understanding the Court's decision through the Court's
increasing practice of borrowing from federal analogies, and a review of
1. Rule lOb-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991).
2. See infra notes 21-36 and accompanying text. For a discussion and breakdown of
the limitation period applied by each Circuit, see James Beasley, Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities Report of the Task Force on Statute of Limitationsfor Implied Actions, 41 Bus.
LAw. 645 (1986) [hereinafter "Task Force"].
3. See Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying New
Jersey's six year statute for common law fraud); Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 542 F.2d 915
(4th Cir. 1976) (applying Maryland's one-year Blue Sky statute).
4. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
5. Id. at 2782.
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t-l(a) and (b)(4) (1988).
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the circuit courts' treatment of the problem. The Comment's analysis
will focus on the ramifications of adopting the one-year/three-year limitation period and the Court's retroactive application of that decision.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

Traditional Statute Selection

Statutes of limitations provide the judicial system with a means of
limiting claims, which are impractical or inequitable to adjudicate due to
the passage of time. 7 Generally, a legislature will either prescribe a limitation period for a newly enacted cause of action or simply apply a
state's catchall statute. An implied cause of action, because of its very
nature, has no prescribed limitation period.8 Traditionally, federal
courts have adopted a limitation period from an "analogous" state provision when no expressed limitation period is provided. 9 Since Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., where a federal district court determined a private
cause of action existed under Rule lOb-5, 10 the circuits have adopted
limitation periods from a variety of state provisions. 1 1
A court presiding over a Rule lOb-5 action faced a problem in determining which state-created cause of action was most analogous to the
Rule lOb-5 claim. 12 The federal circuits found a variety of state actions
7. "[S]tatutes of limitation ... protect the interests of three groups: potential defendants, the courts, and society in general.... A party does not have to defend itself after
long periods of time, when evidence or witnesses may no longer be available." Neil Sobol,
Determining Limitations Periods For Actions Arising Under FederalStatutes, 41 Sw. LJ.895, 897
(1987) [hereinafter Sobol]. "Temporal limitations, especially those of certain duration,
assure potential defendants that they will not be forced to live indefinitely with the threat
of a lawsuit." See Note, Limitation Borrowing in Federal Courts, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1128
(1979) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Note].
8. The adoption of a limitation period from an analogous state law is acceptable
because "[w]hen Congress has not established a time limitation for a federal cause of action, the settled practice has been to adopt a local time limitation as federal law if it is not
inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so." Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67
(1985). For a general discussion on the purpose of limiting actions, see Sobel, supra note
7.
9. Applying state limitation periods has been a time honored practice of the federal
court system. See M'Cluny v. Sillman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830).
10. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The district court in Kardon based its decision that a private 10b-5 action existed on the common
law approach that "[tihe disregard of the command of a statute is a wrongful act and a
tort." Id.
11. See Bath v. Bushkin, 913 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1990) (applying limitation period for
common law fraud); Smith v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 891 F.2d 1567 (11 th Cir. 1990) (applying limitation period from forum state's Blue Sky statute).
Blue Sky statutes are acts which regulate security transactions on a state level. The
term "Blue Sky" originated in Kansas, which enacted the first effective securities statute.
The statute and term are based on preventing promoters from promising only blue skies
and rosy outcomes. See generally, Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 8

(1988) (hereinafter Loss).
Congress's numerous revisions of federal securities law have done little in providing
further guidance, adding nothing concerning the private cause of action or an applicable
statute of limitations for lOb-5 actions. Congress added the regulation of tender offers to
the Act in 1968 and substantially broadened the regulation of the securities markets in
1975. See generally, supra, Loss, ch. 1.
12. "If Congress has not specified an applicable limitation period, the court must ex-
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analogous. The First Circuit looked to personal tort actions. 13 Others
focused on a state's Blue Sky limitation period. 14 Still others applied
the state's common law fraud limitation period. 15 Some circuits, however, failed to consistently borrow the same state-created action-from
within each state, creating further inequities and confusion.
The circuits that adopted a state's fraud limitation period rationalized that Rule lOb-5 was enacted to facilitate prosecution of complex
fraudulent securities transactions. 16 Securities laws, however, supplement, not supplant common law fraud actions. These circuits also emphasized that both actions have analogous proof requirements. Time
constraints weighed heavily as another factor in favor of adopting a common law fraud limitation period. State legislatures generally provide a
longer limitations period for fraud actions than for violations of securities laws. Courts viewed the extended period as being in line with Congress's intent of providing the aggrieved investor with an adequate
remedy.
Several circuits applied limitation periods of a state's Blue Sky or
securities statute. These also were troublesome, although they may initially appear most analogous to Rule lOb-5, as significant distinctions
exist, including: (1) shorter limitation periods than those for common
law fraud; (2) failure to encompass all of the relief available under Rule
lOb-5 or the state's common law; 17 (3) failing to provide for equitable
tolling to prevent an undiscovered claims from being time barred;' 8 and
(4) not requiring proof of scienter thus warranting a shorter limitation
amine the nature of the cause of action to determine the time restriction." Holmberg v.
Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
13. Maggio v. Gerard Freezer & Ice Co., 824 F.2d 123 (Ist Cir. 1987) (applying a
three-year limitation period and barring a thirteen-year-old action).
14. Cf Smith v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 891 F.2d 1567 (lth Cir. 1990) (rejecting federal
analogy and applying Alabama's two-year limitation period); Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d
669 (6th Cir. 1981) (applying both a one-year securities limitation period and an amended
three-year period to different lOb-5 claims); O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15 (4th Cir.
1980) (applying Maryland's securities tolling provision and one-year limitation period).
15. Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting federal analogy and applying equitable tolling to Oregon's two-year fraud limitation period); Sioux Ltd. Sec. Litigation v. Coopers & Lybrand, 914 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying Texas' newly enacted
four-year fraud limitation period rather than two-year period in force at time of trial);
Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying Missouri's two-year
fraud limitation period).
16. "The common-law fraud action was inadequate for the sophisticated transactions
involving insider trading and market manipulation." CarlosJ. Cuevas, The Misappropriation
Theory and Rule 10b-5: Deadlock in the Supreme Court, 13 J. CORP. LAw 793, 795 (1988).
"Thus, common-law actions in fraud or deceit failed to provide adequate protection for
stockholders from individuals who traded on the market exchange based upon privileged
access to corporate information. Due to the continued development of the impersonal
market exchange, Congress sought to provide investor protection ....
" Dana L. Hegarty,
Rule lOb-5 and the Evolution of Common-law Fraud-The Needfor an Effective Statutory Proscription
ofInsider Tradingby Outsiders, 22 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 813, 815 (1988).
17. See Biggans v. Bache Halsley Stuart Shields, Inc., 638 F.2d 605, 610 (3d Cir. 1980)
(holding that where a Blue Sky statute does not provide the relief prayed for the statute of
limitations from the common law action will prevail).
18. Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1980).
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period. 19 This last distinction presented problems as, in 1976, the
United States Supreme Court held the scienter requirement applied to
20
Rule lOb-5 actions.
B.

The Rule lOb-5 Problem

When a Rule lOb-5 claim accrues, the injured party must decide
when and where to file a lawsuit. In the past, this has invited forum
shopping because the statute of limitations applied to the particular action may have been longer in one jurisdiction than in another. Courts in
Rule lOb-5 actions could do little to hinder this practice since the courts
created the problem.
The disparity created by applying different limitation periods to
Rule 1Ob-5 claims led both plaintiffs and defendants into a litigious mine
field. 2 1 A Rule lOb-5 claim could be held time barred in one state or
circuit and be found valid in another. This inequity in procedural process ran contrary to the universal belief that each individual should have
the opportunity to play the game under the same set of rules.
The following two cases arising out of Pennsylvania in 1982 vividly
illustrate the confusion in this area of law. In Ging v. Parker-Hunter,
Inc.,22 a group of investors brought an action under Rule lOb-5 alleging
securities fraud. The securities dealer moved for summary judgment asserting that the claims were time barred under the Pennsylvania Securities Acts' ("PSA") two-year statute of limitations. 23 In addressing the
limitations issue, the court focused on the remedy provided by the state
statute rather than the elements of the offense. The court reasoned that
the state fraud statute, not the PSA, provided investors with the remedy
requested, 24 adopted the six-year limitation period for common law
fraud, and held the claim was not time barred. 25 The PSA also differed
from Rule lOb-5 by requiring privity.
In Fickingerv. C.L PlanningCorp.,26 decided in 1982, six months after
Ging, the plaintiffs brought a class action against a real estate investment
trust, its advisor and the parent company. The plaintiffs maintained the
statute of limitations for fraud applied. The court agreed, finding that
common law fraud would be the only remedy provided under state
law. 2 7 The defendant then argued that the two-year limitation period
for fraud applied, while the plaintiffs contended that the six-year catch19. Diamond v. Lamotte, 709 F.2d 1419 (1Ith Cir. 1983); Biggins v. Bache Halsey
Stuart Shields, Inc., 638 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1980).
20. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
21. "A good illustration of the difficulties that can come up under either the passive or
the active approach to borrowing state statutes of limitations is the problem of limitations
for SEC Rule I Ob-5 securities actions, presently one of the more confused areas of federal
law." Sobol, supra note 7 at 1137.
22. 544 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
23. 544 F. Supp. at 51.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 556 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
27. Id. at 438.
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28
all fraud limitation period was most appropriate.

The Pennsylvania state legislature had enacted new statutes of limitation for a number of actions in the late 1970's.29 The federal district
court was forced to predict which limitation period was most appropriate because the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had not yet decided the
issue.3 0 The court found the two-year period applicable but indicated
that the jury was to determine when the plaintiffs had knowledge of the
31
fraud and whether the limitation period had tolled.
These cases illustrate the disparity and confusion created by the
lack of a standard limitation period for Rule lOb-5 actions in a single
state. Legislatively enacted statutes of limitation, on the state level, can
change at the whim of the General Assembly and generally lack consistency with the purpose of the federal securities laws. 3 2 The problem
became magnified when a circuit chose among different causes of action
within each state,3 3 or the parties involved in the action were within different circuits' jurisdiction.3 4 Defendants and plaintiffs had no basis for
determining whether a cause of action had tolled, thereby forstalling the
suit. Federal securities actions became further complicated when the securities solicitation occurred telephonically because it raised complex
choice of law questions.3 5
This disparity lead to inequities against defendants and may also
have harmed unwary plaintiffs who inappropriately worded complaints
by stating claims that would render the adoption of a shorter limitation
period. Attempts by the circuits to impose some sense of certainty on
Rule lOb-5 actions fell short of providing the uniformity necessary for
36
an efficient and fair judicial system.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 440.
32. Within the Tenth Circuit the limitations period for fraud varies. Colorado, three
years, see CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-80-101 (1989); Kansas, two years upon discovery, see KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-513 (1983); New Mexico, four years, see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-4 (Michie
1990); Oklahoma, two years upon discovery, see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 95 (West 1988);
Utah, three years upon discovery, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26 (1990); Wyoming, four
years upon discovery, see Wyo. STAT. § 1-3-105 (1988).
33. State legislatures are prolific in their adoption of statutes of limitations for varying
causes of action. Colorado alone has well over twenty-five statutes of limitations ranging
from COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-102, applying a two-year limitation period for claims under
absolute liability to § 8-4-126, C.R.S., providing a two-year statute of limitations for wage
disputes.
34. For a case dealing with a rule lOb-5 action with parties in different circuits, see
Ceres Partners v. Gel Assocs., 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990).
35. This is especially true with rule lOb-5 actions. The choice of law questions
abound because of the preponderance of diversity citizenship suits; however, these are not
within the scope of this Article.
36. In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.) (en banc),
ceri. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988); Ceres Partners v. Gel Assocs., 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990)
(applying an analogous federal statute of limitations); Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co.,
908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying an analogous federal statute of limitations), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991).
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C. Adoption of an Analogous FederalLimitation Period
The Court has repeatedly stated that when Congress does not provide an express limitation period, it intends the adoption of a statute of
limitations from a state-borrowed cause of action. 3 7 This principle is
premised upon years of Court precedent and the Rules of Decision
Act.3

8

The state-borrowing doctrine may not be lightly abandoned be-

cause of congressional reliance. The Court has on a number of occasions, and particularly more recently, limited the choice of adoptable
state actions, or simply adopted a limitation period from an analogous
federal statute.
In Del Costello v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters,39 the issue centered upon what limitation period would govern an employee's claim
both against his employer for breach of a collective bargaining agree40
ment and against his union for breach of duty of fair representation.
The claims were brought under different theories, including a contract
claim against the employer and an arbitrator/bad faith claim against the
union. 4 1 Recognizing the inherent inconsistency of both claims, the
Court adopted the six-month limitation period prescribed under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 42 In searching for an equitable limitation period, the Court found Maryland's one-year limitation period for
breach of contract too long and thus inequitable to the defendant. The
state's limitation period for vacating an arbitration award was considered too short to allow a plaintiff to reasonably assess the claim. 43 The
Court determined the six-month period provided by the NLRA section
10(b) addressed the unique nature of employee/union disputes. 44 In
citing prior decisions, 45 the Court found that Congress's specific intent
was to balance national interests against individual rights when establishing the NLRA limitation period. 4 6 This balancing of interests, together with the intrinsic inconsistency of the claims, led to the rejection
of a state-created analogy and the adoption of a federal statute's limitation period.
The Court has repeatedly stated that when a lower court chooses a
statute of limitation, it should do so in a straightforward matter. In Wilson v. Garcia,4 7 the Court determined the proper limitation period for
bringing a Section 1983 civil rights claim. The majority recognized that
37. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-267 (1985); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S.
610, 617 (1895).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 52 (1990).

39. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
40. Id. at 156.
41. Id. at 164.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1989).

43. 462 U.S. at 166.
44. See id. at 167-72. Six months would provide the employee with enough time to
bring suit and also would be short enough to promote the federal policy of rapid final
resolution of labor disputes.
45. See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
46. 462 U.S. at 171.
47. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
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a Section 1983 cause of action could be raised under differing legal theories, and a plaintiff could allege a number of different limitation periods.4 8 The Court stated that Congress, in enacting the legislation,
could not have intended such inconsistency in the enforcement of civil
liberties. 4 9 The Court enumerated a three-part test for determining the
most analogous state statute from which to borrow a limitation period.
First, a court must decide whether state or federal law governs the characterization of the claim. 50 Second, if a federal characterization applies,
the court must determine if all similar claims should be viewed in the
same light or viewed differently depending on the circumstances. 5 1 Finally, the court must characterize the claim to establish which statute
'52
provides the "most appropriate limiting principle."
In applying the test, the Wilson Court determined that Section 1983
provided "a uniquely federal remedy" against impediments of state law
on civil liberties. 53 The majority reasoned that Section 1983 may "encompass numerous and diverse topics and subtopics" within each
claim. 54 The Court acknowledged that while national uniformity in such
actions was preferred, such consistency was not necessary, 55 and held
that a Section 1983 limitation period must be consistently derived from
56
the same state-based action within each state.
In Agency Holding, Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc.,57 the Court
decided the appropriate limitations period for a private action brought
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO). 58 In Agency, an insurance agency alleged fraud and civil conspiracy three years after the alleged violative acts occurred. The district
court held the claims were barred after applying a state-borrowed twoyear fraud statute of limitations. The Third Circuit reversed, finding the
state's six-year "catchall" statute the most appropriate. The Supreme
Court, however, held a federal statute, the Clayton Act, 5 9 most analogous for adopting a statue of limitations.
In Agency, the majority found that a uniform federal limitation period better fulfills congressional intent because RICO claims embrace
diverse local jurisprudential concepts. These legal concepts encompass
"enterprise and pattern of racketeering activity" that do not conveniently fit into state-based common law statutory schemes. 60 The Court
adopted the limitation period provided by the Clayton Act because both
48. Id. at 273-74.
49. See id. at 268-69.
50. Id. at 268.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 271-72.
54. Id. at 273.
55. Id. at 275.
56. Id. at 279. The statute of limitations for a personal injury was chosen as the appropriate limitation period for a Section 1983 cause of action arising in New Mexico.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1961-68 (1989).
58. 483 U.S. 143 (1988).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 15(b), 18 U.S.C. § 1964.
60. 483 U.S. at 150.
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the RICO and Clayton acts were structured to compensate for similar
injuries and provide similar remedies. 6 1 Moreover, the possibility ex62
isted that a state's limitation period was too short.
Del Costello and Agency Holding, Inc. hold that courts must adopt a
federal limitation period when state limitation periods compromise congressional intent or fail to provide a reasonable time in which to bring
an action. This determination must be made through an application of
the three-part test enumerated in Wilson. The Court's repeated application and recognition of the state-borrowing method evidences a substantial presumption favoring state-borrowing.
The Supreme Court repeatedly denied certiorari in cases presenting a similar question as applied to Rule lOb-5. 63 Without guidance, a
number of federal circuits began adopting limitation periods from
analogous federal statutes in an effort to provide consistency to a prejudicial and chaotic situation.
D.

Rule lOb-5 and the Circuit Courts

The increasing growth in the number of lOb-5 claims placed a significant burden on the federal courts. Rule lOb-5 was the federal securities regulation most often used by investors seeking remedy for a
fraudulent act. The traditional state-borrowing method for selecting an
appropriate limitation period proved burdensome, unpredictable and,
quite often, inequitable. After almost forty years of adopting limitation
periods ranging from one to ten years, several circuits began adopting a
uniform circuit-wide limitation period.
In In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation,64 the Third Circuit, in
an en banc decision, adopted a uniform, circuit-wide limitations period
from an analogous federal securities statute. Prior to Data Access, the
Third Circuit had applied a state's Blue Sky limitation period, unless
that statute failed to provide the remedy sought by the plaintiff. In the
latter instance, the court then would apply the limitation period of a
state action most analogous to the claimed relief.
The Data Access plaintiffs argued for application of the New Jersey
statute of limitations for common law fraud. 6 5 The Third Circuit rejected the common law fraud analysis, noting the lower threshold of
proof needed in a Rule lOb-5 claim. 6 6 Rather than look to the usual
alternative (the state Blue Sky statute), the court opted for a federal so61. Id. at 151.
62. Id. at 154.
63. In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 849 (1988); Nortek, Inc. v. Alexander Grant and Company, 532 F.2d 1013 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977).
64. 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988) (adopting limitation periods from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, codified as amended at, 15
U.S.C. §§ 9(e), 18(c) and 29(b) (1988)).
65. Id. at 1538.
66. Id. at 1544.
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lution. The Third Circuit concluded that language in Del Costello 67 and
Agency Holding6 8 authorized a retreat from the practice of state-borrowing.6 9 In Del Costello, the Court adopted a limitation period from an
analogous federal statute because state law provided an insufficient period. The Agency Holding Corp. decision rejected borrowing a state-created action because a common law action and RICO could not easily be
compared or reconciled. In both decisions the Supreme Court, not finding a better analogous state source, adopted a limitation period from a
federal statute.
The Third Circuit examined the problems arising out of the tradi70
tional practice of adopting state-borrowed limitation periods:
We are required to examine each contention of a federal securities complaint with great particularity to determine whether
the state blue sky statute tracks the particular federal claim, and
if not, to determine claim by claim which other state limitations
period will apply depending upon the resemblance between the
precise federal claim and those based in state or common law
7
actions. '
The majority recognized that the traditional practice did not provide any "bright-line guidance" on the problem 7 2 and instead found
that "[a] factual, claim-based approach to characterizing the case for limitations purposes would not promote [federal interests]." 7 3 The court
reasoned that Congress intended to provide national and uniform remedies to fill a void in the common law. Using the analogy of the country
as a "commercial universe," the court found state-based actions too diverse to accomplish the uniformity necessary to promote economic
74
goals.
In rejecting the adoption of a state action, the Third Circuit relied
on Supreme Court dictum construing lOb-5 suits as not substantially
analogous to fraud or deceit claims. 75 The majority found that section
10(b), companion sections 9(e), 18(c) and 29(b) of the 1934 Act and
sections 12 and 13 of the 1933 Act accomplished the same objectivesprovide full disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate
commerce and prevent fraud.7 6 The court held these sections most
analogous. With each section having a similar limitations period, 77 the
court reasoned that "[w]hen Congress has created a right to sue in se67. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
68. 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
69. 843 F.2d at 1540.
70. The court, in reexamining its Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 638
F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1980) decision, illustrates the problem arising out of a single 1Ob-5 claim
of action within a single state and the disparity between the state's applicable statutes of
limitation. 843"F.2d at 1541.
71. 843 F.2d at 1541.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1543.
74. Id. at 1548-49.
75. 843 F.2d at 1545 (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 n.22 (1988)).
76. 843 F.2d at 1548.

77. Id.
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curities matters, it has, with one exception, declared a limitations period
78
no longer than three years."
Following the DataAccess decision, two other circuits adopted a similar approach. The Seventh Circuit adopted the one-year/three-year limitation period in Short v. Belleville Shoe ManufacturingCo. 7 9 After finding a
uniform limitation period should apply to all Rule lOb-5 claims, the
court focused on whether to adopt a limitation period from section 13 of
the 1934 Act or the more recently enacted section 20A. 80 The majority
concluded that section 13 had a more general application and was better
suited for the wide variety of claims brought under Rule lOb-5. However, after reviewing a SEC amicus brief in a prior case, 8 1 the court
found section 20A's five-year limitation period appealing. It reasoned
the longer period may have been more reflective of Congress's most
recent intent in enacting securities laws. 8 2 The five-year period of section 20A was rejected because of the prior adoption of section 13 by the
Third Circuit and the court's paramount concern for national
uniformity.
The Second Circuit, in Ceres Partnersv. GEL Associates, 83 also adopted
the one-year/three-year limitation period. The court relied heavily on
Data Access because the plaintiff resided in the Third Circuit and the defendant in the Second. After considering section 20A, the court
adopted the section 13 limitation period because of the great emphasis
placed on the need for uniformity.
III.

INSTANT CASE

With three circuits utilizing a single, uniform limitations period and
all other circuits continuing the state-borrowing practice, the issue was
ripe for United States Supreme Court treatment. The Court addressed
the issue in Lampf v. Gilbertson.8 4 In Lampf, the purchasers of shares in
several failed limited partnerships brought suit against the law firm that
prepared tax memoranda allegedly relied upon by the investors. 8 5 The
investors claimed the law firm violated Rule lOb-5 by making misrepresentations that induced their investment. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants, finding the claim barred by Oregon's two-year limitation period for fraud. 8 6
78. Id. at 1550. Three judges dissented; however, the discussion focused on the majority's failure to address the question of retroactivity. The dissent found, after applying
the three part test from Chevron Oil Co., 404 U.S. 97 (1971), that the majority's holding
should not apply to the case at hand. 843 F.2d at 1553.
79. 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990).
80. The statute of limitations for section 20(a) states: No action may be brought
under this section more than five years after the date of the last transaction that is the
subject of the violation. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(b)(4) (1990).
81. Brief for the United States, Lebman v. Aktiebolaget Electrolux, cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 3214 (1989) (No. 88-1114).
82. 908 F.2d at 1391.
83. 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990).
84. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
85. Id. at 2776.
86. Id. at 2777 (District Court decision is an unpublished opinion).
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On review, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding
that a question of material fact existed precluding summary judgment.
In reversing, the court expressly rejected the defendant's claim that a
federal limitation period should apply. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, citing the "divergence of opinion among the circuits regarding
87
the proper limitations period."
A.

Majority Opinion

In adopting the one-year/three-year limitations period from the
1934 Act, the majority reiterated that a court's decision on the appropriate limitations period should be clear and straightforward.8 8 Justice
Blackmun, writing for the majority, enumerated a three-step, Wilson-like
test for determining the appropriate limitation period when one is not
expressly provided.8 9 First, the court must determine the need for a
uniform limitation period. When a federal cause of action can arise
under different legal theories, the court should bow to predictability and
judicial economy, and err on the side of uniformity. 90
Second, the court should decide whether a state or federal source
should provide the foundation for the limitation period. The majority
specifically noted the geographic character of the claim as warranting
additional consideration. When a claim can be multi-state in character,
a federal limitations period is preferred to prevent forum shopping and
to simplify the lower court's task.9 1 Finally, any federal analogy must
provide a "closer fit" to the litigated claim than is afforded by state bor92
rowed sources.
In applying this test, a need for a uniform limitation period for Rule
10(b)-5 claims was evident. The majority found that a national, uniform
statute of limitations would both serve congressional intent and provide
judicial economy. In assessing whether to look to a state or federal
foundation, the Court rejected an assertion that state-based fraud statutes provided the closest analogy because Congress had expressly ar93
ticulated several similar limitation periods in the same enactment.
These federal limitation periods recognize the expansive geographic
character of Rule lOb-5 claims and shift the presumption to using a federal source. In rejecting the SEC's claim that a five-year statute of repose is more representative of congressional intent, the Court found
that the express limitation periods from the 1934 Act provided the clearest evidence of such intentions at the time of enactment of section
10b.

94

Finally, the majority rejected any application of the doctrine of eq87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id. at 2779.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2780.
Id. at 2780.
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uitable estoppel to the new limitation period. It held the three-year
component acted as a statute of repose, and application of the doctrine
would be contradictory to the intent of the legislation. 95 The majority
then found the investor's claims were time barred. In a terse concurrence, Justice Scalia articulated the need for congressional action and
96
not judicial reaction.
B.

Dissenting Opinion

Justice Stevens, in a dissent joined by Justice Souter, echoed the
concerns ofJustice Scalia in recognizing the need for Congress to articulate limitation periods. In citing four decades of precedent and Congress's awareness of the state-borrowing doctrine, Justice Stevens
argued that the Court had both made policy and possibly overstepped
its constitutional bounds. 9 7 The dissent disagreed with the majority's
reliance on Agency Holding Corp., stating that RICO actions are relatively
new and the adoption of a federal analogy (the Clayton Act) did not
reverse forty years of precedent. 98
Both Justices O'Connor and Kennedy authored concurring dissents. Justice O'Connor focused on the majority's retroactive application of the decision. 9 9 She observed that the claims were time barred
because the plaintiffs were "unable to predict the future."' 0 0 Citing
Chevron Oil Company v. Hulson 101 as an example, Justice O'Connor stated
that plaintiffs should be harmed for "sleeping on their rights," and not
02
for relying on long established precedent.'
Relying on Chevron Oil Company, Justice O'Connor applied a three
element test for determining whether a new decision may properly be
applied retroactively. First, the decision must establish a new principle
of law overriding clear past precedent relied on by the litigants.10 3 Second, the Court must determine whether the retroactive application of a
new decision will advance or retard the purpose and operation of the
law. 10 4 Finally, the Court must establish that a retroactive application of
its decision will not produce "substantial inequitable results."' 0 5 In
Lampf, the Court clearly disregarded the Chevron test. First, the Court
overruled clearly established precedent. Second, while predictability is
desirable in the future, it cannot be applied to the past. Finally, the majority's action was highly inequitable to the plaintiffs, who had litigated
this issue for over four years. 10 6 Justice O'Connor believed that such
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 2781.
Id. at 2783.
Id. at 2784 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2785.
Id. at 2785 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2786.
404 U.S. 97 (1971).
111 S. Ct. at2786.
404 U.S. at 106.
Id. at 107.
Id.
111 S. Ct. at 2787.
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action by the majority went against earlier precedent, holding that appli07
cation of a retroactive limitation period violates due process..
Justice Kennedy's dissent focused on the three-year statute of repose adopted by the majority. Since Rule 1Ob-5 was aimed at fraudulent
actions, he found the three-year period was contradictory to the intent
of the rule.1 08 Justice Kennedy reasoned that each "analogous" cause
of action borrowed by the majority was fundamentally different from
Rule lOb-5's anti-fraud character. 10 9 He recognized the limitation periods expressed in the 1934 Act may not be the most analogous to Rule
lOb-5 claims.
This dissent noted the burden a plaintiff has in a fraud claim and
that concealment is an inherent characteristic because of the very nature
of fraud.1 0 Noting that short statutes of repose are repugnant to fraudbased actions, Justice Kennedy believed that the majority's three-year
repose period "simply tips the scale too far in favor of wrongdoers.""'
IV.

ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court's decision in Lampf evidences a common sense
approach to a complicated statute of limitations problem. There are,
however, areas in the majority's opinion that are inconsistent with precedent and demonstrate faulty logic. Specifically, the Court's actions evidence a trend rejecting the practice of state-borrowing and the
federalization of certain common-law doctrines within the federal court
system. The Court's cursory application of its own three-part test and
the silent retroactive application of the decision go against the grain of
justice and equity.
A. Application of "Statute Selection" Test
The majority's superficial application of its "statute selection" test
to the Rule 1Ob-5 limitations problem produced the desired uniformity,
but sacrificed law based upon thoroughly reasoned progressions. In
choosing an appropriate limitations period in any particular Federal District or Circuit, it is abundantly clear that inconsistencies arise because
of Rule 1Ob-5's diverse application. This broad application presents a
cornucopia of legal theories and ancillary limitation periods to choose
from because remedies for securities fraud can encompass tort or contract theories. The Court correctly determined that there was a need for
a uniform statute of limitations for all 1Ob-5 actions, citing predictability
and judicial economy as the main reasons.
Recognizing that a uniform limitation period can be applied on a
state or national level, the majority next looked to the geographic character of the claim. Any survey of Rule 1Ob-5 claims clearly demonstrates
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 2786.
Id. at 2790 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2789.

Id.
Id. at 2790.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1

the complexity and geographic diversity of such causes of action. This
was readily evident in Ceres Partners,1 12 where the opposing parties resided in different circuits that utilized different limitation periods. The
majority also recognized the threat of forum shopping and the general
complexity of a Rule lOb-5 limitation ruling.
The analysis runs into trouble when the Court seeks a "closer fit"
from a federal statute. It should be noted that the presumption rests on
choosing a state-borrowed limitation period and that this presumption, 1 13 based on forty years of precedent, can only be overcome by a
statute that is clearly more relevant and more properly tailored to the
intent of Congress.
The Court concludes that other sections of the 1934 Act provide a
"closer fit" for Rule lOb-5 actions because section 10(b) was enacted
along with these other provisions. 114 The Court cites Del Costello as support for its assumption that a federal analogy is preferred. 115 The
Court's reliance on Del Costello rests on a weak foundation. Del Costello
dealt with claims that were commonly brought simultaneously between
employee and employer, and employee and union, but under two dis16
tinct legal theories, including breach of contract and breach of duty."
In Del Costello the Court faced diversionary claims, which by their very
nature gave rise to contradicting limitation periods when using the stateborrowing method. This inherent contradiction made it necessary for
the Court to find a third, federal-based source for an equitable statute of
limitations.
The Lampf Court's determination that the expressed limitations period provided in other sections of the 1934 Act is Congress's clearest
intent is based on an assumption that the other sections remedy similar
injustices and therefore related to section 10(b). This assumption is a
long, logical leap because the majority does not point toward a particular statute section as it did in Malley-Duff.1 17 There, the limitations period from the Clayton Act was applied to a RICO cause of action. The
Lampf Court simply asserts that since the 1934 Act is directed, like Rule
lOb-5, at securities improprieties, both statutory sections are clearly
analogous. 18
Justice Kennedy points out that these "analogous" sections articulate purposes other than those of Rule lOb-5. Section 78(i) prohibits
acts of manipulation of security prices. The section specifically deals
with misrepresentations of active trading, price fixing or violation of the
rules and regulations of the Securities Commission. Section 7 8(g) prohibits misleading or false statements in general. These two sections deal
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
U.S.C.
118.

918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990).
Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2778.
Id. at 2781.
Id. at 2780.
Del Costello, 462 U.S. at 164.
Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 150 (citing the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15
§ 15 (1990)).
Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2780-81.
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with specific acts which, because of their narrow scope, may justifiably
give rise to a one-year/three-year statute of limitations. Conversely,
Rule lOb-5 and section 10(b) generally apply to any fraudulent securities transaction. The Supreme Court has held that under a lOb-5 claim
a plaintiff must prove the elements of common law fraud, particularly
scienter 1 19 Additionally, Rule 1Ob-5's wide acceptance and use as a litigative tool provides evidence of its special status among securities law
remedies available to an investor/plaintiff.
The very nature of fraud makes its discovery difficult. In contrast, it
is substantively easier to trace a misleading statement or a price fixing
scheme, particularly when a national securities trading board is involved
in the monitoring and regulation of such transactions. It is clear that the
Court's apparent acquiescence of the 1934 Act as a "closer fit" is built
upon shaky ground. The Court states that the goal of securities laws is
to protect investors against the manipulation of stock prices through
regulation of securities transactions and exchanges. However, rule lOb5 has been applied to a vastly wider scope of dealings, including sales of
units in limited and general partnerships, activities not highly regulated.
Based on the Court's own presumption that state-borrowing is the
appropriate method for selecting a statute of limitations when none is
expressly provided, the Court failed to overcome that presumption and
the Court's federal analogy should not stand. A good faith application
of the Court's three-part test would have accorded the adoption of a
longer limitation period. The five-year period enacted through the Insider Trading Act, as suggested by the SEC, would have provided continuity between each jurisdiction. Insider trading and fraud share
common characteristics, such as difficulty of discovery. The five-year
limitation period would both promote congressional intent and not undermine the principle use of Rule lOb-5, i.e., halting general securities
fraud.
B.

Retroactivity

The majority's decision to adopt a uniform, national statute of limitations for Rule lOb-5 actions is in accordance with virtually every commentator who has written on the subject. However, the Court's
retroactive application of the limitation period is deplorable. As noted
injustice O'Connor's dissent, "the court shuts the courthouse door on
respondents because they were unable to predict the future."' 20 There
can be'very little "analysis" of the majority's retroactive application of
the holding because the Court simply states that the plaintiff's actions
are time barred. 12 1 No legal justification, based on case law or statute, is
provided to support this ruling.
Such ruling by the Court goes against the grain of precedent, which
consistently holds that when there is a drastic change in a well estab119. Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
120. 111 S. Ct. at 2786.
121. Id. at 2782.
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lished law, especially a limitation period, it is inequitable to apply the
new law retroactively.1 22 In Chevron Oil Company v. Huson, the Court articulated a test for determining whether a judicial decision should be
retroactively applied.1 2 3 In Chevron, the Court was faced with a statute
of limitations problem focusing particularly on a cause of action for personal injuries under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. Congress
had enacted a statute providing for federal rights and federal claims but
failed to express a limitation period for such actions. The Court found
that Louisiana's one-year statute of limitations for personal injury was
the "closest fit." A retroactive application of the new limitation period
would have barred the plaintiff's cause of action.
The Court articulated three separate factors for determining the
retroactivity question. 124 These factors are: (1) whether there is established a new rule and overriding clear precedent; (2) whether retroactivity will retard the rule's purpose; and (3) whether retroactivity will
produce "substantial inequitable results." In Chevron, the Court determined the statute of limitation should not be applied retroactively in
that particular case. If the Chevron test is applied to the Lampf decision, it
becomes clear that the new Rule lOb-5 statute of limitation should not
be applied retroactively.
First, the Court's decision to apply the new limitations period to
1Ob-5 actions overrules clear precedent in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which, prior to Lampf, applied a limitation period by borrowing
from the relevant state fraud claim. 12 5 Additionally, prior to the Lampf
decision only three Circuits had determined that there was a clear federal analogy to lOb-5 actions. The first of these Circuits did not adopt
the federal analogy rule until 1988. In fact it was only in the last three of
Rule 1Ob-5's forty years of private use in civil litigation that the concept
of federal analogy had even been adopted by the federal judiciary. It
should be noted that the Lampf plaintiffs brought their action in 1986,
two years prior to any Circuit's adoption of the federal analogy. It is
readily apparent that the Lampf plaintiffs have fulfilled the first factor in
the Chevron test. The Court overruled precedent on which the litigants
had relied.
Second, in looking to the effect of this decision on Rule lOb-5, it is
obvious that the application of a particular statute of limitations has a
great effect on Rule lOb-5's use. Rule lOb-5 provides investors with a
federal cause of action arising out of any fraudulent transaction.dealing
with securities. By applying such a short limitation period, the purpose
of Rule 1Ob-5 will be greatly retarded. Now, as in Lampf, fraudulent actions must be discovered within three years. The retroactive application
of the Court's decision on the Lampf plaintiffs is disastrous because the
122. See St. Francis College v. A-Khazrhai, 481 U.S. 604, 608-09 (1987); Chevron Oil
Co., 404 U.S. at 97; Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55 (1902).
123. 404 U.S. at 106-07 (1971).
124. See supra note 101.
125. Lampf, II1 S. Ct. at 2785.
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cause of action was not filed within the three-year statute of repose and
therefore, the claims were barred. This is an onerous result after five
years of litigation and reliance on well established precedent both in the
Ninth Circuit and throughout the United States.
The third factor of the Chevron test, substantial inequity, is clearly
met. The Court's determination to apply the new limitation period retroactively completely eliminated the plaintiffs' hopes for a successful litigative outcome and caused great injustice and substantial hardship
which could have been avoided by not applying the decision retroactively. The Court's failure to follow Chevron in its decision not only
harmed the plaintiffs but cast doubt on the Court's intellectual integrity.
Aggrieved parties have no way of determining which precedent the
Court will choose to apply or reject in any particular case.
V.

CONCLUSION

No one argues with the Court's determination that claims brought
under Rule 10b-5 are complex and diverse enough to warrant a uniform,
national statue of limitations. The inequities placed on both the plaintiff
and defendant are readily apparent through a reading of district or appellate opinions applying different statutes of limitations from different
state-borrowed causes of actions. The majority's haste to bring order to
this chaos has, however, missed an opportunity to make a well educated
decision rather than a mere determination of law. The Court's adoption
of the one-year/three-year statute of limitations from the 1934 Act may
be judicially prudent but such a decision falls short of the Court's purpose. The Court, according to its own precedent, had a duty to find the
"closest fit" for a Rule lOb-5 claim, not just the simplistic task of finding
a justifiable alternative to the state-borrowing method. In rejecting the
SEC's argument, which promoted the adoption of the five-year period of
section 20(A), the Court failed to produce a uniform limitation period
which would also advance Rule lOb-5's purpose of remedying fraudulent transactions. At the time of this writing, there is already a movement afoot in Congress to legislate a five-year statute of repose for Rule
lOb-5.
While the Court's adoption of the one-year/three-year limitation
may be defenseable, its retroactive application of this newly determined
statute of limitations borders on a violation of a plaintiff's right to due
process. To retroactively apply a law, after plaintiffs had spent an enormous amount of time and money relying on established precedent, went
against all precepts ofjustice and equality. To apply the statute of limitations retroactively without a hint of justification or legal rationale is
simply a slap in the face of any individual relying on any precedent, in
any court. The injustice of the Court's retroactive application has far
reaching ramifications. Lower courts will now retroactively apply the
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new limitation period to bar unwitting plaintiffs. 1 2 6 The Court's decision merely to pass judgment and apply that ruling without any articulated reason diminishes respect for the Court and makes the legal
community wonder whether, in the future, decisions will be founded on
a rational extension of past precedent or merely the current whims of
the judiciary.
Joseph Cachey III

126. See Lewis v. Hermann, No. 89 C 04576, 1991 WL 199627 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17,
1991); Welch v. Cadre Capital, 923 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1991).

ARIZONA V. FULMINANTE: ROMANCING COERCED
CONFESSIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The March 26, 1991 United States Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. Fulminante,I applying the harmless error rule to involuntary confessions, has met with unjust criticism. Contrary to these criticisms, the
ramifications of the opinion are not abrogations of due process. Fulminante is significant as the admission of an involuntary confession will no
longer automatically trigger reversal. Instead, the evidence will be subprove beyond a reaject to a stringent test requiring the prosecutor to
2
sonable doubt that the confession was harmless.
Criminal defendants who are found guilty by trial often find an error in the proceedings leading to their conviction. 3 Accordingly, all fifty
states and the United States Congress have enacted harmless error statutes. 4 Such statutes establish the rule that ajudgment shall be sustained
unless there are errors or defects which affect the material rights of the
parties. 5 While a more stringent application of the harmless error rule
applies to errors involving the denial of a federal constitutional right,6
the Court, for the first time, extends the rule to coerced confessions.
The Rehnquist majority opinion was met by a bitter dissent fromJustice
1. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
2. Id. at 1265.
3. James C. Scoville, Deadly Mistakes: Harmless Errorin Capital Sentencing, 54 U. CHI. L.

REV. 740 (1987) [hereinafter Scoville].
4. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
5. The current harmless error statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1988), incorporates the
harmless error statute enacted in 1919, Act of February 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181,
which provided that a judgment was to be affirmed "without regard to technical errors,
defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." However,
the original statute was repealed in 1948 and replaced a year later by a version in which the
term "technical" was deleted, 63 Stat. 105 (1949). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(A) modeled

after the Act of 1919, which provides, "any error, defect, irregularity or variance which
does not affect the substantial rights shall be disregarded." See also FED. R. Civ. P. 61 and
FED. R. EvID. 103(A).

Although it appears that repeal and reenactment resulted from confusion over
whether FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(A) and FED. R. Civ. P. 61 made § 391 redundant, 11 CHARLES
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2881 (1973), the result is that § 2111 may be coextensive with Chapman. See United States v. Hastings, 461
U.S. 499 (1983) and ROGER TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 41-43 (1970).

6. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). For a short history of harmless error
rules see Phillip J. Mause, Harmless ConstitutionalError: The Implicationsof Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L. REv. 519 (1969) [hereinafter Mause]; Vilija Bilaisis, Comment, Harmless
Error: Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct, 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 457, 459-60 (1983);
Nolan E. Clark, Note, Harmless ConstitutionalError,20 STAN. L. REV. 83 (1967); Note, Harmless ConstitutionalError: A Reappraisal,83 HARV. L. REV. 814 (1970).

For a discussion on the differences between constitutional and nonconstitutional
harmless error rules, see Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946); Steven H.
Goldberg, Harmless Error: ConstitutionalSneak Thief, 71J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421,422-

23 (history of nonconstitutional harmless error rules).
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Byron R. White 7 and with much reproach from commentators8 accusing
the majority of deserting the privilege against self-incrimination. 9 However, Fulminante upholds the ban on admissions of coerced confessions
into evidence and does not threaten resolution of the constitutional
guarantees. The result is that no conviction will be affirmed if there is
any reasonable doubt that it is based on the involuntary confession.
This Comment analyzes the Court's decision to apply the harmless
error rule to the erroneous admission at a jury trial of involuntary confessions. 10 It specifically discusses how the Court balances society's interest in convicting the guilty with a defendant's interest in avoiding an
unjust conviction. The Comment also examines the historical development of the constitutional harmless error doctrine and the future implications of the decision. Further, it will attempt to reconcile with the
Rehnquist majority, the Court's critics who claim that a threat to the
defendant's constitutional right to due process looms on the horizon.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Common Law

Traditionally, the Court has found the erroneous admission of a coerced confession" at trial can never be considered harmless. 12 This
traditional exclusion of coerced confessions from the harmless error
doctrine reflects the attitude imbedded in American and English jurisprudence.' 3 Originally, an error in a criminal trial proceeding led to
reversal regardless of whether the error affected the outcome. 14 The
federal courts rationalized there was a "stringent presumption of preju7. The Supreme Court, Justice White, held that: (1)defendant's confession was coerced; and (2) error in admission of the confession was not harmless; and, per CJ. Rehnquist, held that; (3) harmless error rule applied to admission of involuntary confessions.
8. The Supreme Court's Harmful Error, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1991, at A22; Alan Ellis,
Time to Draw the Line on Police Power, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 29, 1991, at A27; A Supreme Court
Retreat, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1991, at A20; Editorial: Supreme Court Ruling, BOSTON GLOBE
(City Edition), Mar. 29, 1991, at 47; Opening the Door to Police Abuse, CM. TRIB., Mar. 28,
1991, at C22; Who s Activist Now? ConservativeJustices Rewrite CriminalRights, SEAT.E TIMES,
Mar. 28, 1991, at A10; Todd Spangler, Delegates Clear Bill to Make Coerced Confessions Useless,
WASH. TIMES, April 5, 1991, at B4 (judiciary committee chairman of the House of Delegates in Maryland, John Arnick, is pushing a House bill in Maryland which says that no
conviction may stand in a case where a coerced confession was introduced).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides, "[n]o person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...."

10. Supreme Court cases have used the terms "coerced confession" and "involuntary
confession" interchangeably. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
11. For the Supreme Court's interpretation of the meaning of "coerced," see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1986).
12. In Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958), the Court held that a conviction must
be reversed when a coerced confession is introduced into evidence. Id. at 568.
13. For a complete discussion of the English heritage and American modification of
the harmless error rule, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 26.6 (1985).
14. See James Duke Cameron & Jones Osborn II, When Harmless ErrorIsn't Harmless,
1971 LAw & Soc. ORD. 23 (1971); Scoville, supra note 3; Robert Pondolfi, Comment, PrinciplesforApplicationof the Harmless ErrorStandard,41 U. CMI. L. REV. 616, 617 (1974) [hereinafter Pondolfi]. For a complete discussion of harmless error, see ROGER TRAYNOR, THE
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dice" from a trial error.1 5 As retrials increased, the rule of automatic
16
reversal was widely criticized as a waste of judicial resources and reviewing courts were condemned as "impregnable citadels of technicality." 17 Critics were concerned that reversing convictions based on
technical errors would undermine the public confidence in the judicial
system. 18 Consequently, there was pressure for harmless error
legislation.
In 1919 Congress adopted a federal harmless error statute, which
served as the model for most state legislation. 19 As a result, a trial error
does not automatically call for a reversal of a criminal conviction. Instead, the conviction will be upheld if the appellate court concludes that
the error had no impact on the conviction. 20 The reviewing courts
weigh the effect of the error on the jury's probable evaluation of defendant's culpability. 2 1 The federal statute was generally interpreted as applying only to nonconstitutional errors. 2 2 A nonconstitutional error
involves any rule violation. 23 All federal constitutional errors were still
subject to automatic reversal because of the conclusive presumption of
prejudice when a criminal defendant was deprived of a constitutional
right.2 4 However, some state appellate courts applied their state harmless error statutes to both constitutional and nonconstitutional state
25
rights.
This inconsistent application of nonconstitutional harmless error
rules led to the advent of the constitutional harmless error doctrine. In
1963, in Fahy v. Connecticut,2 6 the Supreme Court declined to determine
RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 8, 11-13 (1970); 1 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE

§ 21 (3d ed. 1940).
15. In Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the Supreme Court held that the
illegal admission of defendant's statement is reversible error "since the prosecution cannot on one hand offer evidence to prove guilt ... and on the other hand for the purpose of
avoiding consequences of the error ... be heard to assert that the matter offered as a
confession was not prejudicial because it did not tend to prove guilt." Id. at 541.
16. See, e.g., WIGMORE, supra note 14, at 370-73 n.3.
17. Marcus A. Kavanagh, Improvement of Administration of Criminaljustice by Exercise of
Judicial Power, 11 A.B.A.J. 217, 222 (1925), quoted in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.
750, 759 (1946). See TRAYNOR, supra note 14, at 14-15 n.3 ("There had to be an end to
battles of bright or dull wits in the courtroom on witless technicalities.").
18. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (recognizing the harmless error
doctrine "promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying
fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.")
Id. at 681. Cf.TRAYNOR, supra note 14, at 50 ("Reversal for error, regardless of its effect
on the judgement, encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the public
to ridicule it.").
19. Act of February 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2111
(1988). See supra note 5.
20. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 13, at 996.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Nonconstitutional harmless errors include: joinder, venue, discovery, jury selection and any other violations of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. LAFAVE &
ISRAEL, supra note 13, at 996.
24. See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946).
25. By 1967, all fifty states had adopted harmless error rules by statute. See Chapman
v. California, 286 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
26. 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
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whether the erroneous admission of evidence obtained by an illegal
search and seizure, a constitutional error, can ever be subject to harmless error under the federal standard. 2 7 Assuming that the rule applied,
the majority reversed the conviction, holding that it was not harmless
error for the trial judge to admit the evidence. 28 The dissenters in Fahy
rejected the majority's approach. They saw no reason why the harmless
error rule should not apply to constitutional errors as well as nonconstitutional errors. 29 This dissent ultimately prevailed and became the law
in the landmark case of Chapman.
B.

The Chapman Case

30
Four years after Fahy, the Supreme Court in Chapman v. California,
held that a conviction can be upheld despite a violation of a criminal
defendant's constitutional right under the theory of constitutional harmless error.3 1 In Chapman, the prosecutor persistently commented on the
defendant's failure to testify. 32 Justice Black, writing for the majority,
rationalized that there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair
trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless. 33 However,
there may be some constitutional errors that in the setting of a particular
case are "so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with
the federal constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring automatic
reversal of the conviction."' 34 The majority concluded that the prosecutor's continued comments concerning a defendant's silence were subject
35
to harmless error analysis.
The Court noted that simply because the rule of automatic reversal
had not been applied to constitutional errors in the past, that did not
mean a constitutional error could never be harmless. 36 Justice Black explained that, "harmless error rules serve a useful purpose since they
block setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little
likelihood of having affected the result of the trial."'3 7 The Court held

27. Id. at 86. The constitutional violation was a breach of Mapp v. Ohio 1 367 U.S.
643 (1948).
28. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 87 (1963).
29. Id. at 92-95 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
30. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
31. Id; See Skoglind, Harmless ConstitutionalError: An Analysis of Its Current Application,
33 BAYLOR L. REV. 961 (1981) [hereinafter Skoglind] (examining commentators' theories
attempting to explain Chapman's application of the harmless error doctrine).
32. In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the Court held that a prosecutor's or
judge's comment on the defendant's failure to testify overly burdens the defendant's right
to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and is constitutional
error. See CAL. CoNsT. art. VI § 4.5 (forbids reversal unless the error complained of has
resulted in a miscarriage ofjustice).
33. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8 citing as examples Payne v. Arkansas,
356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced confessions), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(denial of right to counsel), Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1926) (biased judge).
34. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22.
35. Id. at 24.
36. Id. at 21-22 (Court noted that harmless error statutes do not distinguish between
federal constitutional and nonconstitutional errors).
37. Id. at 22.
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that a federal constitutional error can be harmless, but that the prosecution carries the burden of proving "beyond a reasonable doubt that the
3 8s
This
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."
federal constitutional standard remains more stringent than the typical
9
state rule.n
The Chapman decision provides a two-step analysis for dealing with
a constitutionally based error. First, the reviewing court must decide
whether the constitutional error falls within the types of violations subject to harmless error analysis.4 0 Second, assuming the harmless error
beyond a reasonrule is appropriate, the court must consider whether,
41
able doubt, the error had no impact on the verdict.
It is important to recognize that the nonconstitutional harmless error test applies to both evidentiary and "structural errors," but the constitutional harmless error rule applies only to those errors which
implicate the jury's decision. Structural errors are those that cannot be
compared to other evidence presented at trial in order to determine
whether they were harmless. Under the constitutional harmless error
doctrine, structural errors still result in automatic reversal. 42 This distinction reflects the Court's view that a constitutional error implicates
the defendant's right to a fair proceeding more significantly than other
trial errors. 43 The Supreme Court has increasingly utilized the constitutional harmless error doctrine, 4 4 and the Rehnquist Court recently declared that the rule presumptively applies to virtually all types of federal
45
constitutional errors.
38. Id. at 24. There are numerous articles on Chapman v. California,note 3. See, e.g.,
Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal ConstitutionalError- A Process in Need of a Rationale,
125 U. PA. L. REv. 15 (1976) [hereinafter Field]. See also supra note 3.
39. The typical state constitutional rule allowed an appellate court to uphold a conviction if the court could find that, despite the constitutional error, there was "overwhelming
evidence" to support the conviction. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 23. See Pondolfi
supra note 14, at 619.
40. Scoville, supra note 3, at 743.
41. For example, even if the jury heard evidence that was obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure, the appellate court
will affirm the conviction if the evidence did not contribute to the verdict. Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53 (1970). For an explanation of the "affect" test or the "overwhelming evidence" test of Chapman see Field supra note 38; Skoglind supra note 31, at
961.
42. See supra note 33. See also Kotteakos V. United States, 328 U.S. at 764-65.
43. Scoville supra note 3 at 744-45 (1987).
44. Tom Stacey & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless ConstitutionalError, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 79 (1988) [hereinafter Stacey & Dayton] (an examination of the expansion of constitutional harmless error). For discussion of the widespread use of constitutional harmless
error during the Burger Court, see Stephens, The Burger Court: New Dimensions in Criminal
Justice, 60 GEo. L.J. 249 (1971).
45. In Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578-79 (1986), the Court, in holding an erroneous
malice instruction subject to harmless error analysis, explained:
while there are some errors to which Chapman does not apply, they are the exception and not the rule .... [I]f the defendant had counsel and was tried by an
impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other errors that
/
may have occurred are subject to harmless error analysis.
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C. Post-Chapman
Commentators and lower courts have criticized Chapman for providing little guidance and clouding the issue of which constitutional errors
are subject to the harmless error rule, rather then to a rule of automatic
reversal. 4 6 While Chapman failed to enunciate a clear standard to determine which errors fall into the harmless error category, the opinion tenuously established which types of errors would not be subject to the
rule. There are two types of constitutional errors that are not subject to
harmless error analysis. First, there are those errors which are so fundamental to the constitutional right to a fair trial that they mandate automatic reversal. 4 7 Second, there are those errors the effect of which on
the jury is so uncertain that the appellate court is unable to determine
whether the error is harmless. Consequently, the application of the out48
come-determinative test is impossible.
In an attempt to clarify which type of errors would not be subject to
the harmless error analysis, the Court in Chapman cited to three cases:
Payne v. Arkansas, which involved a coerced confession, 4 9 Gideon v. Wainwright, which involved the denial of the right to counsel at trial 50 and
Tumey v. Ohio, a case which concerned a judge with a financial stake in
the outcome. 5 l The denial of the right to counsel and of the right to an
impartial judge can be viewed as rendering "a trial fundamentally unfair. '' 52 In the case of a coerced confession, it was assumed that a reviewing court would not be able to determine with certainty that such an
53
error was nonprejudicial.
Since Chapman, the Court has continually expanded the application
of the harmless error doctrine to a range of constitutional evidentiary
related errors, but it has not offered guidance in determining which errors apply to the rule. 54 Conversely, the Court has found that the harmless error rule applies to the admission of evidence obtained in violation
46. See, e.g., Mause supra note 6 at 527-33; Skoglind supra note 31. Cf. Rose v. Clark,
478 U.S. 570 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Rather than creating a broad, new presumption in favor of harmless error analysis ...Chapman merely rejected the notion that
such analysis was always impermissible and articulated a rigorous standard for determining whether a presumptively prejudicial error could, in fact, be deemed harmless.").
47. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. provides in pertinent part: "[n]o person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law ......
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part: "[n]o state ...shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ...."
48. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 13,
at 1001.
49. 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
50. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
51. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
52. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986).
53. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. at 568 (When a "coerced confession constitutes a part
of the evidence before the jury and a general verdict is returned, no one can say what
credit and weight the jury gave to the confession.").
54. See generally Stacey & Dayton supra note 44, at 712.
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of the Fourth 55 and Sixth Amendments. 56 The right to cross-examine
an adverse witness, 57 violation of the Bruton rule 58 (prohibiting use of a
nontestifying codefendant's confessions), 5 9 the failure to instruct the
jury on the presumption of innocence 60 and the defendant's right to be
present at all stages of the trial6 ' have been translated by the Court as
subject to the harmless error rule. More recently, the erroneous exclusion of defendant's testimony regarding circumstances of his confession,6 2 and a jury instruction containing an erroneous conclusive
63
presumption were found to violate the defendant's right to a fair trial.
On the other hand, the Court has frequently reiterated the Brain 64 decision, which held that the erroneous admission of a coerced confession
automatically mandates reversal of the conviction.6 5 In these cases, the
Court apparently viewed coerced confessions as having such an impact
on the jury as to make it impossible to establish harmlessness. Furthermore, the Court abhors 66 the use of involuntary confessions because it
conflicts with the societal belief that "the police must obey the law while
enforcing the law."' 67 The use of an erroneously admitted confession
55. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (admission into evidence of gun obtained in illegal search and seizure was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt).
56. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing in violation of Sixth Amendment right to counsel was subject to the harmless error
rule); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) (Sixth Amendment right to confrontation by accuser was subject to the harmless error rule).
57. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
58. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
59. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972); see also Brown v. United States, 411 U.S.
223 (1973).
60. Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979).

61. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983).
62. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
63. Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989).
64. In Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the defendant was arrested for
murder committed on the high seas and was brought into the police detective's office
where he was interrogated. He was tricked into an inculpatory statement when the detective told Bram that another sailor said that he saw Brain commit the murder. Brain replied: "[hie could not see me from there." Id. at 562. The detective told Brain if he had
an accomplice, he should say so and not carry the entire blame on "[his] own shoulders."
Id. at 539. Bram then said that Brown was the murderer. Id. The majority, considering
the totality of the circumstances, held that Bram's statements were involuntary. Id. at 56264. The Court quoted a criminal law treatise: "a confession, in order to be admissible,
must be free and voluntary: that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion
of any improper influence." Id. at 542-43 (quoting 3 William 0. Russell, RussEu. ON
CRITMES 478 (6th ed. 1896)).
65. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8; Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368,
376 (1964) (defendant's confession, which occurred while he was under drugs in a hospital
emergency room, violated due process); Hayes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 518 (1963)
(defendant's written confession was obtained by substantial coercion and its admission
constituted reversable error); Lynum v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 537 (1963) (defendant may
have made an involuntary confession when threatened that her financial aid would be discontinued); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (defendant was incompetent at
the time he confessed); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (deceptive techniques
were the cause of a coerced confession); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945)
(overturning conviction due to introduction of a coerced confession at trial).
66. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960).
67. Id.
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has been characterized as an "impermissible doctrine." '68
D. Involuntary Confessions
Supreme Court decisions since Chapman have reaffirmed Payne and
held that the admission of an involuntary confession requires automatic
reversal, 69 even though it relates to an evidentiary question. The Court
declared that even though there may be sufficient evidence apart from
the confession to support the conviction, admission of a coerced confession into evidence contaminates the judgment because it violates due
'7 1
process 70 and provides a "false foundation for any conviction."
72
Payne was reaffirmed
after Chapman, but has also been judicially
undermined. In Milton v. Wainwright,73 the Court applied the harmless
error rule to the admission of a confession obtained in violation of the
defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. A confession obtained
through a violation of the Sixth Amendment may have a similar impact
on a jury's evaluation of the defendant's guilt as a coerced confession, 74
and though it may have a higher likelihood of being false, the Court still
applies the harmless error rule.
The harmless error rule's applicability to the erroneous confession
cases was described as "inherently unreliable" for several reasons. 75
First, due to the broad standards used to determine whether a confession is coerced, 76 many confessions that are borderline involuntary
could be the procedural error needed to reverse the defendant's conviction. In substance, a confession is voluntary if it is the product of "an
essentially free and unconstrained choice" 7 7 by the party making the
statement. The voluntariness of a confession is determined by the totality of all the surrounding circumstances, 78 including the characteristics
of the suspect and the details of the interrogation. 7 9 In theory, it seems
the voluntariness requirement could be stretched to include almost all
68. Lynum v. Illinois, 372 U.S. at 537.
69. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. at 561.
70. Id. at 562. In Payne, the defendant, a "mentally dull" nineteen year old negro was
arrested without warrant, denied his right to a hearing before the magistrate, not advised
to remain silent or on his right to counsel, held incommunicado for three days, denied
food for long periods and told by police chief that thirty people were going to attack him
outside.
71. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. at 568 (quoting Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 191
(1953)).
72. Nincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 401 (1978) (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U.S. at 206) ("the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional
inquisition").
73. 407 U.S. 371 (1972).
74. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 13, at 1005.

75. Id.
76. Lorey J. Ayling, Comment, CorroboratingConfessions: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Legal
Safeguards Against False Confessions, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1121 (proposing that a false confession includes a broad range of self-incriminating behavior).
77. Id. at 1123 n.4 (citing Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)).
78. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
79. Id.
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confessions that are the result of arrest or interrogation."0 In reality,
the doctrine has been used to exclude from evidence two types of confessions: confessions obtained under prolonged and inherently coercive
82
circumstances8 1 and confessions produced by the suspect's weakness.
Second, coerced confession cases can be hypothesized where they
would have no impact on the jury's evaluation of the defendant's culpability. 8 3 Therefore, the justification for exclusion of coerced confessions
from harmless error analysis seems dependent on the fear of police misbehavior,8 4 concern for the "judicial proceedings as a whole" 8 5 and be-

lief in the fundamental principle that our system of criminal justice is
"an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system .... *"86 Finally, the
doctrine's applicability has confused lower courts because of the diverse
and inconsistent application of the rule to certain constitutional errors.8 7 Most lower courts have adhered to the rule of automatic reversal
for coerced confessions, but some have held the erroneous admission of
involuntary confessions to be harmless error. 8 Lower courts have also
80. Ayling, supra note 76, at 1123 nA (citing CHARLES MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, § 147 (3rd ed. 1984)).
81. Ayling, supra note 76, at 1123 n.4 (citing Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143
(1944) (defendant confessed after he was deprived of sleep, food and held incommunicado); Hayes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (confession obtained after defendant
had been held incommunicado for sixteen hours); see also Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.
534 (1961) (police officer threatened to bring in defendant's wife if defendant did not
confess).
82. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (defendant who had a bullet wound confessed in a hospital emergency room); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (defendant
confessed while in great pain and on drugs in the hospital emergency room).
83. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 13, at 1005.
84. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 319 (1959) (defendant finally confessed, after
repeatedly refusing to answer without counsel, when police initiated the help by his friend
to invoke sympathy); see also Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (confessions obtained after brutal beatings).
85. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 50 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
86. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).
87. Although most courts have held that involuntary confessions are subject to an
automatic reversal, other courts have applied the Chapman rule. See Harrison v. Owen, 682
F.2d 138, 140-42 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Murphy, 763 F.2d 202, 208-10 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063 (1986). These cases also applied Milton v. Wainwright,
407 U.S. 371 (1972), a Supreme Court case subsequent to Chapman, in which the defendant contended that one of his four confessions was involuntary. The Court held that any
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury was presented with other
overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. Id. at 372.
88. The federal circuit court cases include: Moore v. Follette, 425 F.2d 925, 928 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 966 (1970) (admission of an improperly obtained confession can be considered harmless); Meade v. Cox, 438 F.2d 323, 325 (4th Cir. 1971) (despite a dispute about the voluntariness of the statement, court found its admission to be
harmless error); Harrison v. Owen, 682 F.2d 138, 142 (7th Cir. 1982) (admission of involuntary confession prompted by police telling the defendant that consideration would be
given to defendant was held to be harmless error); United States v. Carter, 804 F.2d 487,
489-90 (8th Cir. 1986) (police detective misled defendant into thinking he was being questioned for an assault, not a murder, which induced an involuntary confession whose admission into evidence was harmless error).
State court cases include: State v. Castaneda 724 P.2d 1, 6 (1986) (admission of defendant's statement concerning the location of the victim's body induced by police deceit,
if coerced was harmless error); People v. Gibson, 440 N.E.2d 339, 343-44 (1982) (improper admission of defendant's incriminating statements to his prison mate, a government informant, were, in light of other testimony, harmless error); People v. Ferkins, 497
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applied the harmless error doctrine to a defendant's statements ob89
tained in violation of Miranda.
After expanding the categories of errors subject to harmless error
analysis, the Supreme Court finally clarified the fate of the admission of
an involuntary confession. Coerced confessions have been excluded for
ninety years from scrutiny under the harmless error rule, but lower
court confusion and Rehnquist's perseverance 90 prompted the Supreme
Court to take a closer look at this issue. Conflicting opinions among
state and federal courts over whether coerced confessions should be
subject to harmless error analysis gave rise to the Supreme Court'9 grant
of certiorari in the instant case, Arizona v. Fulminante.9 1
III.
A.

ARIZONA V. FULMINANTE

Facts

On September 14, 1982, Oreste C. Fulminante telephoned the police to report his 11-year-old stepdaughter, Jeneane Hunt, missing.
Jeneane's body was discovered in the desert two days later. She had
been shot in the head at close range with a large-caliber weapon and had
a ligature tied around her neck that could have been used to choke
her. 9 2 Due to inconsistencies in Fulminante's statements to the police
concerning his stepdaughter's disappearance, Fulminante became a suspect injeneane's murder.9 3 Since no charges were filed, Fulminante left
Arizona. Later, Fulminante was convicted of an unrelated federal crime
and imprisoned in a federal correctional facility in New York. While he
was imprisoned, Fulminante cultivated a friendship with Anthony
Sarivola ("Sarivola"), a former member of an organized crime family,
who was serving a 60-day sentence for extortion. Sarivola, an informant
for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was masquerading as a member
of an organized crime family. 9 4 After hearing that Fulminante was suspected of murdering a child in Arizona, Sarivola discussed the rumor
with Fulminante. Fulminante initially denied any connection to the murN.Y.S.2d 159, 161-62 (1986) (error in the admission of involuntary statements was harmless due to the cumulative impact of the statements).
89. The Miranda protections govern custodial interrogations, Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). See Amicus Curiae United States Brief for Petitioner at 26, Arizona v.
Fulminante, 111 U.S. 1246 (1991) (No. 89-839); see generally Stacey & Dayton supra note
44.
90. When Rehnquist served as a law clerk forJustice RobertJackson in 1952, Rehnquist wrote a memorandum concerning a coerced confession case, Stein v. New York, 346
U.S. 156 (1953). He argued against the dominant view (that convictions which may be
based on coerced confessions cannot be sustained on appeal) alleging that "[t]he ivory
towers ofjurisprudence... [have] weakened local law enforcement .... Let's hope it has
come to an end." Jackson did not succumb to Rehnquist's argument, but Jackson did
uphold the convictions on different grounds. Tony Mauro, How Television Captured the
Court, Legal Times, April 8, 1991, at 6-7 (quoting Rehnquist's memorandum to RobertJackson in Jackson's papers at the Library of Congress).
91. Arizona v. Fulminante, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
92. Arizona v. Fulminante, Ill S. Ct. 1246, 1250 (1991).
93. Id.
94. Id.
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der. Sarivola told his FBI contact, Agent Ticano, about the rumor, and
Ticano asked Sarivola to try to discern more about it. 9 5 Sarivola then
spoke with Fulminante again, who was "starting to get some rough treatment from the guys" '9 6 because of the rumor. Sarivola promised Fulminante protection from the other inmates, "but told him, 'You have to tell
me about it,' you know. I mean, in other words, 'For me give you any
help.' -97 At that time Fulminante then admitted to Sarivola he had sexually assaulted and choked Jeneane, forced her to beg for her life, and
then killed her. 98 Sarivola was released from prison in November of
1983 and Fulminante was discharged six months later.99 After Fulminante's release, Sarivola and his fiancee, Donna, met Fulminante at a bus
terminal. Fulminante told Donna he could not return to Arizona because he had killed a little girl there. Fulminante then admitted to
Donna he had sexually assaulted and choked Jeneane, and then forced
her to beg for her life. 100
Before and during trial, Fulminante made motions to suppress his
confessions, claiming they were involuntary. The trial court denied the
motion and both confessions were admitted at trial. The jury found
Fulminante guilty and sentenced him to death. 10 1
Fulminante appealed, claiming the admission of his two confessions
violated his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.10 2 The Arizona Supreme
Court initially determined that Fulminante's confession to Sarivola was
coerced, but that its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
because of the overwhelming evidence against Fulminante. 10 3 Fulminante's second confession to Donna was not "fruit of a poisonous
tree," ' 0 4 which the court ruled admissible. Fulminante moved for a motion of reconsideration, which the court granted.
In its supplemental opinion, the majority held, over one dissent,
that precedent precluded application of the harmless error doctrine to
the erroneous admission of a coerced confession.' 0 5 The court held
that "until and unless the Supreme Court changes the law, we must order [the] defendant retried without the use of the coerced
95. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 5, Arizona v. Fulminante, II1 S. Ct. 1246 (No.
89-839).
96. 111 S. Ct. at 1250 (quoting Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 83, Arizona v.
Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (No. 89-839)).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 6, Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (No.
89-839).
101. 111 S. Ct. at 1250-51.
102. State v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602, 608 (Ariz. 1988).
103. Id. at 610-11.
104. The court held that Fulminante's second confession was not tainted by the first
confession to Sarivola based on the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine as espoused in
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). This portion of the Arizona Supreme
Court's holding was not challenged by the Supreme Court. 111 S. Ct. at 1251 n.l.
105. 778 P.2d at 627.
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6

Supreme Court Decision
1. Majority Opinions

In a fragmented majority opinion written in part by Justice White
and in part by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that
Fulminante's confession to Anthony Sarivola was coerced, 10 7 that the
harmless error rule applied to the erroneous admission of a coerced
confession, 10 8 but that the admission of Fulminante's confession was
not harmless. 10 9
The first issue the Court addressed was whether the Arizona
Supreme Court erred in holding Fulminante's confession involuntary. 110 In determining the question of the voluntariness, the Court,
speaking through Justice White, made an independent determination"'
by applying the totality of the surrounding circumstances test.1 12 The
White majority held that there was a credible threat of violence unless
Fulminante confessed, and a credible threat suffices for a finding of a
coerced confession. The Court affirmed the Arizona Supreme Court's
supplemental finding that the confession was involuntary. Four Justices
joined Chief Justice Rehnquist in dissenting on this issue.
The next issue the Court addressed was whether the admission of a
coerced confession at trial is subject to harmless error analysis. 1 3 This
portion of the majority opinion, written by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, explained that the "common thread" connecting errors subject to harmless error analysis was that they all involved a "trial error."'1 14 This type
of error, which occurs during the presentation of the case to the jury,
may be assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to
determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.1 5 Rehnquist distinguished trial errors from "structural defects"
in the trial mechanism, the latter not subject to harmless error
analysis. 16

The Rehnquist majority concluded that the erroneous admission of
an involuntary confession is a trial error, similar in kind and degree to
other types of erroneously admitted evidence. 1 7 Thus, a coerced confession can be considered harmless error when there is enough addi106. Id.
107. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1252 (1991) (White, J.).
108. Id. at 1266 (Rehnquist, J.).
109. Id. at 1258 (White, J.).
110. Id. at 1251.
111. Id. at 1252. See also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985); Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978); Hayes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963); Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 228-29 (1940).
112. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1251.
113. Id. at 1263-66.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1264.
116. Id. at 1264-65. See also infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
117. 111 S. Ct. at 1265.
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tional evidence to justify a guilty verdict. 11 8 The majority imposed a
stringent standard for an appellate court to determine whether an error
was harmless: the error must be harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.1 19 Justice White, joined by four other justices, dissented on this
issue.
The final issue the Court addressed was whether the State had met
its burden of demonstrating that the admission of the confession to
Sarivola did not contribute to Fulminante's conviction. 12 0 The majority
on this third issue, again written byJustice White, explained that confessions profoundly impact the jury12 1 and provided three reasons why this
error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. First, White ex12 2
plained both confessions were required for a successful prosecution.
Second, the jury's assessment of the second confession, to Donna, could
12 3
have been dependent on the first involuntary confession to Sarivola.
Finally, the admission of the first confession led to the admission of
124
other evidence prejudicial to Fulminante.
2.

Concurring Opinion

Justice Kennedy, accepting the majority's finding that the confession was coerced, wrote a separate concurrence "[in the interests of
providing a clear mandate to the Arizona Supreme Court."' 125 He
agreed that the admission of involuntary confessions should be subject
to harmless error analysis, but emphasized that a court must appreciate
' 12 6
the "indelible impact a full confession may have on the trier offact."
3.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice White strongly dissented on the second issue concerning the
application of the harmless error rule to coerced confessions. Justice
White, actually reading a bitter dissent from the bench, 127 accused the
majority of abandoning "one of the fundamental tenets of our criminal
justice system"' 128 by not automatically reversing a conviction once an
involuntary confession is admitted. He explained that the severity of a
coerced confession required that improper admission of such evidence
should never be subject to harmless error. Justice White cited numerous authorities accusing the majority of overturning a "vast body of precedent." 1 2 9 Moreover, White called the majority's distinction between
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
Timas,
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1257.

Id.
Id. at 1258.
Id. at 1258-59.
Id. at 1259-60.
Id. at 1267.
Id. at 1266.
See David G. Savage, High Court Allows Forced Confessions in Criminal Trials, L.A.
Mar. 27, 1991, at Al.
Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1254.
Id.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
trial error and
"meaningless." 1 3 0

structural

defects

in

the

trial

[Vol. 69:1
mechanism

Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented from the majority's first finding
that the confession was coerced. He agreed with the trial court's finding
that there was no evidence to indicate Fulminante confessed because of
fear.' 3 ' Justice Rehnquist also dissented from the majority's final conclusion that the error was not harmless. He adhered to the Arizona
Supreme Court's initial finding that, in light of the other overwhelming
evidence against the respondent, the error was harmless beyond a rea132
sonable doubt.
IV.

ANALYSIS

The result in Fulminante is an expansion of an already widening use
of the constitutional harmless error doctrine, which strikes a balance between the defendant's interest in a fair trial and society's interest injudicial precision and economy. 13 3 The Supreme Court has increasingly
extended the application of the constitutional harmless error rule since
its inception in 1967.134 There is no clear basis for the outrages against
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion. Critics claim the Court has
abandoned the constitutional requirement of due process, 13 5 however,
the premise of these criticisms is distorted. The holding is a step towards preventing defendants from escaping conviction because of harmless constitutional errors. In this way, the decision balances society's
interest in convicting the guilty and an innocent person's interest in
avoiding an unjust conviction.
The key distinction between the majority and the dissent is the difference in their interpretations of Chapman. Chapman is the foundation
upon which all law concerning the harmless error doctrine is built.
White, in his dissent, used Chapman's citation to Payne in a footnote as an
example of the blanket exclusion of coerced confessions from harmless
error analysis. Yet, the majority held that it is not clear that Payne stood
for such a premise.' 3 6 The majority explained not all constitutional trial
errors trigger automatic reversal 13 7 and Chapman, in dictum, merely
made a historical reference to Payne in a footnote.' 3 8 Payne did not reject applying the harmless error analysis to coerced confessions, but re130. Id.
131. Id. at 1262.
132. Id. at 1266.
133. See generally Stacey & Dayton supra note 44 (an examination of the expansion of the
constitutional harmless error doctrine).
134. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See authorities cited supra note 5.
135. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1253 (WhiteJ., dissenting); see also Martin
Tolchin, Defense Lawyers Assail Court Ruling on Coerced Confessions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1991,
at B10; Paul D. Kamenar, Restore Balance of Society's Rights, USA TODAY, April 2, 1991, at
Al2.
136. 111 S. Ct. at 1264.
137. Id. (citing Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963)).
138. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602, 627 (Ariz. 1989) (Cameron, J.,
dissenting).
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jected a different, more lenient rule than the harmless error doctrine.13 9
Justice White's dissent discredits the Rehnquist majority's analogy
between trial errors and structural defects in the trial mechanism. By
claiming the majority makes a "meaningless dichotomy,"' 140 the dissent
overlooks the rationale. The majority cited a string of cases 14 1 that apply the harmless error rule to constitutional errors. Upon a thorough
examination of all the cases, the majority concluded that each case may
be assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The "common thread" in these cases is that they each involved a "trial
error."1 4 2 This is distinct from a "structural defect." 1 43 A "trial error's" impact on the jury may be compared to and weighed against the
other evidence presented at trial in order to determine whether it is
harmless. On the other hand, a "structural defect" is an error in the
engineering of the trial that cannot be cured by other evidence. While
1 44
and an impartial judge 14 5
the total deprivation of the right to counsel
are structural defects in the trial mechanism and oppose analysis by the
harmless error rule, the admission of an involuntary confession is not of
the same caliber since the weight given it by the jury can be compared to
other evidence admitted to determine its relative impact on the jury's

verdict. 146
Justice White's dissent neglects changes in the law that could allow
the harmless error doctrine to apply to coerced confessions.' 4 7 Some
scholars have argued that the historic rationales for excluding coerced
confessions from harmless error analysis no longer exist due to the re148
cent widespread use of the constitutional harmless error doctrine.
The dissent makes a blanket assumption that any type of coerced confession is per se harmful and therefore reversible.' 4 9 The cases the dissent
cites include only three that held the admission of a coerced confession
139. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1264.
140. 111 S. Ct. at 1254 (White, J., dissenting).
141. Harmless error rules have been applied to a breadth of errors in state and federal
proceedings. See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct 1441 (1990) (unconstitutionally
broad sentencing jury instructions); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989) (erroneous
conclusive presumption in jury instruction); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988)
(admission of evidence in violation of the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause); Pope v.
Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501-504 (1987) (jury instruction, which misstated an element of the
offense); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) (erroneous rebuttal presumption injury instruction); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983) (defendant's right to be present at trial);
United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (improper comment on defendant's silence
at trial).
142. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1265.
143. Id.
144. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
145. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
146. Id.
147. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602, 627 (Ariz. 1989) (Cameron, J., dissenting) (suggesting the changes in the law now make it possible for the harmless error doctrine to apply to coerced but reliable confessions); see also James D. Cameron & Jones
Osborne, When Harmless ErrorIsn't Harmless, 1971 LAw & Soc. ORD. 24, 29-30 (1971).
148. Stacey & Dayton supra note 44 at 712 and accompanying text.
149. Id.
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could not be considered harmless error.1 50 In all three cases, the confessions were obtained under extreme coercive pressure, where the defendant was weakened and put through an intensive interrogation
process by public authorities. 15 1 However, the facts of the confession
should not be conclusive since the rationale is based on the amount of
other evidence presented at trial.
The harmless error doctrine has been applied to a growing number
of evidentiary errors. 15 2 In Milton v. Wainwright,153 the Court applied
the harmless error rule to a confession by the defendant to a police officer posing as a fellow inmate in the same cell as the defendant. The
defendant had also made three other full confessions. The Court reasoned that in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's
guilt, assuming that the challenged testimony was improperly admitted,
it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.154 In Delaware v. Van Arsdall,155 the Court held that the denial of the defendant's opportunity to
impeach a witness for bias was subject to harmless error analysis.
Justice White's dissent makes a strong point concerning the impact
of involuntary confessions. The majority acknowledged the damaging
impact of a coerced confession on the defendant and enunciated a stringent standard to determine the contribution of the confession to the
conviction. 15 6 The burden is on the prosecutor to prove that the admission of the confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' 57 The
Fulminante decision demonstrates the difficulty in proving the harmlessness of a coerced confession. This is due to the majority's rejection of
the state's harmless error argument, despite Fulminante's second incriminating confession.
The dissent justifies precluding coerced confessions from harmless
error analysis in light of brutal methods used to extract confessions.
These tactics did not exist in Fulminante. Assuming there had been abusive tactics by the interrogators, the due process clause does not serve as
an instrument to reform the behavior of state officials. 158 Nor does the
Fulminante decision promote such official misbehavior; rather, the rule
incorporating the deterrent policy as the constitutional ban on involun150. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964);
Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
151. In Payne, a "mentally dull" young defendant went through a brutal police interrogation process. See supra note 70. In Jackson, the defendant, who was shot twice, made
incriminating statements to a police officer while the defendant was in the emergency
room and drugged on demerol, an analgesic sedative. Jackson, 378 U.S. at 368. In Mincey,
the defendant was in unbearable pain and almost comatose, when he made an incriminating statement after an interrogation. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 385.
152. See Stacey & Dayton supra note 44.

153. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972).
154. Id. at 372.

155. Delaware v. Van ArsdaIl, 475 U.S. 673 (1986). Violations of defendant's right to
prohibit the use ofa nontestifying codefendant's confession at trial as protected by Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), are also subject to harmless error analysis.
156. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1266.
157. Id.
158. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 438 (1945) (Stone, CJ., dissenting).
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tary confessions is left in force by the decision. Involuntary confessions
will continue to be subject to the voluntariness doctrine in order to determine their admissibility.159 The opinion will not be a catalyst for cor160
rupt police interrogation.
The dissent underrates Fulminante's criminal justice policy. The
overriding purpose of a criminal trial is to determine the defendant's
guilt or innocence.' 6 1 The harmless error doctrine is not a shield to
protect the defendant from a fair prosecution. 16 2 This is why the
Supreme Court in Chapman held that a constitutional error does not automatically trigger reversal.' 63 This harmless error test covers a
breadth of errors, and the majority in Fulminante saw no reason to preclude its extension to coerced confessions. 16 4 In criminal procedure,
the problem has been described as one of balancing conflicting interests
and of securing as many interests as possible.' 65 By attempting to promote this goal, the Court has stressed that the defendant is entitled to a
"fair trial, not a perfect one."' 66 The harmless error doctrine recognizes that the underlying purpose of criminal justice is to concentrate on
the equity of the trial rather than on a practically inevitable trial error in
16 7
order to promote public respect for the criminal system.
In the future, it seems there will be fewer trial errors that the defendant may use to escape a conviction because of the growing use of
the harmless error doctrine. 16 8 The distinguishing feature between errors subject to the harmless error analysis and those that are excluded
will be whether the court finds an error to be a trial error occurring
during the course of the proceeding, or a structural defect in the trial
mechanism. To determine which category the error falls into, reviewing
courts will examine whether the error is such that its contribution to the
conviction can be qualitatively assessed in light of other admitted evidence in order to determine whether the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, or whether the error is a fault in the engineering of
the trial whose impact upon the jury cannot be evaluated. When a court
159. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
160. Bruce Fein, Crying Wolf on Coerced-Confession Cases, N.J. LAwJ., April 18, 1991, at 18
(Commentary).
161. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975).
162. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 94 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); cf. United
States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (it is the reviewing court's duty to ignore harmless
errors).
163. Chapman y.California, 386 U.S. at 22-23. See also Pendolti supra note 14, at 61819.
164. Arizona v. Fulminate, 111 S. Ct. at 1264.
165. Roscoe Pound, The Future of 1heCriminal Law, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11 (1921)
provides:
(Tihe social interest in the general security and the social interest in the individual life continually come into conflict and in criminal law, as everywhere else in
law, the problem is one of... balancing conflicting interests and of securing as
many as may be and as completely as may be with the least sacrifice ....
166. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968); United States v. Hastings, 461
U.S. 499, 508-09 (1983).
167. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); see TRAYNOR, supra note 14, at 50.
168. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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finds a trial defect, as it did in Fulminante, the error will be subject to
harmless error analysis.
V.

CONCLUSION

Whether the Court faithfully adheres to this distinction between
trial errors and structural defects is unpredictable. Will the Court preserve the categories it has created and continually conclude that no errors will be found to be harmless unless they are cured by other
evidence? Will lack of adequate counsel remain an error in the trial
engineering or will the Court maintain the category by changing the law
and creating more stringent rules for competent counsel? A consistent
application of the doctrine will depend on the Court's adherence to the
standard Rehnquist pronounced in this opinion.
Wherever one falls on the ideological spectrum, the application of
the harmless error rule to coerced confessions is no threat to civil liberties since the constitutional ban on coerced confessions is sustained.
The Supreme Court has stated it is not willing to "discredit constitutional doctrines for the protection of the innocent by making them mere
technical loopholes for the escape of the guilty." 1 69 A strong impetus
behind the harmless error doctrine is a balancing of the defendant's interest in a fair trial against the societal interest in judicial economy and
precision.' 70 The expanding use of the harmless error doctrine will
help to promote this goal and enhance judicial precision.
Fulminante has not dislodged a defendant's right to due process.
While the enmity surrounding the opinion may cause critics to refuse to
acknowledge that Fulminantehas a relatively minor effect on criminal justice, 17 1 it remains to be seen how steadfastly the Court will adhere to
their conviction.
Karina Pergament

169. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 196-97 (1953), overruled by Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368, 398 (1964).
170. See United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983) (A balance needs to be
struck "between the prosecutor on the one hand, and the interest in the prompt administration ofjustice and the interests of the victims on the other.").
171. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1991, at B10 (Late Edition).

